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“Ah,	  happiness	  courts	  the	  light	  so	  we	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  the	  world	  is	  gay.	  But	  misery	  hides	  aloof	  so	  we	  deem	  
that	  misery	  there	  is	  none.”	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 I began research for this dissertation while working as an investigator at the Public Defender 
Service for the District of Columbia (PDS). PDS is a government office that provides free legal 
representation in criminal law cases for indigent residents of DC who are charged with a crime. My job 
entailed meeting clients in the jail almost every day. Visitors to the DC Jail come to a room where they 
can speak with inmates through a plate glass wall, telephone receivers connecting the visitor side with 
the inmate side. It is a scene that Americans mostly know through movies, and I was shocked when I 
first saw the room of black women speaking across the glass to the black men in orange jump suits on 
the other side. It was my first confrontation with the vast racial injustices of the American criminal 
justice system. Since I visited the jail on legal business, I was abl  to sit alone in a small room with the 
client.  
 It was in one of these small rooms, with a square table separating us, that I met a nice client 
who was my age, and who was in prison for violating parole. He was working for a tow truck company, 
and in the course of following company policy, was pulled over and arrested in suspicion of stealing 
the car that he was towing. He was in the company’s truck, had company paperwork. Because of the 
arrest he was revoked, meaning brought back to jail on a parole violation. He was never formally 
charged in court with stealing the car (the case was dropped immediately), and we at PDS thought that 
he would be freed from jail immediately. His boss at the company explained the situation to the parole 
officer, and told of how good of an employee he was. The parole officer, who could have released him 
from prison, decided instead to schedule a formal parole hearing three months hence, and also made 
our client stay in prison until the time of the hearing. The hearing was delayed twice, and our client 
ended spending over five months in the DC Jail, which, like many jails, is a cramped, dirty, dangerous 











inflict on its citizens in the name of criminal law.  
 As a contrast to my experience in DC, I also met a group of prisoners in Worcester Prison, 
about an hour away from Cape Town, South Africa, who are an inspiration. In response to the drugs 
and gangs that rule the South African prisons, they formed their own rehabilitation group, and named it 
the Group of Hope. They spend most waking hours making beads out of rolled paper to make into 
jewelry. Through a network of outside support, they sell the jewelry, and pay for clothes and birthday 
parties for orphans in the city of Worcester. Meeting these prisoners, I saw a different kind of 
expression on their faces: ones of warmth, curiosity and vitality. DC inmates are usually either angry or 
jaded, and if I were in the DC jail I would be one of the angry ones. The 16 Group of Hope members 
take their rehabilitation extremely seriously, and as a result, the prison staff has responded in kind. The 
staff has allowed the Group to give AIDS prevention conferences to the other inmates, grow vegetable 
gardens, and extraordinarily, let the orphans into the prison once a month so the Group members can 
give them small presents and play games with them. I attended one celebration in the prison courtyard 
in which the Group members had even rented a blow-up jumping castle. 
 When I read criminal justice theory, it is against the backdrop of these two lopsided 
experiences: the dehumanizing DC Jail, and the prisoners in Worcester making the most of their time. 
Criminal justice is an endlessly pockmarked and variable landscape, offering stories of outrage and 
despair, hope and redemption, sinister characters and normal men coping with prison hours that pass 
with the speed of syrup. Everyone has a theory of punishment, built over years by the accumulated 
details of stories that speak to what they believe. Each day yields a new crop of anecdotal evidence 
from news reports and popular media. Theorists aim to provide the tools to cut clear lines through the 
jumbled geometry of popular discourse. And drained of the headline-catching stories, theory makes for 
dryer reading, and this dissertation is no exception. Does theory make up in progress and consensus-
building what it loses in vividness? I’m afraid that the tradeoff is not proportional. But it is with the 











to the debate.     
 Below I will argue that a state should minimize legal punishment1 and rely as much as possible 
on alternatives. In order to know to what extent we may minimize punishment and use alternatives, we 
need a clear idea of what those alternatives are, and when we can justifiably use them. The purpose of 
this dissertation is to analyze the morality of putative alternatives to punishment. I will explore what 
makes them non-punitive, define them, and analyze whether they can be justified.  
 The structure of the dissertation is as follows. The first chapter investigates the concept of 
punishment. I will defend a definition of punishment: authorized, retributive, intended harm. Then I 
will proceed to explain the need to justify punishment, and give an overview of how it is at least 
plausible to believe that no justification has yet succeeded. I will end the chapter with a brief discussion 
of the requirements of a criminal justice system. The second chapter is about money. I will scrutinize 
whether the theory of ‘pure restitution’ may completely replace punishment. I will argue that it cannot, 
and furthermore I will caution against the widespread use of mandatory monetary restitution. I will also 
provide a positive argument for the state’s duty to provide compensation to victims of violent crime. 
The third chapter brings in the true heavyweights for non-punitive interventions: offender rehabilitation 
and offender incapacitation. After defining them, explaining why they are non-punitive, and defending 
justifications for them, I will conclude that they provide the most substantive opportunities for the state 
to shift its criminal justice burdens away from punishment. In the fourth chapter I will explore rituals: 
restorative justice conferences, trial and therapeutic jurisprudence, reentry ceremonies and apologies. 
My argument for a minimally punitive regime will come together in the last chapter. In doing so I will 
explain why a state must rely on punishment to a small but crucial extent, and that punishment can be 
minimized drastically in comparison to today’s practices. I will also address concerns regarding 
security and deterrence. 
                                                















1.1	  Defining	  Punishment	  
 
 Since the 1950s scholars have defined legal punishment as intentional hard treatment 
administered by a legal authority and inflicted on a person for breaking a law. This is my reformulation 
of the definition that is regarded as canonical and known as the Flew-Benn-Hart definition. According 
to this 'standard' definition, the five conditions that an act must meet in order to be considered an act of 
punishment are: “(i) It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered unpleasant. (ii) It 
must be for an offence against legal rules. (iii) It must be of an actual or supposed offender for his 
offence. (iv) It must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the offender (v) It must 
be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offence is 
committed.”3 
 A definition of punishment should remain neutral regarding the debate of whether punishment 
is justified. The Flew-Benn-Hart definition has been widely accepted and uncontroversial in this 
regard. An example of violating the neutrality requirement would be supplementing the Flew-Benn-
Hart definition with terms that serve to justify punishment without further argument. A brazen example 
of this would be using the term 'deserved' within the definition, as in 'punishment is harsh treatment 
inflicted on an offender who deserved it by breaking the law.'   
  A definition of punishment should be sufficiently narrow to only delineate cases of punishment, 
but wide enough to capture all cases of punishment. While the Flew-Benn-Hart definition is useful as a 
historical standard, I think that a more precise and accurate one can be offered. Boonin defines 
                                                
3 Hart, 1959-60, at 4. Michael Davis' useful discussion of this definition, 2008, at 75-76.  Wood, 2010, is another example 











punishment as “authorized reprobative retributive intentional harm.”4  The definition I will be 
defending is a slightly amended version of Boonin's: punishment is authorized retributive intended 
harm. Granted, the difference between the Flew-Benn-Hart and Boonin definitions is minor, and the 
difference between Boonin’s and mine is also small, but these differences matter most when talking 
about borderline cases, which is a primary task of this dissertation. One of Boonin's harshest5 critics, 
Leo Zaibert, writes that the only differences between the Flew-Benn-Hart definition and Boonin's  are 
that, “[f]irst, Boonin’s definition incorporates an element of official disapprobation more conspicuously 
than the Flew-Benn-Hart definition. Second, Boonin avoids talking about punishment as ‘'pain,' 
'mischief,' and similar terms; instead, he talks about punishment as 'harm.'”6 Zaibert is right to point 
this out, but he misses another difference: Boonin also is much more precise and bold in describing 
what intentional harm means. In the classic definition, while Hart specifies that punishment is 
intentional, it is unclear what exactly that means. The amendment I make to Boonin's definition is to 
remove the reprobative requirement, to change a slight aspect of the retributive requirement, and to 
further specify what is meant by the intention requirement.  I include the table below as a reference for 
the following sections in which I explain the constitutive parts of Boonin's definition and defend my 
amended version of it against objections. 
 Flew-Benn-Hart Boonin Amended Boonin 
Authorized Yes Yes Yes 
Retributive Yes, Unspecified Strong Reading Weak Reading 
Reprobative No  Yes No  
Intention Yes, Unspecified 'Intentional'  'Intended'  
Harm Yes Yes Yes 
 
 I will spend much more time discussing the intention requirement than the others, and for this 
reason I will save it for last. I focus on the intention requirement of punishment because it is the most 
                                                
4 Boonin, 2008: 1.1. 
5 Zaibert is harsh, but also  unfair. In his review he  mischaracterizes some of Boonin's arguments. 











important one for me to defend. Unlike the other requirements, I rely on it to frame what counts as 
alternatives to punishment. Boonin places similar weight on this requirement. However, he does not 
adequately defend his position against objections that argue the intention requirement artificially 
narrows the scope of punishment, so I will be defending it further.  
 
1.1.1	  The	  Harm	  Requirement	  
 By including harm as a part of his definition, Boonin means that “acts of punishment all, in 
some way, make the person who is punished worse off than she would otherwise be.”7 Some writers 
have argued against including harm as a necessary feature of punishment because the harm could 
become ultimately beneficial; an example is an offender who turns his8 life around because of his time 
in prison. Definitionally denying that punishment could be ultimately good for the offender would 
violate the neutrality requirement because it would rule out the possibility that punishment could be 
justified by ultimately benefitting the offender. Boonin argues that this objection fails because 
including harm in the definition refers only to the immediate action of punishing but remains “neutral 
on the further question of whether or not being subject to such a harm might produce beneficial 
consequences in the future, including beneficial consequences that are great enough to outweigh (and 
perhaps even to justify) the immediate harmful ones.”9  
 
1.1.2	  The	  Retributive	  Requirement	  
 Retribution, in the context of legal punishment, is reprisal for breaking the law, and thus the 
retributive requirement of punishment holds that for an act to be punitive, it must be inflicted on an 
offender in response to his particular offense. I defend a slightly amended explanation of this 
                                                
7 Id. at 7. 
8 Because the majority of offenders and crime victims are male I will use this pronoun throughout the paper. 
9 Boonin, 2008: 7. He goes on to argue against other objections to including harm as part of the definition, including 












requirement than the one Boonin defends. Here is how Boonin explains this requirement: “to be a legal 
punishment, an act must involve intentionally harming someone because he previously did a legally 
prohibited act, which means that he is responsible for having done the act and that he had no valid legal 
excuse for doing so.”10 While at first this may seem unassailably straightforward, note that under this 
definition only offenders who are in fact guilty can be punished. One objection argues that innocent 
people can be punished too. If, this objection goes, an innocent person is mistakenly convicted of a 
heinous crime and he is sentenced to death, then surely the state's act of killing him is an act of 
punishment. This scenario actually occurred when Texas executed Cameron Todd Willingham in 2004 
for the death of his children by fire in 1991. Arson forensic investigation technique had advanced so 
much by the time of his execution that scientists reviewing the evidence concluded with near certainty 
that Willingham was innocent.11 I agree with this objection, and my amended version of the retributive 
requirement holds that in order for an act to be punitive it must involve the state intending to harm 
someone because the state has sufficient reason to believe that he committed a legal offense.  
 Boonin uses analogies with repayment and reward to argue that an innocent person cannot 
technically be punished. The concepts of repayment and reward are predicated on certain conditions. 
Inherent in the concept of repayment is prior payment and debt. If you are not owed money, then you 
cannot be repaid; and likewise if you are not guilty you cannot be punished. Or consider rewards.  If 
you could somehow buy an honorary Nobel Prize by donating money to the foundation, then we would 
not say that you 'won' a Nobel Prize. The normal conditions of winning which are, inter alia, rising to 
the top of your field on your own merit, contributing original groundbreaking progress, and being 
chosen by careful deliberation regarding the merits of your work, have not been filled. You have not 
technically been rewarded the Nobel, rather it has been granted to you based on special conditions that 
                                                
10 Id. at 17. 
11 Grann, 2009. See also Santos, 2013, for a related story in which Arizona deemed a man innocent and released him after 











differ from the normal conditions required to win a Nobel.14 Likewise, an innocent person cannot be 
punished, because the concept of being punished is predicated on the condition of actually being guilty 
of the offense.  
 However, there is one major flaw with this argument: the concepts of repayment, reward and 
punishment are not predicated on the actual state of affairs that lead to a particular repayment, reward 
or punitive act, but rather on the state of affairs the relevant party believes to be true, to the best of its 
knowledge. To continue the Nobel analogy, consider the case of a scientist who rises to the top of his 
field, contributes groundbreaking progress, and is chosen by the Nobel committee to receive a prize, 
but unbeknownst to the committee and the rest of the scientific community the scientist has been 
cheating by plagiarizing and using the work of others without attribution. Under Boonin's strict 
conception, he has not be rewarded because he has not deserved the prize based on his own merit, i.e. 
he has not met the specific conditions required to qualify as a recipient of the reward. But this is not 
how the concept of reward works in practice. The relevant party deciding the merit of the recipient 
gives the reward, and even if their decision was based on information that turns out to be false, that 
does not change the fact that they did reward the recipient.  
 Consider a case of a counterfeiter lending someone money. The recipient spends the counterfeit 
money and later dutifully pays money back to the lender, but he does not realize that the original 
money was counterfeit. In this case, the recipient is a relevant person to be deciding whether he repaid 
the counterfeiter. If he told his friend that he repaid the money, it would be strange if we deemed that 
he was not properly using the concept of repayment. Rather, the state of affairs gave the recipient 
sufficient reason to believe that he did in fact repay the money, and so we should agree that he was 
properly using the concept of repayment. If at a later time the recipient learns of the counterfeit, then he 
might think that he was swindled into unfairly repaying. But this does not change the original condition 
of repayment in which the relevant party assessed that a repayment was made.  
                                                











 Consider punishment: there are many cases in which we will never know the truth about the 
crime. The state does its very best to find out the truth, but it cannot be assured of absolute certainty. 
When Texas convicted Willingham, it had used the best means available of ascertaining the truth. After 
forensic technology advanced over the proceeding decade, those means were found to be faulty, and we 
now know with relative certainty that Willingham was innocent. He was punished, but we have the rare 
ability to look back and assess that the punishment was unfair. In most cases when the state punishes an 
innocent person, neither the state nor the public will ever know about the offender's innocence, and we 
still refer to these cases as punishment. The concept of punishment squares best with our intuitions 
when we use it from the point of view of the relative party assessing guilt. The relevant party is the 
state, and when it determines that an offender is guilty and inflicts harm to him for the offense, we say 
that he is punished without any reference to the certainty of some external 'Truth.' 
 One might object and insist that repayment requires actual debt, reward requires actual 
deservingness, and punishment requires actual guilt. I have discussed these three concepts because they 
are the ones that Boonin uses in his illustration, but there are many similar concepts that rely on certain 
preconditions. However there is a range of these concepts, spanning those whose preconditions are 
usually self-evident, to those whose preconditions are less certain and thus determined by a relevant 
party to the best of its ability. I argue that legal punishment is in the latter category. In the former, there 
are easy cases such as: if I recover from an injury, I must have been injured, or if I reacquaint myself 
with a person, I must first have been acquainted. In these such cases there is usually no reason to doubt 
the original condition, e.g. of injury or acquaintance, and we might simply call a person who claims to 
be reacquainting with someone they have never met a liar who is misusing the concept of re-
acquaintance. However, even in these cases, there may be situations that would make us question 
whether the original state of affairs need actually be true in order to merit the use of the concepts of 
recovery and re-acquaintance. For instance if a hypochondriac takes a day to recover from an illness he 











acquaintances of the person he is impersonating. The uncertainty of preconditions intensifies as we 
move to concepts such as punishment. The very reason that there is a committee to determine the Nobel 
prize, or a trial to determine guilt, is because conditions of deservingness and guilt are difficult to 
ascertain. There is less certainty, and we therefore use these concepts based on the eye of the relevant 
deciding party. For these reasons I conclude that the term 'retributive' should be defined in terms of a 
state's knowledge, so that a state's actions against an offender are retributive if it has sufficient reason 
to believe that the offender is guilty.  
 Finally, one might claim that the term 'sufficient' is too ambiguous, and claim that it is better to 
rely on the actual state of affairs to define the concept of punishment. However, I see no problem with 
leaving the degree of certainty to be decided by the relevant party. In the U.S., guilt is often determined 
by jury trials, in which twelve citizens need to make this determination of what is sufficient reason. 
Various systems have various methods of determination, and while some may be more successful than 
others, I see no reason that this ambiguity should challenge my defense of the retributive requirement. 
Furthermore, there are usually varying determinations of guilt throughout the process of a trial. If 
someone is arrested and held before trial based on strong suspicion of guilt, then this action is 
retributive, even if later at trial he is determined to be innocent. At the time of arrest, based on the best 
available knowledge, the state determines that there is sufficient reason to believe that the suspect is 
guilty in order to detain him. This fulfills the retributive requirement, and thus we may call the action 
retributive. Later when all the evidence is weighed in a more systematic way, he is determined 
innocent, but this determination does not retroactively change the status of his pretrial detention. It was 
a retributive action all along. 
 Boonin labels the two readings of the retributive requirement the 'strong' and 'weak' readings: 
the strong one claiming that only guilty people may be punished and the weak one claiming that 
innocent people may be punished. I have argued for the weak reading, and have focused on defending 











detention as an example. 
 
1.1.3	  The	  Reprobative	  Requirement	  
 Boonin and others argue that punishment involves not only retribution, but also reprobation. 
Harm is inflicted because a law is broken, but also because the state condemns the offender's actions. 
According to Boonin, “[t]he reprobative requirement maintains that part of what makes an act a 
punishment is that it expresses official disapproval of the offender's behavior.”15 R.A. Duff in particular 
has focused on the expressive aspect of punishment as a way to justify punishment. But including 
reprobation within the definition of punishment does not violate the neutrality requirement because it 
remains neutral on the further question of whether the condemnatory aspect of punishment can justify 
it.  
 The most immediately puzzling question about this requirement is whether it is necessary. I will 
argue that adding reprobation to the definition is redundant because the retributive requirement of 
punishment (regardless of strong or weak reading) makes punishment necessarily reprobative by 
condemning the actions of offenders who break the law. For the reprobative requirement to be justified, 
there would need to be cases of authorized, retributive, intended harm that do not condemn the 
breaking of the law. Boonin attempts, but fails to show that there are such cases, and he uses the 
following example. Imagine a gang whose initiation rites include making its initiates “break the law – 
say, by stealing a car – in order to be eligible for initiation.”16 Imagine further that only after the 
initiates break the law do they undergo the next phase of the initiation, which includes the gang 
members intentionally harming the initiates, for example branding them with a hot iron. In this case, an 
authority (the gang leadership), is intentionally harming someone as a direct consequence for breaking 
the law, yet the action carries no condemnation with it. Rather, praise and approval of breaking the law 
                                                
15 Boonin, 2008, at 23. 











are implicit in the rite.  
 This example, while clever and original,17 does not succeed in allaying worries of the 
redundancy of including reprobation within the definition. One could argue that the authority in the 
case of gang leadership is importantly different from the state's authority in legal punishment. By using 
laws set by an entirely different authority from the one meting out the harmful treatment, the example 
may provide room for reprobation and retribution to disjoin. What is needed is an example of legally 
authorized, retributive, intended harm that is not reprobative. I do not believe there is such a case. In 
making a criminal law, the state is drawing a line, and in doing so, it inherently condemns any 
instances when offenders cross that line. The act of retributively harming the offender for crossing that 
line is an expression of the state's condemnatory attitude toward the offender. There is no way that the 
two could become separated. As von Hirsch puts it, criminal law is “morally loaded…The message 
conveyed through prohibition is that the behavior is reprehensible, and that the person should consider 
its wrongfulness (and not just the unpleasant consequences) as a reason to desist. The criminal law 
expresses blame in its very design.”18 Or as Duff writes, criminal law is “an institution that defines, and 
by implication condemns, a range of public wrongs.”19 Punishment does in fact include reprobation,20 
but there is no use including it as a separate requirement because it is redundant given the retributive 
requirement.  
  
1.1.4	  The	  Authorized	  Requirement	  
 While there are non-legal kinds of punishment, they are not the focus of this paper, so when I 
use the term 'punishment,' I am referring to legal punishment. Legal punishment must be “carried out 
                                                
17 Zimmerman, 2011, uses the same example, at 17, to illustrate the same point but does not attribute it to Boonin. 
18 Von Hirsch, 2011, at 271. 
19 Duff, 2011b, at 72. 











by an authorized agent of the state acting in his or her official capacity.”23  The requirement that an 
action needs to be authorized to qualify as legal punishment is the least controversial of the constitutive 
parts of punishment, so I will not address it further.  
 
1.1.5	  The	  Intention	  Requirement	  
 Punishment is not only harmful, but intended to be harmful. When we punish we “invoke our 
authority in order to inflict pain.”24 There are many cases when two harmful treatments are identical, 
but one is clearly punishment and the other is not. Boonin gives the following illustration: the state 
could harm someone by making him pay $5,000. However, if the state is making him pay it for taxes, 
then he is not being punished. But if the state is making him pay because it is harming him due to his 
guilt, then it is clearly punishment, because “[w]hen the state punishes someone... it inflicts various 
harmful treatments on him in order to harm him.”25 It is important to distinguish the difference 
between merely foreseeing that one will cause someone harm and intentionally causing him harm.26 It 
may seem objectionable to distinguish whether an act counts as punishment based on the intentions of 
the punisher, but this provides an accurate account of what we consider punishment. Consider another 
example Boonin gives: “[i]f you see a uniformed official forcing a laborer to lift a heavy rock, you 
cannot know whether what you see is a prisoner being punished or a slave being exploited” unless you 
know the intention of the officials.27  
 The glaring problem with examples like the laborer and the $5,000 is that they don't isolate 
intention as the only difference between the harmful treatments. It is possible that the reason we view 
the slave and the prisoner differently has to do with other properties of punishment (besides intended 
harm) that don't exist in the slave labor case. Perhaps what accounts for the difference we see between 
                                                
21 Boonin, 2008: 24. 
21 Tunick, 1992, at 1. 
25 Boonin, 2008, at 13, original emphasis. 
26 Hanna, 2009, also makes this argument. 











the two is that the slave hasn't broken a law. In order to isolate whether intention is essential to 
punishment, we should choose examples that differ only with regard to the intention of the harm.  
 In the following discussion I cover seven such examples. The first three I list briefly as they 
have been considered examples of problem cases that have not been able to be explained by the 
standard definition of punishment. One of the benefits of the definition I defend is that it neatly handles 
these problem cases that have plagued the standard definition. Three years after Boonin's book was 
published, Dolinko wrote in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Criminal Law that the standard 
definition needs modification because cases such as deportation, which is clearly not punishment, fall 
under its scope. Dolinko goes on to note that there are also problem cases such as impeachment of a 
president, which is non-punitive because, quoting Fletcher, “removal of the president is constitutionally 
authorized to protect the public, not to inflict 'unpleasant consequences' on the offending president.”28 
Disbarment of attorneys is another practice that “satisfies all of Hart's criteria and clearly carries a 
condemnatory message, but whose status as 'punishment' is debatable.”29 These three problem cases 
(deportation, impeachment, and disbarment), however, provide examples of acts that fulfill all the 
requirements of punishment except one: intended harm. Dolinko concludes that “[f]or present purposes, 
however, there is no need to arrive at a precise set of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
punishment.”30 I contend that there is a pressing need for such a definition in the literature to avoid 
further misunderstandings, and it was very nearly filled with Boonin's definition in 2008. Below I give 
four further examples which demonstrate that when the intention to harm is not present, but the other 
elements of punishment are, then the act is non-punitive, and therefore intended harm is a necessary 
requirement of punishment.  
 While Boonin's discussion of definition makes the mistake of not isolating intention in order to 
defend its necessity, he also provides a compelling example in a footnote that does isolate intention as 
                                                
28 Dolinko, 2011, at 405, quoting Fletcher, 1978, at 410.  












the only relevant feature differentiating a non-punitive action from punishment.  
 In the U.S. there are laws “which authorize states to post photographs of convicted sex 
offenders and other information about them on the internet after they have been released from 
prison.”32 The constitutionality of these laws was challenged on the basis of punishing offenders above 
and beyond the punishment they already received while serving their sentences. In 2003 the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that while these so-called Megan's law provisions harm offenders, they do not 
punish offenders. By making this distinction, the Court  
“relied precisely on the distinction between foreseeable and intentional harm. As Justice 
Kennedy wrote for the majority in the 6-3 decision, 'The publicity may cause adverse 
consequences for the convicted defendants, running from mild personal embarrassment 
to social ostracism,' but the intention of the laws is 'to inform the public for its own 
safety, not to humiliate the offender.'” 33  
 
Megan's law provisions fit all the requirements of punishment except for the intention to harm. When 
the state posts a photo of a sex offender online, it is authorized because it is administered by the state; it 
is retributive because it is a direct consequence of an offender being convicted for breaking a law; and 
it is harmful. If we agree with the Supreme Court's interpretation that posting the photo is not 
punishment, then it must be because the intention to harm the offender is missing, which aligns with 
the Court's stated reason for its interpretation. 
 An objection to the argument from the Megan's law provisions is that they are not truly 
retributive because they are not directed at the offender. But this is a misunderstanding, and perhaps a 
conflation of retribution with intention. Retribution is backward looking: harmful treatment of an 
offender (like publishing the photo) that is a direct result of the offender's conviction qualifies as 
retributive. The fact that the harm isn't directed at the offender is precisely the reason that the act does 
not qualify as punitive. 
 Here is another example of a non-punitive act that is retributive, authorized harm, but not 
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intended to be harmful. Imagine a virus that is very dangerous for a large portion of the population but 
for the rest of the population it has no medical effects. Furthermore, this virus is extremely contagious, 
and can be easily caught if someone comes into contact with a mosquito in a particular region of forest. 
The government has made it illegal for citizens to enter that region. A man enters the region, contracts 
the virus but is not affected by it, and when he exits the region he is detained by a border patrol agent. 
He is tested for the disease and quarantined, but his quarantine is in a comfortable environment, say a 
hospital, without any effort to harm him further than keeping him from spreading the virus. Once he is 
determined to be safe to reenter the public, he is released from the hospital. We would not say that this 
is punishment, and furthermore this is an example of authorized, retributive harm without intending to 
harm the offender. He is guilty an offense, which makes the state intervention retributive because it is 
in direct response to the offense. The government has the law in place to protect its citizens, and it 
detains any and all offenders to test them for the virus. Imagine further that if the offender has the 
virus, he is quarantined, and if he doesn't then he is set free with a fine to help pay for the upkeep and 
improvement of the border patrol. Neither the detention for testing, nor the quarantine, nor the fine is 
intended to harm the offender. All three harmful treatments are explicitly intended to prevent a deadly 
outbreak of the virus, and furthermore not intended to harm the offender.   
 Another example is the practice of pre-trial detention,34 which resembles the virus example in 
many ways: in both cases a government detains an offender first to determine whether he is potentially  
dangerous, and if he is found to be so, it detains him not to punish him but out of concern for the safety 
of the community. Interpretation of the US Constitution has held that pretrial detention is not 
punishment. United States v. Salerno35 is a US Supreme Court case that is perhaps most useful36 for 
understanding the history of the discussion of whether pretrial detention is punishment. The case came 
                                                
34 Boonin brings up pre-trial detention, 2008: at 15, n. 18. 
35  United States v. Salerno 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
36  Boonin and Tunick have used the case of Bell v. Wolfish, but I think it is less illustrative. Bell deals with a very specific 
question of whether a particular detainment practice is inhumane, while US v. Salerno includes discussion of the history 
of the debate surrounding pretrial detention. Salerno deals broadly with the constitutionality of pretrial detention in 











to the Court because Anthony Salerno was arrested in relation with mafia activity, and detained before 
his federal trial because he was found to be potentially dangerous to the community. Salerno's side 
argued that his detention constitutes punishment before trial and is therefore unconstitutional. The 
Court concluded that pretrial detention is not punishment, and the Court's opinion is very helpful to 
understand the intention requirement, so I will quote it at length. The opinion explains that pretrial 
detention is not punitive but regulatory, and that the intent of the legislators is the key to determining 
whether a law is punitive. It also includes a discussion of the limits and restraints placed on regulatory 
detention. 
[...]The Court of Appeals assumed that pretrial detention under the Bail Reform 
Act is regulatory, not penal, and we agree that it is. 
As an initial matter, the mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably 
lead to the conclusion that the government has imposed punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 
supra, at 537. To determine whether a restriction on liberty constitutes impermissible 
punishment or permissible regulation, we first look to legislative intent. Schall v. 
Martin, 467 U.S. at 269. Unless Congress expressly intended to impose punitive 
restrictions, the punitive/regulatory distinction turns on 
"whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be 
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned [to it]."  
Ibid., quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-169 (1963). 
We conclude that the detention imposed by the Act falls on the regulatory side of 
the dichotomy...  Congress instead perceived pretrial detention as a potential solution to 
a pressing societal problem. Id. at 4-7. There is no doubt that preventing danger to the 
community is a legitimate regulatory goal. Schall v. Martin, supra.37  
 
 
I include this quotation to demonstrate three points. First, there is a long history of courts determining 
that pretrial detention is non-punitive precisely because it lacks the intent to harm the offender. 
Secondly, in order to determine that the intention is non-punitive, it is important to ask what the 
intention is, and where it originates. In the case of pretrial detention, the intention to maintain 
community safety comes from the legislators who decide what circumstances would potentially justify 
                                                












pretrial detention. The legislators' regulatory power39 in this case is restricted by the detainee's due 
process rights (to a speedy, fair trial, to legal representation, etc.). Third and finally, it is up to the 
courts to determine whether the legislative intent is in fact non-punitive; and whether the restriction of 
liberty in pretrial detention is proportional given the further legislative goal (e.g. of community safety 
for pretrial detention); and whether the “procedural safeguards”40 have been adequately upheld. The 
Court's opinion describes the test for whether an action qualifies as harmful but nonpunitive regulation 
as a dialogue between legislation and courts: legislators declare intent, and the courts interpret and 
judge its appropriateness and proportionality. 
 A quick and final example is confiscation of illegally obtained profits. When the state seizes 
assets obtained through criminal acts, its action is clearly not intended to harm the offender, but rather 
to recover stolen property. The action is retributive, harmful to the offender, but not punitive. This 
shows again that the lack of intention to harm the offender results in a non-punitive action. The Dutch 
government classifies such confiscation is a “measure,” explicitly defined as non-punitive because of 
the lack of the intention to harm.41 
 One objection to the intention requirement comes from Jan De Keijser, who criticizes the Dutch 
government's categorization of “measures” as non-punitive, calling this a “definitional stop.”42 De 
Keijser's accusation of a definitional stop means that he is claiming that the intention requirement I 
have defended is guilty of violating the neutrality requirement for defining punishment, because it 
“prevents us from examining the rational and moral status of deliberately inflicting pain.”43 But why 
can we not examine the moral status, or justification, of harmful but non-punitive interventions? De 
Keijser gives no reason. I take him to mean that the distinction unfairly justifies (or puts a stop to moral 
scrutiny without further discussion), harmful state interventions that are not intended to harm. But there 
                                                
39 Tunick, 1992, at 126 cites another Supreme Court case “where regulation is distinguished from punishment”: Schall v  
Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984), at 269-270. 
40 United States v. Salerno 481 U.S. 739 (1987). at 742. 













is nothing about calling these interventions 'non-punitive' that works to justify them, or violates the 
neutrality requirement. Taxes are one such intervention, and there is no reason that we are prevented 
from examining their “rational and moral status” simply because they are non-punitive. 
 Due to current penal practices, which do not sharply distinguish sanctions based on intended 
harm, punishment is widely seen as any harmful sanction for breaking the law. The lay public will have 
differing intuitions on whether practices such as pretrial detention and Megan's law provisions count as 
punishment. And this is in part because the public usage of the term 'punishment' is broad, with 
indistinct boundaries. But the mere fact that current public intuition might blanche at the idea of a 
nonpunitive speeding fine should not exclude the possibility that under the most precise definition of 
legal punishment, a nonpunitive speeding fine could exist. Especially considering the legal precedents I 
have highlighted, a nonpunitive speeding fine is plausible with sufficient legislative and judicial 
dialogue regarding the regulatory intent. I have provided a defense of a precise definition of 
punishment, one that sharpens the standard philosophical definition with the specification of the 
intentional requirement. Unless this definition can be shown to be faulty, there is no good reason to 
dismiss it based on current popular usage of the term. 
 It is likely that, despite the foregoing discussion and arguments, some will still take this 
definition to be mistaken, and insist that intended harm is not a necessary feature of punishment. Yet 
even if that is the case, the reader could take this dissertation to be a conditional argument: if one 
understands punishment as I have defined it, as authorized, retributive, intended harm, then I will 
explore the alternatives to punishment and show that we should minimize punishment by relying on 
these alternatives.  
 It is still useful to keep in mind that most scholars writing about punishment construe it as 
including intentional harm.49 To take two examples out of dozens, Kolber recently noted, “Criminal 
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law theorists overwhelmingly agree that for some conduct to constitute punishment, it must be imposed 
intentionally;”50 and Sayre-McCord writes “[p]unishment has at its core the intentional infliction of 
pain or harm.”51 It may seem strange that so many scholars use a definition that might now strike the 
reader as controversial, but the full implications of the intended harm requirement have generally gone 
unnoticed.52 Also, it may have struck my reader that I have been careful to use the term 'intended' 
instead of 'intentional,' which is the much more popular phrasing among the literature. This is because 
there is an ambiguity that arises in many scholars' definitions of punishment by the use of 'intentional.' 
One may construe the phrase 'intentional hard treatment' to mean that an act was taken deliberately that 
resulted in hard treatment of an offender. That is to say, the action itself was taken deliberately, but 
may or may not have as the intended result the harm of the offender. In this way, taxation is intentional 
harm that the state imposes on its citizens. However this is importantly different than the concept I have 
been defending. I use the adjective 'intended' to modify the harm requirement because it leaves no such 
ambiguity: the aim of the action must be to inflict harm.53 
 The reason I have taken such care to defend the intention requirement of punishment is because 
in order to determine what counts as an alternative to punishment the primary difference between an 
alternative and punishment in many cases will be the state's intention behind the act. In some cases, the 
intentions of the state interventions that I take to be alternatives to punishment are clear enough to be 
uncontroversial, but in many others the intentions might be debatable. Objectors to Boonin's definition 
of punishment have accused him of directing the intention based on what is convenient to label an 
alternative to punishment.54 This objection doesn't actually make a case against Boonin's definition, but 
                                                                                                                                                                 
67, Duff, 2001, at xiv, McDermott, 2001, at 403, Zimmerman, 2011, at 20, Hanna, 2009, at 238, Corlett, 2003, at 285, 
Sayre-McCord, 2001, at 504, De Keijser, 2011, at 200, as well as dozens of others that I won't list here. 
50 Kolber, 2012, at 1. 
51 Sayre-McCord, 2001, at 504, his emphasis. 
52 Even when scholars use Boonin's definition, they are apt to misuse the intention requirement. See Ward, 2009, at 290, 
where he uses the intention requirement to apply to the intended therapeutic outcomes of clinicians, rather than harm. 
Also see von Hirsch, 2011, at 263 for an explicit rejection of using the intention requirement to determine an alternative.   
53 Husak, 2011, at 222 makes the intentional/intended mistake, which is very common. 











signals a potential pitfall when discussing alternatives. Leo Zaibert points out, and I agree with him, 
that someone's reported intentions may not be his true intentions, and morally categorizing an act based 
on such a fickle mental state presents serious problems. But I disagree with him that categorizing a 
state intervention following crime as either a punishment or an alternative faces this problem. As the 
long quotation I used above from US v Salerno shows, the intentions behind such interventions are not 
hidden mental states within one person's mind. They are explicit and publicly debated, arising from the 
nexus between the legislators and the judiciary: the legislators declaring the intention, the judiciary 
interpreting whether the implementation or means of achieving the intended goal are appropriate or 
excessive. It is true that there are criminal justice decisions that come down to the intent of one person, 
say a police officer or a judge. But even in those cases there is (or should be) an extensive system of 
regulations to prevent abuse, such as sentencing guidelines, and the language of the regulations is 
where we may determine the intent of the legislators. Zaibert is correct to point out that we should be 
vigilant when discussing the intention behind alternatives to punishment. While many alternatives are 
straightforwardly non-punitive, like apologies or monetary victim restitution, others are less obvious. 
When discussing an alternative that I think might be controversial, in that some may view it as a 
punishment, I will address it and attempt to use legislative and judicial precedent where possible to 
illustrate the state's intention 
 
1.2	  Justifications	  of	  Punishment	  and	  Their	  Objections	  
 In this section I review the major justifications of punishment, and some of their leading 
objections. The major justifications, consequentialist, retributivist, expressivist, and others such as 
educational, have produced a vast literature, hence I don't intend to give a detailed account of any of 
the justifications and objections, but rather a brief, general overview. 











simply a theoretical dilemma, detached and awaiting for an Arthurian sage to finally pull the 
justification from the anvil; rather, meeting the need is long past overdue. We would be guilty of 
tolerating a very serious wrong if our current punitive practices turned out to be unjustified. The need 
to justify our practices presses upon us with the weight of the intense suffering of the millions of 
people being punished around the world daily. This suffering is inflicted purposefully, by the state, 
with the moral smugness of unflinching certainty. But scholars have tried to meet this need to justify 
punishment for many decades, and there is good reason to believe that they have failed.  
 This need for justification is what philosophers refer to as the 'problem of punishment.' 
Generally, books or articles that attempt to justify punishment start by acknowledging this problem, so 
there are many different wordings.56 Generally it can be stated that by punishing someone the state 
treats him in a way that would otherwise be wrong, so the resulting problem is the moral need to justify 
this practice. Ted Honderich writes, “The problem of punishment arises mainly but not only for the 
reason that the practice involves...a deliberate and avoidable infliction of suffering.”57 Hart writes of 
the “mounting perplexities” with punishment and of the need for a “morally tolerable account of this 
institution.”58 Duff writes that “when we reflect on the punishments inflicted (in our name) on so many 
of our fellow citizens and on the effects of those punishments on those who suffer them, we cannot but 
raise the question of legitimacy—of what can justify any practice of criminal punishment.”59 Boonin 
adds precision to these general calls for justification. He writes that since it is harder to “justify 
intentionally harming someone than it is to merely foreseeably harm [him],” then the problem becomes 
more acute than it first seems: “we must explain not only why the line between offenders and 
nonoffenders is morally relevant at all but, in particular, how it can be important enough to justify not 
                                                
56 See Dolinko, 2011, at 403 for a description of how the question of the justification of punishment goes back to “at least 
the time of Plato.” McDermott, 2001, asks succinctly “How could evil acts have the effect of making morally 
permissible what would otherwise be further evil acts?” at 404. 
57 Honderich, 1969, at 11. The question of whether it is in fact avoidable suffering is the subject of my later chapters. 
58 Hart, 1968, at 1.  











merely harming those on one side of the line but intentionally harming them.”60  
 While philosophers are in unanimous agreement that there is a need to justify the practice of 
punishment, few note how pressing the need is. Because the need is so urgent, due to the currently 
enormous and ever growing62 amount of suffering that is intentionally inflicted via punishment, it is 
dire enough to compel us to desist from our current practices of punishment as much as possible in 
favor for alternatives, only punishing as much as required by necessity. Adam Gopnik recently wrote in 
The New Yorker, “The scale and the brutality of our prisons are the moral scandal of American life.” 
He goes further by saying that mass incarceration is the fundamental fact of the USA today, “as slavery 
was the fundamental fact of 1850.”63 I will not evaluate here whether Gopnik, and other writers like 
him64 who decry current penal practices, are justified in making such sweeping claims. I quote him 
merely to suggest that punishment could be analogous to other, once-widespread practices that inflicted 
tremendous suffering, but have failed to be justified. Slavery is one such practice. Gross notes other 
practices like this, including torture, which used to be respectable but is now “widely regarded as 
morally deplorable.”65 To further illustrate the link between torture and punishment, I point to Stephen 
Kershnar's article arguing for the permissibility of punitive torture. His argument in part relies on the 
acceptance of forfeiture-based retributivism as a justification of punishment.66 To this list I can 
confidently add the practice of legally discriminating against people based on their race or sexual 
orientation. Since I will ultimately argue that we should minimize punishment, slavery is not the most 
apt comparison. There is no acceptable 'minimal slavery.' This difference points to the fact that the 
moral questions surrounding punishment are more nuanced than those surrounding slavery, torture and 
state-sanctioned discrimination. A better analogy is killing non-combatants in war. History is littered 
                                                
60 Boonin, 2008, at 28. Boonin also considers two objections to the claim that punishment is in need of moral justification. 
62 In 1980 there were 220 prisoners per 100,000 people in the USA; by 2010 there were 731 per 100,000. See Gopnik, 
2012. 
63 Id. 
64 See especially Davis, 2003, Alexander, 2010, and Stuntz, 2011. 
65 Gross, 2012, at 162. 











with wars in which opponents practiced this without reservation. It is only relatively recently that we 
have arrived at consensus that this practice must be minimized as much as possible. Over the course of 
this dissertation I argue that we should treat punishment the same way: using it only when necessary, 
and immediately reform our practices to minimize it as much as possible.   
 To add one final reason that the need to justify our practices is more urgent than widely 
believed, Kolber has made a compelling case that unintended but reasonably foreseeable harms should 
also need justification.69 This means that foreseeable harms such as loss of jobs, restriction of sexual 
activities, infliction of heightened risk of assault, etc. also need justification. The massive suffering that 
goes on in crowded prisons that is not intended by the state but is foreseeable also needs to be justified, 
and this adds to the burden of justification. 
 The goal of this section is to convince the reader that it is at least plausible that no justification 
for punishment has succeeded. It should be noted that many scholars who are not abolitionists agree 
that all justifications up to now have failed. Stephen Garvey, who is critical of abolitionists concedes 
that “[a]ll efforts to come up with a justification have so far failed, and are perhaps are bound to fail.”70 
Dolinko writes, “The search for an acceptable justification of punishment continues” and that “the 
quest for the justification of punishment may never come to an end.”71  
There are two reasons I take the time to explain the justifications of punishment and their 
objections, given my goal of assessing alternatives. First, I want the reader to have at least a taste of 
how forceful the objections are without simply taking other writers' word for it. Alternatives to 
punishment become more important once one admits the possibility that we may not be able to justify 
punishment. And secondly, if one is familiar with the rigorous objections that have been fired at 
punishment, it provides a ready arsenal of possible arguments against the alternatives I consider later. 
Throughout this brief summary I rely heavily on Boonin’s book The Problem of Punishment. The 
reason for this is that it is by far the most comprehensive and detailed book-length treatment of the 
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70 Garvey, 2011, in Deigh and Dolinko eds., at 498.  
71 Dolinko, 2011, in Deigh and Dolinko eds., at 427 and 428. Interestingly, Dolinko only briefly considers that this search 
may be futile, in a footnote mentioning Boonin's book, but never fully considers the implications of the weight of the 











justifications for punishment and their objections.72 Because this is merely a glancing overview, there 
are many forceful objections that I do not mention, and furthermore, I do not have the space to fully  
explain the power of the objections that I do mention. Readers should not take anything in this section 
to be a full argument against a particular justification; but rather it should be seen as an abbreviated 
sketch of some of the reasons why scholars are pessimistic about justifications of punishment. 
 
1.2.1	  Consequentialist	  Justifications	  and	  Objections	  
 All consequentialist justifications argue that punishment is justified because of its good 
consequences. The most common good consequence that these justifications appeal to is a decrease of 
law-breaking, which means that the community will be safer, and people will be happier and better off 
because of punishment. Consequentialist justifications cite various ways in which punishment is able to 
bring about this increased well-being, and the most prominent are: (1) general deterrence, meaning that 
potential offenders choose not to commit a crime because of the potential punishment; (2) 
incapacitation, meaning that offenders being punished are restricted from committing further crimes 
because of the constraints of their punishment; and (3) specific deterrence, or desistance, meaning that 
offenders, once finished serving the terms of their punishment, choose to not commit further crimes 
because of their prior punishment. 
 There are two main consequentialist justifications. The act-consequentialist version maintains 
that happiness and well-being are increased by punishing offenders, and moreover, that each act of 
punishment should be evaluated based on its usefulness of increasing well-being. The rule-
consequentialist justification also maintains that happiness and well-being are the goals of punishment, 
but rather than evaluating each act of punishment based on its usefulness in achieving that goal, it 
argues that the overall good consequences are what justify the institution of punishment. When 
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evaluating individual cases, according to the rule-consequentialist, if we determine that an offender is 
in fact guilty, then we can justify punishing him according to the general rules which justify the 
institution as a whole. This allows the rule-consequentialist to speak of constraints that can be placed 
on specific acts of punishment, while the justification is based on the system as a whole. Hart provided 
a famous version of this, arguing that “it is perfectly consistent to assert both that the General Justifying 
Aim of the practice of punishment is its beneficial consequences and that the pursuit of this General 
Aim should be qualified or restricted out of deference to principles of Distribution which require that 
punishment should be only of an offender for an offence.”73 This broad kind of consequentialism, 
which includes rule-based, side-constrained and Rawlsian versions, among others, arose in part because 
of serious objections against the act-consequentialist justification, but it also faces serious objections.  
 Here I will explain the two main problems with the act-consequentialist justification, and I will 
then show how the rule-consequentialist justification tries but fails to solve these problems. A major 
objection to the act-consequentialist justification is the 'punishing the innocent objection.' Because the 
main goal of punishment is to increase overall well-being on a case by case basis, “then in at least some 
circumstances, deliberately punishing an innocent person is also morally justified because it produces 
more overall utility than would any available alternative.”76 There are many examples in which 
punishing an innocent person might be the best way to prevent more crime. For instance, to prevent a 
riot the state could punish an innocent person whom an angry crowd wants punished. Or the state could 
make an example of someone innocent in order to deter future criminals. There are many similar 
examples in the literature.77 Because this justification allows for punishing innocent people, this 
justification is unacceptable.  
 Another objection besides punishing the innocent is the 'not punishing the guilty objection.' 
There are many cases in which consequentialist reasoning will lead to the unacceptable result of not 
punishing a guilty person. For instance imagine a famous movie star that is so widely beloved, that 
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act-consequentialist justification. See at 21. 
76 Boonin, 2008, at 41. 











after committing a significant crime, the state calculates that it would be overall more painful for 
everyone to see him suffer than to punish him. Clearly such reasoning is unacceptable because it treats 
the movie star unfairly based on his popularity, which should not be taken into account for how to 
respond to his crime. There are at least three further convincing objections to the act-utilitarian version 
which I will not discuss here.78 
 The rule-consequentialist family of justifications faces some of the same problems as the act-
consequentialist version, including the 'punishing the innocent objection.' In overcoming this objection, 
the rule-consequentialist version “must ultimately rest on two claims: that legislators reasoning on 
utilitarian grounds would endorse a system of rules on which innocents are never deliberately punished 
and that this would suffice to justify adhering to such rules even in cases where more good would be 
done by breaking them.”79 Rawls attempts to argue just this.80 However, this is a chimerical task, 
because such a system of rules cannot be fully adhered to when using consequentialist reasoning. There 
would simply be too many cases that would arise in which punishing innocents would lead to more 
foreseeable good, and if the state were using consequentialist reasoning it could not justify declining to 
punish the innocents in these cases. Consider a murderously angry mob that wishes to see a certain man 
jailed. The state suspects, or even knows that he is innocent. But it also knows that the mob will likely 
kill ten or more people in riots if the state does not placate it by sentencing the man to jail. Even if it 
chose a hefty sentence of five years for the innocent man, it would be avoiding the much worse 
outcome. In this case, using consequentialist grounds, it would not make sense to stick to rules 
forbidding punishing the innocent. Rawls' formulation artificially cuts out plausible candidates for 
punishing innocents based on consequentialist grounds, such as this case and many others like it.  
  This demonstrates a problem plaguing rule-consequentialism known as the “rule worship 
problem.” Suppose, despite the foregoing arguments, there is a way for a utilitarian legislature to craft a 
rule against punishing innocents,81 there remains the problem: “why, on utilitarian grounds, should 
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judges always follow the rules that the legislature sets down for them?”82 This is a general problem that 
rule-utilitarians face. If there were a clear case when the best overall utility can be gained by breaking 
the rule, why, on utilitarian grounds, would someone be constrained by the rule? Rawls gives an 
answer specific to the ‘punishing the innocent’ objection, which is that a judge can rightly claim that 
his authority, qua judge, does not allow him to break rules in service to greater utility. But this is 
simply evading the question by fixing on practice guidelines for judges. “The practice conception of 
rules simply replaces the rule worship problem with the practice worship problem: why should a person 
go along with a practice in those cases where abandoning it would do more good?”83 Thus, Rawls' 
answer to the “rule-worship” objection fails. These same reasons that prevent the rule-consequentialist 
from solving the problem of punishing the innocent also obstruct it from solving the problem of not 
punishing the guilty. 
  Besides the problems of punishing the innocent and not punishing the guilty, there are other 
objections that plague the rule- consequentialist justification. I will not mention most of them, but to 
give a brief example of how forceful they are, consider this one further objection: the rule-
consequentialist justification may result in wildly disproportionate punishments. If a justification 
entailed a practice of executing motorists for speeding, then we would have to abandon the 
justification. And there is no reason to believe that rule-consequentialist reasoning may not lead to such 
an outcome, especially given the enormous death toll of accidents on highways, and how many fewer 
people die when motorists adhere to lower speeds. “If a single act of executing someone for speeding 
would produce enough deterrence to compensate for the harm done to the speeder himself, for 
example, then establishing a system of rules in which anyone caught speeding is executed would do so 
even more effectively.”84 
 
1.2.2	  Retributivist	  Justifications	  and	  Objections	  
 There are many versions of retributivist justifications for punishment, including: desert-based, 
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forfeiture-based (and the similar debt-based), fairness-based, trust-based, and revenge-based.85 These 
versions focus on the offender, and claim that punishing him is justified because he deserves it, or 
because he forfeited his right to not be punished by offending, or because it is only fair to punish him, 
or because he violated trust, or simply because society wants revenge. Together these justifications 
share the quality of being backward looking. That is to say, rather than concerns for future benefits 
which consequentialist justifications aim for, retributivist justifications focus their reasons on features 
of the offender based on their past offense. I will explain three of these justifications (desert-based, 
forfeiture-based and fairness-based), and summarize some of the objections against them. 
 Perhaps the most intuitive version is desert-based retributivism, which maintains that the state is 
justified in punishing an offender because the offender deserves the punishment. There are two 
versions  of claims that desert-based retributivists make. The more expansive one claims that we are 
obliged to punish an offender because he deserves it; and the narrower version claims that we are 
merely justified in punishing him.86 I will only be addressing the versions supporting the narrower 
claim because this is the easier claim to justify. Many desert-based justifications argue from particular 
cases in which we feel strong intuitions that someone should be punished, and these are usually cases 
of horrific offenses. Because of our strong intuition that these offenses are punishable, the argument 
goes, then the moral permissibility of punishment in general “best accounts for” our strong moral 
beliefs, and can then be applied to all law breaking.87 Another way to understand this argument from 
particular cases of desert avoids the messiness and question-begging of extrapolating from particular 
intuitions to justification of punishment in general.88 This second construal is what Boonin claims is the 
strongest reading of Moore, Kershnar and other desert-based retributivists. “To say that a person 
deserves to be punished, on this account, is not simply to say that she should be punished. Rather, it is 
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to say that the world will be intrinsically a better place by one morally relevant measure if she is 
punished than it will be if she is not.”89 In other words, the strongest, most charitable reading of desert-
based retributivism takes our intuition that particular offenses deserve punishment, and reasons that the 
world is inherently a better place when offenders are punished. Many philosophers argue that this 
reasoning is invalid,90 but assuming for the sake of argument that it is valid, the question remains 
whether this can support a justification of punishment. Here I will summarize two objections which 
argue that this is not possible: the 'not punishing the guilty objection,' and the 'punishing the innocent 
objection.'  
 A justification of punishment would need to draw the line between innocent and guilty such that 
the state would retain the right to punish anyone who is guilty. The 'not punishing the guilty objection' 
shows that the desert-based retributivist cannot draw such a line. The driver who drives without a 
license and speeds to get a pregnant woman to the hospital does not deserve to suffer based on moral 
blameworthiness.91 Therefore, under the desert-based retributivist justification, the state would not 
maintain the right to punish the driver because he does not deserve it. There are many cases in which an 
offender is morally blameless, and hence not deserving of retribution, but still legally guilty. The state 
should still be able to preserve the right to punish the legally guilty but morally blameless, and the 
desert-based retributivist cannot justify this. A response to this objection could say that breaking the 
law is still overall immoral, but that would entail that the driver would be morally prohibited from 
driving the woman to the hospital and would have to search for his license before leaving, which is 
clearly not the case.92  
 However, even if this weren't the case, and if, for the sake of argument, every instance of 
breaking the law could be counted as overall immoral, there are still many cases of law breaking in 
which the offender does not deserve to suffer. A person could act out of ignorance or for a good 
motive.  A poignant example of acting from ignorance comes from a Pulitzer prize winning piece of 
journalism about parents who forget that their infant is in the back seat and leave the child to die in the 
                                                
89  Id. at 92. 
90 See id. at 93 note 10 for a list. 
91  There is a limitless number of examples like this that show that someone has broken a law but remained morally 
blameless. 











hot car.93 This happens with surprising frequency, and it is clear from the cases that any parent is 
susceptible to this tragedy. It usually happens when the parent is busy, stressed, not following normal 
routine, and the child is in a car seat in the back seat facing the rear of the car, as is mandated by new 
child safety laws in the USA. The parent returns to find the child dead, and begins in that moment what 
is surely a lifetime of intense suffering because of his action. Some judges have conceded that the 
parent does not deserve to suffer any more than he clearly is and convicts the parent of criminal 
negligence but is lenient with his sentence. The desert-based retributivist, acknowledging that the 
parent neglected the child due to external factors and with no intention to harm, would agree with the 
lenient judge that the parent does not deserve to suffer any more than he already is. It seems 
uncontroversial, given our current practices, that the state should preserve the right to punish such 
parents. Therefore in order for this retributivist justification to succeed it would need to provide reason 
for the state’s right to punish the parent, but it cannot. 
 A less dramatic example explains why desert-based retributivism cannot maintain the right to 
punish (nor can it actually punish) the legally guilty but morally blameless. A man is in a rush to park 
his car, and he parks it in an illegal spot that he does not realize is off limits. The state punishes him 
regardless of whether he morally deserves it, and the desert-based retributivist, whose only criterion for 
punishment is moral blameworthiness, cannot justify the state's action. There are many strict liability 
offenses that states punish even if the offenders are blamelessly ignorant of committing a crime.94 
 Another objection to desert-based retributivism is the 'punishing the innocent objection.' There 
are many cases of people who do not break the law but who clearly deserve to suffer. The desert-based 
retributivist must hold that the state can punish such a person, which is clearly a case of punishing the 
(legally) innocent (despite being morally culpable). Boonin gives the example of a man who has 
familiarized himself with spousal abuse laws “and does everything he can to make his wife miserable 
without crossing that [legal] line. If he is legally allowed to scream at her, he screams at her. If he is 
allowed to cheat on her, he cheats on her. In any way he is allowed to embarrass, belittle, degrade, and 
insult her, he does, and with relish.”95 However, given that desert-based retributivism originates in 
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cases of morally reprehensible behavior and reasons that the culprits deserve to suffer, then clearly this 
man, according to this reasoning, deserves to suffer. And “since such desert is the basis for the right to 
punish on the desert-based retributivist account,” then it follows that under such an account the state 
should punish the man even though he “violated no just and reasonable laws.”96  
 One response to both of the above objections is to say that desert may come from both legal 
culpability and moral culpability. This would explain why the state may punish the morally blameless 
but legally guilty, as well as not punish the morally blameworthy but legally innocent. However, this is 
an ad-hoc response that begs the question: the problem the justification is supposed to solve is why the 
state is allowed to punish, and only allowed to punish, the legally guilty. The justification cannot 
accomplish this without adding two caveats to address the above objections: the morally blameworthy 
deserve punishment, but only if they are legally guilty and the legally guilty but morally blameless also 
deserve punishment. Adding these qualifications vitiates the explanatory power of the justification.  
 The justification, to review, tracks our impulse that certain offenders deserve to suffer because 
of moral culpability. Boonin cites Kershnar who gives the example of a woman who helps out the 
Nazis by pointing out overlooked Jews; our “intuition is that she deserves a rather severe punishment” 
even though she acts to help the legal authorities.97 This goes to show that we track moral culpability 
rather than legal culpability for the kinds of intuitions founding this account, which provides additional 
reason that the above response fails. One might claim that a desert-based retributivist could simply 
draw the line at legal culpability and claim that the state should only be able to inflict suffering when 
an offender commits a moral violation that also breaches a just law. But this response cannot explain 
why the state is justified in giving the parking ticket to the time-crunched and morally blameless driver 
who parked in the off-limit spot. And once again, this is an ad-hoc adjustment: if the justification 
results in undesirable consequences such as punishing the innocent and not punishing the guilty, it is 
the justification that should be changed or dismissed rather than tweaking the justification's logical 
outcome according to preference.  
 In contrast to the desert-based version, the forfeiture-based retributivist justification holds that 
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an offender forfeits a right not to be punished by committing an offense. Goldman writes that “by 
violating the rights of others in their criminal activities, [offenders] have lost or forfeited their 
legitimate demands that others honor all their formerly held rights.”99 To defend the claim about 
forfeiting rights, a forfeiture-based retributivist may argue that there is an essential link between moral 
rights and moral duties. This link provides the basis to contend that “negating one's moral duties would 
involve negating one's moral rights.”100  
 Boonin details seven forceful objections to the forfeiture-based retributivist justification of 
punishment, and Lippke notes that many others have also subjected it to “withering criticism.”101 I only 
explain two from Boonin: the 'unforfeited rights objection' and the 'disproportio ate punishment 
objection.' These two are no more or less compelling than the five others Boonin presents, but are good 
representatives. 
 The 'unforfeited rights objection' claims that it is extremely unlikely that infringing certain 
duties would entail forfeiting the corresponding rights. For example, the forfeiture claim “entails that a 
rapist forfeits the right not to be raped and a torturer forfeits the right not to be tortured.” Other 
examples are someone who prevented a religious gathering forfeiting his religious freedom, or a judge 
who takes a bribe forfeiting his right to a fair trial. These examples are deeply counterintuitive, and if 
we reject them, “then we must be unwilling to accept the forfeiture claim” and must reject the 
justification.102 One response is, as Goldman puts it, “if we ask which rights are forfeited in violating 
rights of others, it is plausible to answer just those rights that one violates (or an equivalent set).”103 The 
most common equivalent set that people have in mind is of course time in prison. But if it is truly 
equivalent, then we should be willing to choose freely between the prison time and the corresponding 
forfeited right. But since we are unwilling to accept that the state is justified in sentencing the rapist to 
being raped, then we wouldn't accept the equivalent loss of freedom in prison. In other words, “if a 
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given right is really equivalent to another, then if it is unacceptable to deprive someone of one right, it 
must be equally unacceptable to deprive him of the other.”104 This is in addition to the insurmountably 
daunting task of trying to give reasons why the severity of a particular punishment equates to the lost 
rights ensuing from a particular offense. 
 The 'disproportionate punishment objection' arises from the following question: Does the 
offender forfeit his right temporarily or permanently? It would seem unreasonable to think that a petty 
thief caught stealing $20 would forfeit any right for the rest of his life simply for this one transgression. 
If it is a temporary forfeiture, how do we know what the length of time is, and how do we ensure that it 
is not disproportionate? “[T]here seems to be no nonarbitrary means of determining how long that 
would be without simply abandoning the foundations of the forfeiture-based position.”105 Most crimes 
result in a temporary period of harm for victims, which means that most crimes could potentially be 
punished too much or too little because the forfeiture claim leaves no way to safeguard against this.  
 Fairness-based retributivist justifications, like forfeiture-based versions, frame the justification 
of punishment within larger concepts. The forfeiture-based version is couched in rights, while the 
fairness-based version is framed “in terms of distributive justice.”107 Specifically, this version contends 
that “offenders must be viewed as enjoying an unfair distribution of benefits as a result of having 
committed an offense, so that imposing on them a punitive harm will restore the overall distribution of 
benefits and burdens to its previous and presumptively fair level.”108 The unfairness comes from the 
offender free riding on nonoffenders' cooperative obedience of the law that results in “peace and 
stability.” The free riding specifically comes from the offender's evasion of “the burden of self-restraint 
assumed by those who obey the law.”109 Punishment therefore takes the unfair advantage away from the 
offender. 
 There is one objection here that I will focus on, and five others that I will not discuss.110 The 'not 
punishing the guilty objection' stems from the founding claims of the fairness-based account: first that 
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offenders can be understood “as free-riders who take unfair advantage of their law-abiding fellow 
citizens.”111 And secondly that punishment is justified in leveling the fairness. There is a clear problem 
with the first claim: not only does it not account for the wrongness in the harm to the victim, but it also 
fails to account for most people's lack of desire to commit crimes. It is perverse to think that what is 
wrong with a murder is that it takes advantage of people who refrain from murder rather than the harm 
to the victim. Most people have no desire to murder, and hence “there is no cost to them refraining.” 
And if there is really no cost, then there is no unfairness due to free-riding, which means that “there are 
many cases of lawbreaking for which the fairness-based retributivist cannot justify punishment.” 
 
1.2.3:	  Expressivist	  Justifications	  and	  Objections	  
 While consequentialist and retributivist justifications have been the most common in the 
literature, there are other important justifications. The most prominent is expressivism, also known as 
the reprobative or communicative justification. Other justifications include the consent justification, the 
moral-education justification, the self-defense justification and hybrids of any of two or more of any of 
the aforementioned justifications. For the purposes of brevity I, summarize expressivism and some of 
its objections, while leaving other justifications out of this overview.  
 In a sentence, expressivism makes two claims, first that the state should condemn crime, and 
secondly that only “penal hard treatment” is adequate to fully express the censure, making it a 
necessary component of the state's condemnation.115  Expressivism had an early and notable treatment 
in an influential paper by Joel Feinberg called, “The Expressive Function of Punishment.” But it retains 
its force in the contemporary debate largely due to R.A. Duff, and his book Punishment, 
Communication and Community.116  
 Feinberg writes that the expressive function of punishment serves many important purposes, 
namely that: it allows the state to disavow the offenders' actions; it serves to “speak in the name of the 
people” the state's symbolic nonacquiescence; it vindicates the law by “emphatically reaffirming” it 
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when it is broken; it validates the rights of victims that were transgressed; and finally it absolves 
innocent suspects who were mistakenly accused of the crime. Feinberg asks, “Could not the state do 
this job without punishment? Perhaps, but when it speaks by punishing, its message is loud and sure of 
getting across.”117 Thus Feinberg claims that punishment is necessary because other means of official 
reprobation are insufficiently reprobative.118 He does not give reason why other means are deficient 
beyond simply making the claim, so I turn now to R.A. Duff. 
 Duff is also emphatic in explaining the state's need to condemn crimes. The state should “mean 
what it says” by outlawing certain acts, and thus “it is committed to censuring those who nonetheless 
engage in such conduct. To remain silent in the face of their crimes would be to undermine—by 
implication go back on—its declaration that such conduct is wrong.”119 In answering why punishment 
is necessary over other methods of censure, Duff writes that one route that some theorists, most notably 
Andrew von Hirsch, have taken is to argue that “penal hard treatment adds a deterrent incentive to the 
law's moral appeal.”120 Note that this type of move means that the expressivist is sliding into a 
consequentialist justification. Duff prefers to claim that punishment is a kind of secular penance, and is 
thus a kind of “moral reparation,” or “reformative enterprise...[for] his future conduct.”121 Duff includes 
a grab bag mix of many different punitive purposes within his notion of penance. He succinctly restates 
them in a later article, claiming that the intentional harm of punishment is enforced penance and 
“should serve both to assist the process of repentance and reform, by focusing his attention on his crime 
and its implications, and as a way of making the apologetic reparation that he owes.”122  
 Here I will summarize three of the main objections against expressivism: the 'nonpunitive 
censure objection,' the 'not punishing the guilty objection' and the 'punishing the innocent objection.'123 
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First, the ‘nonpunitive censure objection’ claims that the expressivist has failed to show why other 
means of condemnation cannot be used to adequately censure the offender. Very little work has been 
done to explain this, and most scholars resort to a method similar to Feinberg's: by simply claiming that 
punishment will be “loud and clear” enough to express whatever it is that the state is expressing. This is 
inadequate. Even Duff and von Hirsch fail to give compelling reasons why alternatives may not, 
instead of punishment, perform the functions of expression and inducing penance (Duff) or expression 
and deterrence (von Hirsch).124 There are many means of nonpunitive censure, and the foremost of 
them is the criminal trial. As I will discuss later, the state’s intentions behind having a criminal trial 
include ascertaining guilt, showing symbolic non-acquiescence with the crime, and expressing 
sentiments such as remorse, condolence for victims and condemnation of the offender. But harming the 
offender is not a plausible intention. If we grant that there are many nonpunitive ways that a state may 
condemn an offender, including trial, then the expressivist needs to show how these methods are so 
inadequate as to necessitate the recourse to punishment. This is a daunting task. We can easily imagine 
scenarios in which there are two offenders guilty of the same offense, one receiving punishment and 
the other receiving a nonpunitive condemnation, and the state’s condemnation of the punished offender 
falls much shorter of its condemnation of the other offender. Consider if in the punitive case the 
offender was ushered through a trial in which the judge made a quick decision, the offender was 
whisked away to prison for a couple of months, and then released, all without press or fanfare. In the 
other case, the state held a well-publicized trial, and the judge issued a lengthy opinion with his 
sentence which was published prominently in newspapers. Perhaps the mayor issued an official 
denunciation as well. However, the sentence that was issued was non-punitive. It is clear that the state’s 
condemnation is louder and clearer in the non-punitive case, despite being non-punitive. 
 The ‘not punishing the guilty objection’ holds that “there are many cases in which a person 
violates a just and reasonable law but does not seem to merit moral criticism.” A successful 
justification of punishment would be able to “justify the right to punish in such cases, but the 
reprobative solution clearly cannot do this.”125 Consider a person who violates a strict liability law, 
meaning that he can be punished even if he has an excuse. The expressivist justification cannot account 
                                                
124 See Duff, 1999 and 2001, and von Hirsch 1999. I will address the deterrence question in Chapter 5. 











for punishing these kinds of cases. 
 The ‘punishing the innocent objection’ claims that the state may condemn certain actions 
without making them illegal. The expressivist justification would then require the state to punish those 
legally innocent people who commit such actions. Consider Boonin’s example of the state that 
“declared a certain day to be Holocaust Memorial Day. In doing so, the state would clearly be 
acknowledging that those who deny the fact of the Holocaust merit disapproval.” But because most 
states would not make it illegal to express such denial, we have a clear case in which someone is guilty 
of an action that the state morally condemns, but does not legally proscribe.    
 
1.3:	  Requirements	  of	  Criminal	  Justice	  
 
 Even if punishment cannot be justified, it may be the case that there are no viable alternatives. 
In this case punishment may be a 'necessary evil.' Boonin calls this the 'argument from necessity:' 
justifying punishment by demonstrating the insufficiency of alternatives. In order to determine whether 
punishment may in fact be justified on the basis of necessity, and if so to what extent it may be used, it 
is important to be able distinguish various non-punitive alternatives. Throughout this dissertation I will 
use the term 'post-arrest regime' to refer to the collective institutions of the criminal justice system that 
operate after an offender's arrest. A post-arrest regime is in charge of pre-trial detention, trial, 
sentencing, parole, etc.; in other words, it is the part of the state that is in charge of implementing 
punishment, and any alternatives to punishment.    
 Before assessing alternatives to punishment on their own merits, I will pause to give some basic 
requirements that any post-arrest regime must meet. I will not consider these again until the final 
chapter, in which I will argue for a minimally punitive post-arrest regime, but these requirements will 
be useful to keep in mind while considering alternatives. What are the minimum thresholds that any 
post-arrest regime would need to fulfill in order to be considered tolerable and practicable? Here I 











by which to measure the various alternatives in the final chapter.  
 In order to determine requirements for a post-arrest regime, the first step would seem to be to 
ask: what are the goals and purposes of a state's response to crime? That is, setting aside questions 
about the purpose of a police force, what should a state hope to accomplish once a crime has been 
committed?  Without wading into theoretical territory that is beyond the scope of this essay, there seem 
to be three obvious candidates:  
1. Maintaining public safety and order by pressuring adherence to the law  
2. Communicating condemnation of offenses 
3. Redressing harm done to victims and society. 
  Pressuring citizens to adhere to the law and preventing recidivism both aim for the same 
consequence: to maintain safety and order. Of course, every state allows for risk to its citizens, and the 
same is true when it comes to crime. No state could be expected to maintain completely safe conditions 
for its citizens, and any attempt would likely involve severe abuses of individual liberty. However, 
every state is also expected to maintain enough order and safety to enable people to live productive and 
fulfilling lives without undue fear of crime. Kershnar calls this the “the minimum conditions for just 
mutual relations to exist,”130 which echoes Kant, and is similar to the often-quoted Hobbesian concept 
of 'right to sufficient security.'131 A state is also in the business of communicating moral condemnation. 
As Feinberg and Duff argue persuasively, the state should denounce crime for various reasons. The 
state should condemn crime, among many other reasons, to show its moral non-acquiescence, 
communicating a stance of opposition to the crime, and giving appropriate moral weight responding to 
the crime. Finally, the state should also make amends for the harms of crimes. A state's response to 
crime should acknowledge the harm to the victim, and make efforts to redress the harm. 
 This chapter has hopefully set the stage for exploring alternatives to punishment. I've defended 
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a definition of punishment, which allows us to be precise about what precisely counts as punishment, 
and what stands outside of its ambit as alternative candidates for dealing with offenders. I've given the 
reasons why theorists should scrutinize alternatives and their justifications. If we can enjoy the safety 
of crime prevention without inflicting so much intended suffering, then we should make haste to rely 
more on such alternatives. The idea of avoiding punishment except what is necessary is known as 
'parsimony' in the literature.132 Before we can tell just how parsimonious we can be with punishment, 
we need a better idea of what we would rely on in its stead. There has been relatively little theoretical 

















                                                















 Boonin concludes The Problem of Punishment by arguing for an alternative to punishment 
called pure restitution, and contends that punishment cannot be justified out of necessity because pure 
restitution is a viable alternative. Pure restitution is, as of yet, the only theory that by itself aims to fully 
replace punishment and has received decent treatment among theorists.136 In this chapter I explain the 
justifications for and objections to pure restitution, and conclude that pure restitution, even in its most 
defensible form, cannot be a standalone alternative to punishment. However, I also discuss the 
possibility that restitution can be one part of a minimally punitive crime response regime. I argue that 
restitution is best treated as a voluntary option for offenders rather than a compulsory method of 
redressing harm to victims.  
 In the second part of this chapter I discuss a concept closely related to restitution: 
compensation. When scholars use the term 'restitution' they typically refer to money paid directly from 
the offender to his victim, and that is how I use the term. 'Compensation' is a broader term, used loosely 
to refer either to money paid to a crime victim or to money paid to the state from the offender. When I 
use the term 'compensation' I refer specifically to money paid by the state or other agency to the victim, 
but excluding money from the offender (that is, excluding restitution). I will argue that victim 
compensation for violent crimes is an essential, obligatory component of any post-arrest regime, and 
that it is currently neglected. 
 
2.1	  Pure	  Restitution	  
 
 One of the first serious proposals to replace punishment altogether was put forth by Randy 
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Barnett in 1977 when he proposed to replace punishment with 'pure restitution' (which I will define 
below). He argued that all punishment could be replaced with monetary restitution paid from the 
offender directly to the victim. Barnett's article inspired a vigorous debate, and drew many criticisms. 
Scholars responding to the objections (but not necessarily embracing pure restitution or the wholesale 
replacement of punishment) paved the way for amended, more defensible versions of pure restitution; 
they include Mane Hajdin (1987), Stephen Wilkinson (1996), Joseph Ellin (2000), Geoffrey Sayre-
McCord (2001, 2002), David Boonin (2008), and Nathan Hanna (2008, 2009).137 Sayre-McCord and 
Boonin offer the most analysis, and Boonin's is by far the most comprehensive. I want to acknowledge 
the risk of seeming parasitic of a single author; but I believe that a fair treatment of the subject must 
address Boonin's detailed and thorough arguments, especially because I am rejecting his conclusion. In 
this section I describe how defendants of pure restitution have responded to objections, and why these 
objections have not been sufficiently overcome.  
 To avoid confusion, when Barnett uses the term 'pure' to describe his theory of restitution, he 
means that under his theory the state can only force an offender to make monetary payments to his 
victims. The state cannot punish an offender, nor coerce other actions beyond the scope of extracting 
payment. However, scholars defending amended versions of pure restitution argue for a state that 
cannot punish, but may coerce actions beyond simply transferring money to the victim, such as 
community service. In this sense 'pure' refers to the status as being purely non-punitive rather than 
specifying a limitation to monetary payments.    
 To further clarify, the concept of pure restitution has come to encompass a family of resembling 
versions rather than a single account, and some further differences arise from the questions of the roles 
of the police and civil law in a regime of pure restitution. Some restitutionists take the extreme and 
untenable view of advocating the “abolition of criminal law” altogether.138 Criminal law would 
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essentially collapse into tort law, and the police and courts (to various degrees depending on the theory) 
would be privatized. For instance, Ellin writes that much of the burden of “investigation, apprehension, 
and prosecution” would be paid for by the victim out of pocket, or by insurance companies, and this 
cost would then be added to the offender's restitution.139 It is not clear to what extent Ellin and others 
propose to privatize these institutions, but it makes no difference for this discussion. Because this view 
is unpopular and liable to obvious objections, it would be unfair to attack pure restitution based on this 
version. For the purposes of this dissertation I will assume that the most defensible version of pure 
restitution will leave the institutions of the courts and police unchanged, and maintain that the theory 
can still account for the distinction between criminal and tort law.  
 
2.1.1	  Introducing	  Pure	  Restitution	  and	  Common	  Objections	  
 Here I present Barnett's original version, followed by what I take to be the essential elements of 
any theory of pure restitution. I will note the strongest general criticisms of pure restitution. I then will 
follow this section with a more detailed exploration of the responses to objections and a discussion of 
whether even the most defensible version can overcome them. In his original version, Barnett wrote 
that under a system of pure restitution,  
“No longer would the deterrence, reformation, disablement, or rehabilitation of the 
criminal be the guiding principle of the judicial system. The attainment of these goals 
would be incidental to, and as a result of, reparations paid to [the] victim. No longer 
would the criminal deliberately be made to suffer for his mistake. Making good that 
mistake is all that would be required.”140   
 
Policing and trials would remain unchanged, but when a criminal defendant is found guilty, he would 
be sentenced to a certain amount of restitution. If he could pay it immediately then he would be 
absolved of further obligations. Much of Barnett's article is spent elaborating on possible “refinements” 
to this “basic system.” He notes that insurance companies could sell crime insurance, which would pay 
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out if you were a victim, leaving the companies responsible for collecting the restitution from the 
offender. If the offender could not pay, then “he would be confined to an employment project.”141 And 
there could be “direct arbitration” between offender and victim, resulting in a lower restitution if the 
offender pleads guilty.142  
 While the details of Barnett's version differ from subsequent theories, the essence or Barnett's 
argument remains in any theory of pure restitution. Boonin summarizes his version as follows: “if an 
offender is responsible for having wrongfully harmed a victim, then (a) the state should compel the 
offender to restore the victim to the level of well-being that the victim rightfully enjoyed prior to the 
offense and (b) the state should not punish the offender.”143 By “restore” Boonin means that “the theory 
maintains that the offender must restore the victim to a condition that is as close in value to her original 
condition as possible.”144 Boonin's definition seems to square well with other formulations, despite 
differences in how scholars elaborate the details of their versions. All theories of pure restitution rest on 
two fundamental tenets: first, the state should compel offenders to repair the harm done to their 
victims; and second, the state should not punish offenders.  
 Here I will introduce seven common objections to any theory of pure restitution. The first is the 
objection that restitution is too individualistic: in most cases of crime the total resulting harm cannot be 
restored by giving restitution only to the primary victim(s). The crime's effects spill over to society, its 
harms are not neatly contained within the domain of its immediate victims. Thus a defendant of pure 
restitution would have to be able to explain how an offender could restore the harm done to society. 
The second objection is the concern that there are crimes without a specific victim that can be 
compensated, raising the question of how offenders could possibly pay restitution in such cases. Crimes 
that fall under this category include cruelty to ownerless animals, harm to public institutions, attempted 
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but unsuccessful crimes, and reckless driving that doesn't result in injury to other drivers.145 Under a 
regime of pure restitution, it is not clear that the offenders in these cases of crime would owe any 
specific victim restitution despite the serious transgression. Thirdly, some crimes like rape and murder 
seem too serious to be properly resolved by restitution. The fourth objection is that restitution would 
provide insufficient deterrence and reprobation. An offender might be tempted to view restitution as no 
more than a potential fee for criminal activity; and of course such a message from the state would be 
unacceptably permissive of crime. Relatedly, the fifth objection is that rich offenders would have such 
an unfair advantage that they would be able to buy crimes. If a rich serial rapist chose to pay the hefty 
costs of restitution to his victims, then we would think that something is rotten with the system. The 
sixth concern is that poor offenders would be at a severe disadvantage. It isn't clear how they would be 
forced to pay the cost of their restitution without resorting to unfair measures that systematically 
repress poor offenders compared to ones who can afford the costs of restitution. The last objection 
holds that forcing offenders to pay restitution is in fact punishment.  
 These objections provide a structure for pure restitutionists of what a defensible version would 
have to overcome, so I will progress through the various scholars who address these issues (and I will 
use the arbitrary order of the objections that I listed above). I will also consider objections to these 
responses and adapted versions of pure restitution. I should note that the seven main objections that I 
outlined above are not exhaustive. For the sake of brevity I have grouped together some objections that 
could be considered distinct.  
 
2.1.2	  The	  Harm	  to	  Society	  Objection	  
 This objection holds that because the harms of crimes are not limited to the immediate victims, 
pure restitution cannot account for harms done to these indirect victims. Ellin notes that this objection 
can come in two versions, one claiming more than the other: “On the strong version, society as such is 
                                                











victimized by crimes…. On the weak version, all actual victims are individual people,” by which he 
means that individual people, including the direct victims and indirect victims comprise the group that 
requires restitution.146 I take the weak version to be troublesome enough for pure restitution to merit 
ignoring the strong version in this discussion. Ellin further notes that there are two kinds of indirect 
victims, which he calls “direct-indirect victims” (e.g. witnesses of the crime, family of the direct 
victim) and “indirect-indirect victims” (e.g. neighbors who hear about the crime and feel less 
secure).147 Boonin groups both of these kinds together under the label of 'secondary victims.' Hajdin 
argues (and Ellin adopts his position) that if every apprehended offender is made to pay full restitution 
to his victim(s), plus some extra money to fund restitution for victims of unsolved crimes, then indirect-
indirect victims would have no real reason to worry about the effects of crime. As Hajdin puts it, “Why 
would it matter to you whether the crime rates in the society are high or low, if the system of justice 
were set up in such a way that your becoming a victim of a crime could not make you worse-off?”148 
  Dagger gives two forceful reasons to reject this response. The first is that there are some direct 
victims who will never be fully restored (rape and murder victims). This explains why indirect-indirect 
victims can be justifiably worried about an increase of such crimes in their neighborhood, despite even 
the most robust system of victim restitution.149 There does not seem to be an adequate answer to this 
response under Hajdin's theory. The second reason is that even in other cases, such as car theft, a 
potential victim would still choose to avoid the stress and hassle of replacing a car over what is 
considered to be fair restitution. Hajdin might respond that in such cases the monetary compensation 
need only be raised to the point in which it truly is a fair trade-off, which would negate the worry that a 
potential victim would have a reason to prefer one outcome to another. This response is problematic for 
two reasons. First, Hajdin admits that for his system to be feasible the amount of restitution owed in 
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each case cannot depend on individual assessments of every victim, but rather a general calculation 
based on the type of crime committed. Due to the application of his own theory, it is not plausible to 
raise restitution in every case to adequately account for each victim's ideal point in which it truly is a 
fair trade-off between suffering the harms of victimhood and reaping the rewards of restitution. 
Secondly, as Dagger points out, so long as people are averse to being victims of crime, “people will 
feel the indirect effects of crime, through attitudinal and avoidance costs, in ways for which they cannot 
be compensated.”150 In other words, even despite its implausibility, if it were the case that every victim 
were given the exactly correct restitution such that they were made no worse off than before, we cannot 
help our intuitive desire to avoid being crime victims. Our worries stemming from such desires do not 
include rational calculations of future restitution. For these reasons we should reject Hajdin's solution 
to the Harm to Society Objection. 
 I'll now move from Hajdin to Boonin, who gives two responses to the Harm to Society 
Objection. The first is similar to Hajdin's in that he argues that the worry can be allayed by coercing the 
offender to pay his secondary victims. Boonin acknowledges up front that compelling each offender to 
give “just enough money to every secondary victim” is “of course, completely impractical.”151 But 
unlike Hajdin, he argues that this is not a reason in itself to reject the response. After all, the fact that it 
is “impractical to punish a criminal by subjecting him to precisely the amount of suffering that he is 
thought to merit” does not in itself invalidate punishment. Boonin elaborates, “if the law cannot do 
precisely what it should or may do, this does not mean that it should or may do nothing at all. It simply 
means that it should do the best it can to approximate what it should or may do.”152 He gives the 
example of large class action lawsuits against big tobacco companies, which cannot properly 
compensate the harm wrongfully done to each of the millions of smokers, but “the state can attempt to 
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approximate this result in a reasonable manner.”153 In applying such approximation to criminal cases, 
he suggests that a robber, above restitution paid to the direct victim, could be compelled “to pay a lump 
sum to the city, which would use the money to hire an extra patrol officer, or two, or three, depending 
on how much police power was necessary to restore the community to its previous level of well-
being.”154 
 This is a strong response because it avoids the folly that hinders Hajdin and Ellin's responses, 
namely to attempt to argue that restitution can fully account for harm to every secondary victim. 
Boonin foresees three objections to this response, and addresses them well.155 Indeed, if his theory of 
pure restitution could successfully rely solely on monetary restitution, then I would have little to say 
against his response to the Harm to Society Objection. But even Boonin concedes that there are cases 
when purely monetary restitution will not adequately restore the harm done to a community, even by 
the lowered standard of a “reasonable manner” established by approximating the total harm. He gives 
the example of an exceptionally talented burglar, who after many thefts “has finally been apprehended 
and been made to compensate his victims for the harms he has wrongfully caused them.” Suppose 
further that the burglar has paid an extraordinarily high level of monetary restitution, enough to pay for 
all the stolen goods as well as many new security measures for the neighborhood. Boonin postulates 
that “even with their new alarm systems, organized community watches, and extra police officers 
patrolling the neighborhood, his victims have been made objectively less secure by his actions than 
they were before merely because he is so skilled at evasion and is still free to roam the streets at 
night.”156 This conclusion seems correct, and it gives one of many examples of why Boonin's theory of 
pure restitution (or any other defender's version) must resort to nonmonetary restitution. In this case, 
they may not fully feel secure until the burglar were locked up. I will address the problematic idea of 
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making an offender 'pay' restitution by incarcerating him later. For now, a more unequivocal example 
of why purely monetary restitution cannot suffice to adequately repair harm to secondary victims is the 
case of a rich serial rapist. Presumably, despite if he paid millions of dollars in restitution to his primary 
victims and to improve the community's safety measures, the community would not feel adequately 
repaired if he were still free to rape and pay later. Admittedly, this conjures up another objection, the 
Rich Offender Objection, but this is not a problem for my current illustration. I merely aim to show that 
nonmonetary restitution will be necessary for the most defensible version of pure restitution, and 
specifically to address the Harm to Society Objection. Because the community would prefer to avoid 
being victims in the first place, and because the rapist has such deep pockets, the prospect of a rapist 
who is limited only to monetary restitution as a consequence of his crimes would be deeply unsettling 
for the community. They would require nonmonetary means of ensuring their safety from the rapist, 
presumably some kind of restriction on his movement. Boonin suggests that nonmonetary interventions 
such as the rapists' agreement to be tracked, and his agreement that he cannot come within a certain 
distance of the community could perhaps be sufficient restitution. Other illustrations of this point will 
come up later, and they will supplement the strength of my claim here that Boonin and other 
restitutionists will need to rely on nonmonetary restitution. This brings me to Boonin's second response 
to the Harm to Society Objection.  
 This response elaborates on his first response, but makes the additional claim that state-coerced 
nonmonetary means of paying restitution are justified by his theory of pure restitution. To elaborate his 
burglar example into his full description of this response, he writes that the burglar could  
...be compelled to wear a device by which his location could be monitored by the police 
at all times. He could be subjected to intensive supervision, such as that accompanying 
probation in some cases, which often includes a curfew. He could simply be locked up. 
In other cases, an offender might be made to take an anger management course, to 
undergo therapy, to give up drinking, to stay away from certain people or people under 
a certain age, and so on. If one or more of these impositions are necessary for an 
offender's victims to be fully restored to their former level of safety and security, then 











theory of pure restitution.157 
 
Perhaps the most immediate objection that comes to mind is to insist that one or more of those coercive 
actions counts as punishment. This is the only objection to this response that Boonin addresses, and I 
believe that he succeeds in overcoming it. Because in other sections of this dissertation I argue that the 
actions he lists in the above quotation can be non-punitive, I will not summarize Boonin's response 
here. But I will raise one further objection that those coercive actions are not restitution.  
 It is not at all clear that the nonmonetary state-coerced actions Boonin lists can be justified by 
his theory of pure restitution, as he claims that they are without further argument. Even if some of them 
could be justified using pure restitution, which is doubtful, they could be justified much more easily 
and straightforwardly by appealing to crime prevention. To illustrate this point, I will continue using a 
burglar example in which I claim that the monetary restitution he is forced to pay is justified by the 
theory of pure restitution, but I argue that his so-called 'nonmonetary restitution' can only be justified 
by appealing to crime prevention. Imagine that a burglar is finally caught, and he is sentenced to pay 
restitution to all his victims, including funds to help hire a new patrol officer in order to repay his debt 
to his secondary victims. His sentence also mandates that he wear a GPS device that tracks his 
movements at all times and automatically alerts police when he is not where he is supposed to be. 
Setting aside the question of whether these sentences count as punishment, it is uncontroversial that the 
monetary restitution paid to his victims and secondary victims could be justified by appealing to the 
theory of pure restitution.158 However, it would be very strange to insist that the reason that the burglar 
is forced to wear the device is because by doing so he is giving restitution to his victims by restoring 
them to a level of previous safety. The device seems unambiguously intended to help the police catch 
the burglar if he tries to burgle again, and also to deter him from such attempts. Both of these goals are 
consequentialist reasons to prevent recidivism, and have nothing to do with repairing the harm done to 
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his prior victims. To bring this point into sharper focus, imagine that the burglar had the habit of 
traveling while he burgled, never visiting the same neighborhood twice. Presumably, after catching 
him, the state would still be justified in tracking his movements, but this would not be in order to make 
his previous victims feel safe, but rather to prevent harm to potential future victims. 
 Now, one could contrive a case in which it is more plausible that the burglar's sentence to wear 
the device is justified by a debt to repair the harm done to his victims. For instance if he preyed on five 
or six particular households, repeatedly burglarizing each, then those households would be much more 
relieved to learn of his capture than they would if they were just one-time victims. But even in this 
case, it seems like the best reason to justify the device is to prevent him from returning to those houses, 
not because he is redressing the harm done to them. To further illustrate this point, imagine that 
someone is a victim of a drunken stranger's assault, and that the offender is an alcoholic who is violent 
when he drinks. The victim wants nothing to do with the offender after he is caught and convicted. The 
judge decides that the best sentence is to order monetary restitution on top of mandatory treatment for 
alcoholism. If the judge's reason for giving the order for alcoholism treatment depends, wholly or in 
part, on restoring the victim back to his original state, then the victim have to be aware of the sentence, 
and he would also have to be updated on the offender's progress to ensure that the restoration is 
completed, which could be reasonably assumed to occur when the victim learns that the offender has 
remained sober and thus poses no further risk to him. But if the victim insists that he not hear a single 
thing about the offender after his minimum participation in the conviction (and I'm assuming that 
victim's requests like this one should be respected as much as possible), then it does not seem 
reasonable that the judge's justification for alcoholism treatment could rely on restoring harm to the 
victim. The money for restoration, in bright contrast, seems unproblematically justified by restoring the 
victim.  
 However, a restitutionist could respond by claiming that preventative measures such as GPS 











of increased safety, and the community is composed of anyone who benefits from this increase, 
regardless of they were aware of the risk or the offender's crimes. This argument would hold that since 
the offender inflicts ongoing harm to the community by putting them at risk with potential future 
offenses, then restitution in the form of preventative state interventions should also be ongoing. 
Essentially, this is biting the bullet in two ways: by admitting 1) that both direct and indirect victims 
may not be aware of the restitution (i.e. preventative acts to curb the offender); 2) that the restoration of 
harm does not have to be limited to restoring victims affected by the original offense. The benefit of 
this argument is that restitutionists can deal with problematic cases in which the victims are unaware of 
the restitution, or ones in which people who were unaware of the original offense are given restitution 
to account for their increase in risk, despite not being aware of the original risk or the actions taken to 
curb it. In order to make this argument, the restitutionist needs to show that people can be objectively 
harmed by crime, even if they are not aware of it. Boonin does an admirable job arguing this point, and 
I will not take a stance on that particular question.159 However, the difference between this account of 
restitution and the original conception of monetary restitution is striking. One cannot help wondering 
how much the two actually have in common. An offender paying his victim money for the harm he 
caused him is the simple, original conception. The amended argument would hold that the following 
case of preventative detention is also an example of offender restitution: An offender restoring his 
unwitting victim, who is unaware of both the original offense and the risk the offender's presence in his 
community would impose, by being 'locked up,' in Boonin's words.160  
 Ultimately, this argument fails for two reasons. First, it adds unnecessary complications to what 
would otherwise be straightforward justification of preventative state interventions. Secondly, it strays 
too far from the concept of restitution. To address the first point, Boonin's amended version of pure 
restitution uses crime prevention practices as a means to restore victims by reducing their risk 
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exposure. The problem is that these practices don't need the extra story of restoration in order to be 
justified: they can be justified simply out of concern to prevent crime. Crime prevention practices are 
best understood as a means to prevent crime, and any attempt to turn them into a means for something 
else should be met with skepticism. Not only does the concern of restoring victims seem like an ad hoc 
addition to the justification of these practices, but Boonin's theory of pure restitution gains important 
traction from including these practices. Without them, his theory would be untenable because of the 
fact that many offenders need to be monitored, restricted, treated, or detained in order to maintain a 
tolerably safe community. So it is difficult to see Boonin's justification of these practices under the 
rubric of 'restitution' as anything but piggybacking off the inherent plausibility of their crime 
prevention justification. This can be seen in the number of steps it would take to justify any of these 
particular practices. For example, take an offender who is convicted of a child molestation that 
happened years ago in a different city than his current home of Boston. The state would likely be 
justified in taking a number of interventions with this offender. One uncontroversially plausible 
intervention following the conviction would be that upon his return to his community in Boston, he 
would not be allowed to work or live with children. The obvious justification for this intervention is to 
prevent future harm to children in his community. But Boonin's justification is much more 
complicated. The offender gives restitution to the community, not with money, but because of the 
state's restriction on his movement. Although the members of his community remain unaware of his 
original crime, his restriction restores them to a previous level of objective well being by reducing their 
risk exposure to the offender. These steps are unnecessary. Crime prevention is an end in itself. 
Boonin's account uses it as a means of justifying practices under the banner of restitution, despite the 
uneasy fit. 
 To address the second point, many of the crime prevention practices that Boonin claims are 
justified by appealing to restitution stray so far from the concept of restitution that the justification 











and how it is currently practiced, involves offenders paying their victims. It is an act that the offender 
takes. Of course the act may be coerced, or the offender's wages may even be garnished in which case 
he does not himself complete the action of paying the victim. But it is his money, and it flows from him 
to his victims. As the theory of pure restitution has evolved to address objections, this simple 
transactional concept has morphed beyond recognition. If an offender is locked up against his will 
because he is a danger to the community, what is it exactly that he is paying? What actions or resources 
of his are going to restore his victims? The answers to these questions are not obvious. The conceptual 
force behind restitution resides in an offender's ability to restore his community, and this force loses 
justificatory power the further it lapses away from an offender's payment for his offense. Preventative 
detention is a way to prevent crime; it is not a way for an offender to pay his community back. 
 To summarize and conclude the discussion above, the second of Boonin's responses to the Harm 
to Society Objection claims that state-coerced nonmonetary actions such as wearing a GPS device or 
mandatory treatment are justified by the theory of pure restitution. But for the above reasons, we must 
reject this claim. These are not instances of restitution. Furthermore, because the success of his first 
response, that restitution to secondary victims can adequately approximate the harm done to the 
community, relies on resorting in some cases to nonmonetary restitution, then we must temper his 
conclusion. What Boonin successfully demonstrates in his response to the Harm to Society Objection is 
that in some cases but not all, monetary compensation can adequately repair harm to secondary 
victims. This conclusion depends further on accepting his argument that such restitution is not punitive, 
but I think there is good reason to accept this, and I will give supporting arguments for it at a later 
point. However, this response is not sufficient to overcome the objection. Furthermore, since Boonin 
relies on his claim that state-coerced nonmonetary actions are justified by his theory of pure restitution 
for his responses to other objections, I will refer to my reasoning in this section for rejecting this claim 












2.1.3	  The	  Victimless	  Crime	  Objection	  
 The Victimless Crime Objection points out that there are many crimes that do not have an 
identifiable primary victim to whom the offender should pay restitution. This undermines the theory of 
pure restitution because it calls into question the state's ability to properly respond to such crimes using 
the justification of repairing harm to victims. In this discussion I address a variety of cases that can be 
considered to comprise separate objections. For instance, Boonin addresses the cases of victimless 
wrongdoing (e.g. illegal drugs), failed attempts, and nonharmful endangerment (e.g. drunk driving) as 
separate objections. But the unifying problem for pure restitution in each of these cases is the concern 
that there is no discernible victim, and thus no basis for the state to intervene. 
 Miller notes that controversial topics such as “prostitution, pornography, gambling, and drug 
use” are unhelpful when addressing the Victimless Crime Objection compared to four less 
controversial crimes: (1) cruelty to animals, (2) harm to public institutions, (3) attempts, and (4) 
reckless and/or drunk driving.161 These four crimes are unambiguously harmful to society, and they are 
victimless insofar as there is no clear primary victim to whom restitution could be paid. In Miller's 
words: “On what grounds could persons be prosecuted for such acts if no tangible harm is caused to 
others? What restitution would be appropriate?”  
  Sayre-McCord162 addresses the Victimless Crime Objection by pointing to two tangible harms 
that the so-called 'victimless' crimes create: first is the “marginal costs” to the criminal justice system to 
apprehend and prosecute the crimes. “But the harm is often much more than that, since many 
“victimless” crimes are criminalized precisely because there is a real, albeit diffuse, harm caused by the 
act.”163 Thus in addition to the costs of prosecuting the crimes,  there are the diffuse harms of the 
crimes themselves. The harms may not fall on a single victim that may be paid, but they are spread out 
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among secondary victims. Sayre-McCord offers a further reason to reject this objection that does not 
rely on harms: that breaking a just and reasonable law is grounds enough for the state to force the 
offender to make reparations. He does not elaborate this claim, and it seems dubious to argue that the 
mere breaking of a just law sufficiently grounds reasons for taking a particular response. Advocates of 
punishment and pure restitution would both like to play such a trump card, but both would need to give 
further justifications. 
 Boonin elaborates on Sayre-McCord's secondary victims response to the Victimless Crime 
Objection. This supplements the move that was made to respond to the Harm to Society Objection: 
both responses claim that secondary victims may be adequately, if imperfectly, paid restitution for the 
harms wrongfully done to them. But the response to the Victimless Crime Objection goes further to 
identify such secondary victims as potential beneficiaries of restitution in the four contested cases that 
Miller lists. Many of the problem cases that critics highlight, including Miller's four, can in fact be 
resolved by state-coerced actions that repair harm to primary or secondary victims. For example, 
someone guilty of animal cruelty could pay for his victim's veterinary bills. It is uncontroversial to say 
that animals can be victims of crime when they are bodily harmed; and by paying for an animal's care 
an offender could be repairing this harm. Another uncontroversial example is of an offender who 
defiles a public institution with graffiti who is coerced to pay for the clean up. Yet another example is 
of an offender who attempts to harm his victim but fails, and pays his victim for therapy to overcome 
the trauma of undergoing the potential harm. However, it is not clear how paying for reparations of 
secondary victims can resolve the force of the Victimless Crime Objection in more problematic cases, 
such as an offender who kills an ownerless animal  or an offender who attempts to harm his victim but 
without the victim noticing. These objections are further exacerbated when considering the case of a 
drunk driver. 
 The case of the offender who kills his ownerless animal victim poses two problems. First, there 











else saw the attack, and nobody had any ties to the cat, and other animals could not be said to suffer 
from worrying about an increased rate of animal attacks in their neighborhood. Any secondary victims 
that a defender of restitution could identify would be stretching the notion of victimhood. But we 
would still expect the state to take serious actions to condemn the offender's actions and prevent him 
from further ones. Secondly, reasonable non-punitive responses that a defender of pure restitution 
might endorse would include nonmonetary state-coerced actions. One example is to compel the 
offender to go to animal welfare classes or receive treatment with the goal of desisting from future 
attacks. But these responses seem best justified by prevention of future physical suffering of animals 
rather than reparation paid to secondary victims of the initial attack. 
 Secondly, the case of an offender attempting to harm someone who never learns of the attempt 
poses trouble for pure restitution. Boonin provides a detailed treatment of this specific worry, and 
concludes that the potential victim was objectively harmed, even if he did not realize it, which provides 
a basis for coercing the offender to pay reparation for that harm.164 As an aside, Boonin does not bring 
up the practical worry that in order to pay reparation to the unaware victim, the victim would need to 
learn about the attempt. But assuming that an offender does objectively harm his unaware victim, and 
can be forced to pay reparation to him, the worry arises that the most appropriate kind of reparation 
would be nonmonetary. For example if a stalker whose victim never learns of his stalking is caught, the 
best course of action would be along the lines of ensuring that he does not come near his victim again, 
rather than simply paying for the objective harm he inflicted on his victim. As I showed earlier, pure 
restitution cannot justify such state-coerced nonmonetary actions of this kind. Consider further if the 
stalker’s victim learned of the stalking, but secretly enjoyed it. His family noticed the stalker, reported 
him, and he was detained. In the investigation, the victim cooperated with his family and the police, 
never admitting to the true delight he felt while being stalked. The state would surely be justified in 
making the stalker avoid his victim, but by complying with his orders, the stalker would be actively 
                                                











harming the victim, who acutely misses the thrill of being stalked. There is no way that such harmful 
avoidance may be considered restitution. While this is far-fetched, it further emphasizes the strange 
contortions necessary to try to explain how straightforwardly preventative actions might be justified as 
restitution. 
 Finally, and relatedly, reckless and drunk drivers pose a much more pressing and realistic 
illustration of the same objection above. Imagine a drunk driver who is arrested soon after he begins 
driving, before he encountered any other drivers besides the police. Or consider a drunk driver on a 
particularly empty stretch of highway who is arrested before encountering other drivers. This is another 
case when there are no secondary victims. The state's recourse would be to compel this offending 
driver to similar, if not the same treatment as a drunk driver arrested amid busy traffic. Possible actions 
would include revocation of his driving license and mandatory alcohol classes. Neither of these 
sentences would draw justification from repairing the objective harm done to the other drivers on the 
busy road who were, perhaps unknowingly, put at risk. This can be seen especially in the lack of 
difference between the state's responses to the driver arrested on the empty road and the driver arrested 
on the busy road. Furthermore, the objection about nonmonetary state-coerced actions comes into play 
with the same force. I conclude that pure restitution can justify some responses to 'victimless crimes,' 
but not all, and therefore it fails to overcome the objection.  
 
2.1.4	  The	  Irreparable	  Harms	  Objection	  
 Some crimes, most notably rape165 and murder, result in harms that can never be fully repaired. 
This is not a problem unique to pure restitution. Punishment cannot repair harm done to a murder 
victim any more or less effectively than restitution can. However, this objection claims that pure 
restitution cannot adequately respond to these cases. Boonin does a very thorough job of arguing that 
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simply because an offender takes on a debt that he will never be able to repay does not mean that the 
state cannot coerce him to make as much reparation as possible. His arguments in response to this 
objection are particularly fascinating, and I will not attempt to explain them here. Ultimately I reject his 
arguments because of one problem related specifically to cases of murder as well as problematic 
reliance on nonmonetary restitution that is actually not restitution.  
 There is one serious objection that arises uniquely in the case of murders. This objection states 
that because the victim is dead, there is no sensible way to explain an offender's actions of reparation to 
the dead victim, who “cannot be even partially restored to her previous level of well-being.”166 Boonin 
argues that three undeniable claims can, when taken together, overcome this objection. The first is that 
a debt owed to someone who then dies is still owed to that person, and the money can be transferred to 
the estate of the recently deceased. “This is how the law currently operates, and it is 
uncontroversial.”167 The second is that when someone “cannot pay another precisely what she owes 
him, she can still be obligated to fulfill her debt by substituting something else of comparable value.”168 
For instance if I destroy your irreplaceable painting, then I can still be obligated to pay the approximate 
value despite not ever being able to replace the painting. The third claim is that it is possible to “put a 
dollar value on a person's life.”169 Such approximations of valuing life in dollars already are 
“embedded in the law” and can be seen “[e]very time there is a wrongful death suit.”170 Together these 
three claims work to overcome the objection that an offender cannot be obligated to make monetary 
reparations for a debt incurred by murdering someone: the money can be transferred to the victim's 
estate, the payment can be considered a substitute for the irreplaceable life, and the payment can be 
according to an approximate value for the life lost. But this response leaves Boonin to face at least one 
objection that he cannot overcome: the case of a murder victim who “has no descendants and no 
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will.”171 In this case it would not be possible to transfer payments to a victim's estate, thus undermining 
the first part of Boonin's response. Boonin acknowledges this objection and responds that it can be 
dealt with one of two ways: either the debt can be transferred to the state or it can “be claimed by 
interested parties.”172 Boonin does not elaborate on how an offender paying the state or interested 
parties can be construed as repaying the direct debt owed to the victim. The plausibility of the 
transferability claim that a debt can still be paid to someone deceased relies on the possibility of 
transferring assets to an estate directly related to the deceased. If there is no way to do so, then it seems 
implausible to continue to claim that such transfer can take place.  
 Boonin might respond that this is a question of degree, and that if the state or interested parties 
are the “beneficiar[ies] of the victim's legacy then any debts to the victim become debts to the state.”173 
But this is a degree too far. The transferability claim is credible because the direct relatives or the estate 
of a deceased person are reasonable proxy recipients for him. The reason we believe that they are 
reasonable proxies is because of the directness of the relationship to the deceased: he was the father of 
his surviving children, he was the creator of his estate, the writer of his will. There is no such directness 
in his relationship to the state. Boonin's inclusion of the phrase “interested parties” hints at the 
confusion that this strategy would entail. Suppose a victim with no descendants and no will was known 
to hate paying taxes but who loved his local professional sports team. Arguably there is a much more 
direct relationship between the victim and the sports team than between him and the state. Would the 
sports team be eligible to claim the restitution? I know this is a ridiculous scenario, but I bring it up to 
highlight the confusion that would ensue without the clarity that direct relationships provide. Without 
descendants or a will, we cannot guess the intentions of the deceased, and the strength of the 
transferability claim breaks down. We no longer have reason to believe that we can pay the victim by 
proxy. 
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 Beyond this unique objection, there is a more general objection based on recourse to 
nonmonetary restitution. In discussing irreparable harms, Boonin never explicitly claims that 
nonmonetary state-coerced actions can be justified based on restitution owed to direct crime victims. 
(He only defends this based on restitution owed to secondary victims, which I discussed above). But his 
defense against the Irreparable Harms Objection implicitly relies on this claim. In other sections of his 
defense of pure restitution he references subjecting offenders to probation, GPS monitoring, curfew, 
incarceration, therapy and treatment. This full range of actions would be necessary to sufficiently 
handle rapists and murderers and meet the minimum requirements of a crime response regime. 
However, as I argued above, we should view these actions as preventative rather than examples of 
restitution.  
 
2.1.5	  The	  Inadequate	  Deterrence	  Objection	  
 I move now to Mane Hajdin's response to the criticism that pure restitution would not 
adequately deter offenders. Most crimes are not solved,174 and in a regime of Barnett's pure restitution, 
offenders who are caught would only owe restitution related to their crime. This objection posits that 
under such a regime if an offender considered buying a TV or stealing one, the rational choice would 
be to steal one. This is because he likely would not be caught, and if he were caught he would only 
have to pay a price similar to what he would have paid to buy it. Barnett, Ellin and Boonin all point out 
that the offender should also pay more than the price of the TV for the costs of catching and 
prosecuting him. Hajdin argues further that pure restitution can overcome the objection by treating 
offenders as gamblers. The cost to criminals should be higher than mere 'full restitution,' and instead 
should take account of the criminals' gamble that they won't be caught. In other words, if criminals are 
caught they should pay significantly more than what they owe to repay their gamble that they would 
not be caught. This way the criminal would be properly deterred when considering crime. Of course, an 
                                                











individualized calculation for the gamble involved in each type of crime seems like an implausible task, 
but Hajdin proposes a way to overcome this: “For a certain period we establish the ratio between the 
total amount of damages that are due to criminal acts of a certain type” that are not prosecuted and the 
total amount of restitution due if all cases were prosecuted, then “we increase the amount that each of 
the convicted offenders has to pay by that percentage.”175 What would happen with the surplus income? 
Money over and above the victims' pure restitution would go to a fund that would compensate victims 
of unsolved crimes. This way, “[c]riminals as a group would pay for all the costs of criminal 
activities.”176  This is a clever response, and I suspect that such a regime could arguably have as much 
of a deterrent effect as punishment. One objection would be the plausibility of actually extracting so 
much restitution from offenders, given the high percentage of poor offenders. This anticipates the Poor 
Offender Objection, which I find more forceful and interesting, so I will move forward to discussing 
rich and poor offenders. 
 
2.1.6	  The	  Rich	  Offender	  Objection	  
 As I noted earlier, the possibility of an extremely wealthy rapist who continues to rape victims 
and pay the millions of dollars of restitution poses serious trouble for pure restitution. The only 
plausible response to this scenario would resort to nonmonetary state-coerced actions, which is 
problematic for the reasons I gave above. But even if the crime were less serious than rape and thus 
might not require nonmonetary responses, it would still seem problematic for wealthy people to 'buy' 
crime. Abel and Marsh177 and Sayre-McCord178 both answer that the restitution can be measured in 
effort, or work hours, rather than money. This would level the playing field. One might object to this 
response because if the goal of pure restitution is to repair harm, and a rich offender can adequately do 
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that with money, then forcing him to work additional hours would be redundant. It would also be open 
to criticism that the intention is actually to make him suffer, which would count as punishment. 
 Defendants could respond that the goal is to make the currency of payment fair, rather than 
intending to make the offender suffer. To make an offender work, either at his normal job or one 
provided by the state, seems like it could be justified by the goal of repaying a debt to the victim. 
Working to repay debt is much more straightforward than wearing a GPS device to repay a debt. But 
on closer inspection, we must reject this response. Imagine a wealthy unemployed playboy who enjoys 
spending his time stealing expensive objects and destroying them. If he is caught he could be forced to 
pay restitution measured by hours of work in a government-provided job. This would overcome the 
trouble of his ability to 'buy' the crime. But suppose the victim simply wanted the money for restitution 
as quickly as possible. If the offender were forced to pay the victim but then still work additional hours, 
the justification of pure repayment would seem dubious for the additional hours of labor. And if the 
victim were told to wait until the offender completed the labor, this would undermine the explicit goal 
of repairing harm to the victim.  
 
2.1.7	  The	  Poor	  Offender	  Objection	  
 The Poor Offender Objection draws its force from urgent practical problems rather than 
theoretical inconsistencies. Most offenders are poor. Unsurprisingly, there is a wealth of data showing 
that poor offenders cannot pay victim restitution even when coercive action is taken to compel their 
payment.179 This fact leads to the argument that if poor offenders cannot reasonably be expected to 
afford the restitution they owe, then the theory of pure restitution should be rejected. Secondly, if poor 
offenders know that they cannot be forced to pay restitution because they have no assets, then there 
would be little to deter a poor offender from committing crime. Defendants might counter both 
concerns by substituting monetary payment with work hours. Poor offenders could be compelled to 
                                                











work, either in the private sector or on state projects. This would eliminate the concern over deterrence, 
as well as provide a currency that even poor offenders could use to repay: their effort. 
 Theoretically, this response works well. It avoids the problem of redundancy that plagues the 
same response to the Rich Offender Objection because the poor offender has no option to simply pay 
the restitution. The nonmonetary state-coerced action can also be justified straightforwardly as effort 
directly linked to repaying the offender's debt. But the drawbacks are in the details of implementation. 
Consider two offenders guilty of the same serious robbery, both reluctant to pay the high restitution. 
One has enough funds in his bank account and the other has no assets at all. Pure restitution would 
justify treating the two accomplices extremely differently. One of them would begrudgingly pay the 
restitution, while the other would be consigned to a forced labor camp. Even presuming that the poor 
offender's labor earns him minimum wage, the number of hours required to repay the restitution in full 
would be daunting. If the offender were also charged for the marginal costs added to the criminal 
justice system, such as the costs of his arrest, prosecution, board and housing during the labor camp, as 
well as restitution to the community's secondary victims, then the robbery could very easily cost this 
offender years of forced labor. The stark difference between the two accomplices, both guilty of the 
same crime, one simply having to write a check and the other consigned to forced labor for decades is 
reason enough to reject this response. Even if one does not subscribe to the retributivist ideal of 
equivalent treatments of equivalent wrongdoings, it is easy to see how the resulting situation would be 
untenable. An egregious divide between forced labor camps for the poor offenders and writing a check 
for the rich ones is a politically and historically troubling notion. Given the racial disparity currently 
evident in the US criminal justice system, where a disproportionate percentage of poor black males are 
incarcerated, the switch to a system where fewer wealthy whites were locked up, and the poor black 
men were forced to labor for years would be unpalatable, to say the least. But suppose that the currency 
were measured instead by hours of work rather than the wages of those hours. In this case the state 











number of hours of labor. This response is also flawed because it crosses the line of what pure 
restitution could reasonably justify. If the state goes to the trouble to provide the infrastructure for 
offenders to work, but knows that the work will not result in full restitution, then the state would be 
paying for the offender to work. Why not take the money and compensate the victim instead? Surely 
the money spent on the security, food and housing of offenders in labor camps could instead be 
directed to the victims of the crime in the spirit of repairing the harm done to the victim.  
 However, some might not share my intuitions about proportionality, in which case they may not 
see the “poor offender objection” as a problem for pure restitution. But this will not change the overall 
conclusion that pure restitution fails due to the other forceful objections. 
 
2.1.8	  The	  Restitution	  is	  Actually	  Punishment	  Objection	  
 It will be useful now to take stock of what I have and have not argued in this section. In many 
but not all cases of crime, the theory of pure restitution must resort to state responses that it cannot 
justify. One of the two tenets of pure restitution, is that “the state should compel the offender to restore 
the victim to the level of well-being that the victim rightfully enjoyed prior to the offense.”180 The other 
tenet is that the state should not punish. Many necessary responses to crime simply cannot be justified 
by appealing to restoring victims, or repairing the harm done. However, the goal of restitution can 
justify some responses to crime. What I have argued is that the theory of pure restitution is false, but 
this does not mean that the goal of restitution itself cannot justify non-punitive compulsory victim 
restitution. I now turn to whether this is possible. 
 Even assuming that the theory of pure restitution is false, cases of compulsory victim restitution 
may still be construed as punitive. Take the case of the state compelling a vandal who breaks a window 
to pay for repairing the window. This is clearly justified purely in terms of restitution. But one might 
still object that while it repairs harm, it is also punitive. Forcing the offender to pay clearly harms the 
                                                











offender. However, based on the definition of punishment that I defended in the first chapter, this does 
not qualify as punitive. The intent is to repair the window, not to cause the offender suffering. There is 
some evidence that the general public supports this conclusion. In a study that tracked participants' 
responses to scenarios of victim restitution and punishment, Tsoudis found that people are more likely 
to view compulsory victim restitution as non-punitive, which “further supports the position that victim 
restitution is more compensation than punishment.”181 
 However, consider if the offender refuses to pay restitution. It seems that any mechanisms of 
enforcing his compliance would be punitive. Cholbi writes that if an offender refuses to comply, then 
the state could respond by “forcing her compliance in a literal sense (using electronic funds transfer to 
garnish her wages, for instance) or by resorting to other coercive measures, such as incarceration. Such 
responses amount to punishing her non-compliance.”182 And Kershnar writes, “The likely means of 
ensuring payment is via threat of… punishment”183 These are compelling arguments. If the state orders 
an offender to pay restitution, this alone does not qualify as punitive because the harm involved is not 
intended. However, if the he refuses to pay, and the state threatens to put him in prison, then the threat 
of intended harm is introduced. And if the state carries out this threat, then it seems clear that it has 
punished the offender for non-compliance. There does not seem to be a good response to argue against 
this assessment. A relevant US Supreme Court case shines light on this issue: in 1983 the Court ordered 
that a sentencing court cannot imprison someone who has made good efforts to pay his court-ordered 
restitution debt but cannot make the payment due to “the poverty or inability of the probationer to pay 
the fine and to make restitution.” The Court’s opinion shows that it considered such imprisonment to be 
punishment. It held that a probationer cannot be imprisoned “for failure to pay a fine and make 
restitution, absent evidence and findings that he was somehow responsible for the failure or that 
alternative forms of punishment were inadequate to meet the State's interest in punishment and 
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deterrence.”184 In other words, the Court held that the probationer's poverty is not his responsibility, 
therefore it cannot be held against him as reason for further punishment if he makes good effort to try 
to pay restitution but cannot meet the full payment. 
 Cholbi and Kershnar are correct to point out that many cases of enforcing compulsory victim 
restitution are punitive. They are incorrect, however, in arguing that all cases of enforcing restitution 
are punitive. One notable exception is Cholbi and Kershnar's example of wage garnishment. If an 
offender does not pay restitution and the state threatens to garnish his wages, it is not threatening to 
intentionally harm him. Rather, it is threatening to forcefully do what he was ordered to do: pay the 
victim.  
 I conclude that most cases of actually enforcing compulsory victim restitution are likely 
punitive, with the notable exception of wage garnishment. The court order to pay restitution is not 
punitive, but if it comes along with a threat of punitive enforcement, then its enforcement will entail 
recourse to punishment.  
 
2.1.9	  Looking	  Forward:	  An	  Argument	  for	  Voluntary	  Restitution	  
 To summarize, the theory of pure restitution cannot overcome all objections (or perhaps even 
any of the ones I covered), so it is false. Nonmonetary state-coerced actions often cannot be justified by 
the goal of repairing harm by paying restitution. And enforcing compulsory victim restitution will 
require punishment. Pure restitution, to put it mildly, could not be a standalone alternative to 
punishment. So how would it fit into a non-punitive post-arrest regime? In this section I examine the 
hazards of trying to enforce restitution. In looking at how restitution can be best applied, it is helpful to 
note examples of how it can go wrong. With this practical framework in mind, I argue that restitution is 
best treated as a voluntary option that should be given to offenders. It is in everyone's interest for the 
state to take this avenue seriously. It should facilitate and protect as many opportunities as possible for 
                                                











offenders to pay restitution. One of the main but chronically overlooked benefits of such a system is 
rehabilitation for the offender. 
 To begin, the ruinous effects of mandatory restitution imposed on offenders regardless of their 
ability to pay can be seen today in the USA. In 1996 the passage of the Mandatory Victims Restitution 
Act (MVRA) “made restitution mandatory in almost all cases in which the victim suffered an 
identifiable monetary loss, which removed judicial discretion from the imposition of restitution orders. 
The MVRA also removed judges' ability to fashion restitution orders based on an offender's ability to 
pay.”185 Unsurprisingly, the MVRA has resulted in the explosion of criminal debt, growing eightfold in 
the first decade after its passage, and the vast majority of this debt is unpaid victim restitution.186 In a 
moment of remarkable candor, the Department of Justice admitted that the MVRA “has resulted in a 
large surge in criminal debt, but it has not resulted in any appreciable increase in compensation to the 
victims of crime, in most cases, because of the defendants' inability to pay."187 Because over 85% of 
arrested offenders are impoverished, and because their assets gained by criminal activity are seized by 
the state, and because they have low levels of training and skills, and because their job prospects 
diminish after their release, and for a wide variety of other factors contributing to their poverty,188  
“judges have likened the collection of restitution to 'get[ting] blood out of a stone.'”189 There is 
evidence that suggests offenders do not try as hard to fulfill their restitution orders when they feel that 
the orders are unfair and unrealistic compared to when the orders are tailored to their situations.190  
 In addition to victim restitution, the state has tried to recoup the enormous costs of mass 
incarceration and other criminal justice expenses by imposing fees and fines on top of restitution debt. 
Legal debt is long term and subject to interest, and it is “typically substantial.” In fact, “By 2008, 
                                                
185 Dickman, 2009, at 1688. 
186 Id. at 1691-2. 
187 Id. at 1694, quoting: “Letter from Clarence A. Lee, Assoc. Dir., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, to Gary T. Engel, 
Dir. of Fin. Mgmt. and Assurance, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office (June 6, 2001), in GAO, CRIMINAL DEBT 2001, at 105.” 
188 Dickman, 2009, at 1695. 
189 Id., quoting: “R. Barry Ruback, The Imposition of Economic Sanctions in Philadelphia: Costs, Fines, and Restitution, 
FED. PROBATION, June 2004, at 21, 25.” 











defendants sentenced in 2004 had been charged an average of $11,471 by the courts over their 
lifetime.”191 This additional debt has more and more frequently translated into imprisonment. While 
this may seem implausible given that debtors' prisons were banned in 19th century Europe, and also 
given the 1983 Supreme Court case I cited above, it is an increasingly common practice. The reason for 
this is specifically the practice of arresting debtors “not for nonpayment, but rather for civil contempt 
of court—that is, failure to comply with a court order to pay their financial obligations.”192 This allows 
the courts to imprison debtors without having to charge them for nonpayment. “In short, this civil route 
to prison or jail is not only characterized by relatively few procedural roadblocks, but has enabled 
judges and others to revive an especially controversial practice—the incarceration of indigent 
debtors.”193 
 So what are the effects of these policies and practices? They burden an already penniless 
population with massive debt. This debt follows offenders for years and harms them in various ways: 
lowering their credit rating, decreasing their likelihood of securing housing and income, bankrupting 
family members. And increasingly it results with imprisonment for failure to pay.194 Put succinctly, the 
“epidemic adoption of fines and fees on top of restitution requirements and child support obligations 
has contributed to a massive problem for the poor without justification.”195 Another effect is that 
victims are less satisfied with the compensation they receive.196 I will discuss this further in the next 
section where I argue for state compensation. Finally, by undermining offenders' confidence in their 
ability to actually pay their restitution, the MVRA has compromised the potential rehabilitative effects 
of restitution. To summarize: low rates of actual victim compensation, massive unjustified debt on the 
poor, a pernicious return to debtors' prisons, and a burgeoning bureaucracy to handle the Sisyphean 
task of collecting the un-collectable. This leads me to conclude that there are forceful practical reasons 
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to reject implementing a system of enforced victim restitution.  
 The original function of offender's paying restitution to their victims was to rehabilitate 
offenders. “[I]n the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was imposed primarily to promote 
the responsibility and rehabilitation of offenders, not to compensate victims.”197 In 1979 Galaway 
wrote that public opinion was beginning to change, and over the past three decades we have witnessed 
an almost total reversal. But Galaway warned back then what we have seen now: “Although restitution 
may benefit the comparatively small number of victims of captured and converted offenders, it will not 
be an effective program for meeting the victims' needs.”198 Even the US Supreme Court acknowledged 
that restitution while on the surface seems oriented toward the victim, it is in fact focused on offenders, 
either as a sanction or as rehabilitation. The Court held that “[a]lthough restitution does resemble a 
judgment 'for the benefit of' the victim, the context in which it is imposed undermines that conclusion.” 
And further the Court claimed that criminal court-ordered restitution should not be construed as a 
means of compensating the victim “[b]ecause criminal proceedings focus on the State's interests in 
rehabilitation and punishment, rather than the victim's desire for compensation.”199 That was 1986. 
Unfortunately, by the time that the MVRA was passed, the shift in approach to restitution had become 
complete. 
 There are proven positive rehabilitative effects of restitution. For instance, one study showed 
that offenders who paid a higher percentage of their restitution orders “were less likely to commit new 
offenses.” Another study showed that juveniles who participated in restitution were less likely to 
reoffend than their peers who did not participate.200 Furthermore, voluntary acts of contrition and 
restitution are good signals of desistance, pointing to “the absence of repeated behavior among those 
who had established a pattern of such behavior.”201 Ward and Salmon note that voluntary acts of 
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restitution are an invaluable part of communal reconciliation. They write that, “[t]here are two facets to 
reconciliation that are clinically relevant: offenders' obligation to apologize and make reparations and 
the community's obligation to help the offender reintegrate back into the community once hard 
treatment is served.”202 While I have shown many of the potentially harmful effects of mandatory 
restitution, I don't want to underemphasize the potential positive benefits of opening channels of 
restitution for offenders. There is no reason that an indigent offender in prison should not have the 
opportunity to pay restitution. He could pay with his hours of labor, possibly at community service, or 
at voluntary employment projects in order to make money that he would then choose to send to the 
victim. The rehabilitative and reconciliatory benefits make voluntary restitution something that should 
be available for every offender. 
 
2.2	  Victim	  Compensation	  
 In this brief section I argue that state compensation for victims of violent crime is an essential 
part of any crime response regime. I give three justifications for the claim that violent crime victim 
compensation is the state's obligation. First, such compensation is an essential public good, and the 
state is obliged to provide such goods. Secondly, because the state has a duty to protect its citizens, the 
state should act on the presumption that it owes compensation to violent crime victims for failing to 
protect them. Third, when a law is broken, the state is obliged to communicate certain values and 
commitments. Following cases of violent crime, compensating the victims is the best, most direct way 
for the state to acknowledge the seriousness of the harm, express collective sympathy for the victim, 
express remorse in not having prevented the harm and take responsibility in working to redress the 
harm.  
 Before addressing these justifications, I want to make some background points and clarify 
terms. As a reminder, when I use the term 'compensation' I am referring to payment made from the 
                                                











state to a victim. Compensation is most likely monetary, but there is no reason that the state should be 
limited to monetary compensation. Providing access to psychological treatment seems like an 
unproblematic way to compensate a rape victim. Also, when I refer to 'victims' hereafter I refer to 
“victims who have sustained personal injury directly caused by an intentional crime against the victim's 
life, health or personal integrity.”203 This definition comes from the Commission's Communication on 
Standards and Actions concerning crime victims in the European Union, and it has the advantage of 
including deserving victims of sexual, racist or xenophobic crimes that may not qualify as 'violent' but 
still merit inclusion. For the sake of simplicity I refer to 'intentional crime against the victim's life, 
health or personal integrity' simply as 'violent crime.'  
 I limit the state's obligations to victims of intentional violent crime for two reasons. The first 
reason is that insurance can feasibly cover most victims of accidental violence and property crime, 
while “there is no general type of insurance” for violent crime.204 Secondly, civil law provides avenues 
for seeking damages in all these cases of crime, but because violent crime victims usually do not pursue 
civil lawsuits, and because the state has certain obligations to them that I will enumerate below, they 
should be eligible for compensation in addition to the option to pursue a civil claim. The reason victims 
normally do not pursue civil claims is because they understand that, most often, the offenders will not 
be able to afford the damages owed.205 For this reason civil lawsuits are usually not pursued unless the 
defendant is an institution with deep pockets, and even then, it is enough of an imbroglio to deter most 
potential claimants. Thus, without insurance, and without reliable access to civil damages, violent 
crime victims are left out in the cold. And as I’ve explained, restitution from offenders is an unreliable 
source of compensation. Galaway writes that, “Although restitution may benefit the comparatively 
small number of victims of captured and converted offenders, it will not be an effective program for 
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meeting the victims’ needs.”206 One might argue that victims would be more satisfied to receive 
restitution from the offender. However, research from Australia shows that victims are primarily 
concerned with being compensated, and the source of the compensation does not matter to their level of 
satisfaction. Indeed, because the state can much more reliably compensate victims, it results in much 
more victim satisfaction. Victims who are compensated by the state are even much more willing to 
forgive the offender.207 Unfortunately, most victims of violent crime currently do not apply for the 
scant public compensation funds that are available.208  Due to the justifications I am about to explain, 
the state already has an obligation to compensate them, and the lack of viable alternatives supplements 
this argument. 
 I move now to the justification of violent crime victim compensation as an essential public 
good. George Klosko provides a novel solution to the puzzle of why we consider it obvious that 
governments should provide benefits to their citizens to the exclusion of citizens in other states that 
may be far more needy. In the course of answering this, he focuses on “people’s need for a range of 
public goods, bearing mainly on security in different forms from different threats, if they are to lead 
acceptable lives.”209  He elaborates with the example of the state's protecting citizens from crime: 
“Because of the special relationship she bears to state X, a given individual, Smith, is required to obey 
X’s laws. But her obedience comes at a price. It is in exchange for benefits, especially security, the 
state provides, which are provided only to people who are required to obey.”210 In other words, there 
are public goods that are uniquely available to citizens of a particular state because the existence of a 
particular good depends on the mandatory participation of its citizens in return for the state's providing 
that good. This explains why the good cannot be extended past the borders of the nation state. The law 
is one such example. Citizens are obliged to follow its state's laws, and the state enforces this mandate. 
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As a result, the state is obliged to provide the public good of protection to its citizens. As Klosko 
writes, “Insofar as the necessary cooperation is coordinated by law, citizens are required to obey the 
law. It is only through general adherence to the law that an environment of law and order is able to 
exist... Circumstances are similar with other essential public goods.”211 Klosko gives three criteria for 
what can be considered one of these essential public goods: “The goods in question must be (1) worth 
their costs, (2) indispensable to satisfactory lives, and (3) fairly distributed.”212 
 The public good of  violent crime victim compensation meets these three criteria. Every state, 
whether it is a welfare state or not, spends considerable time and energy protecting its citizens against 
crime. The costs of prevention are clearly worthy, and the cost of redressing harm after the crime is 
equivalently worthy. Violent crime victims are changed dramatically, and in many cases they need help 
to restore themselves to satisfactory lives. Furthermore, by focusing on the most serious transgressions 
of the laws that the state obliges us to follow, this compensation avoids potentially disqualifying 
concerns about fairness of distribution. As I noted earlier, violent crime victims cannot fall back on 
insurance or other means of compensation. And the seriousness of the breach of laws invokes one of 
the state's fundamental obligations: to protect its citizens. As Kolsko notes, a state's obligations are 
based “mainly on security.”213 The state may protect people by preventing crime, or it may protect 
victims from the ongoing negative effects of living through violent crime. It seems uncontroversial that 
protecting citizens is a primary obligation of any state, whether it is a welfare state or a minimal state.  
 The second justification for the obligation of compensation assumes that the state has an 
obligation to protect its citizens from violent crime. Given this duty, every instance of violent crime 
could be seen as a failure of the state to fulfill its duty. Of course, the state cannot ever be reasonably 
expected to prevent all violent crime. Thus it will probably be unclear from case to case whether the 
state is in fact responsible for a lapse in its responsibility. Given this uncertainty and the foundational 
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claim that the state's duty to protect is a very significant one, the state should then act on the 
presumption that it owes violent crime victims compensation for failing to protect them.214 
 The third justification stems from the argument that the state is obliged to express certain values 
and commitments following an instance of crime. This thinking receives forceful treatment from 
Feinberg and Duff, and although they were attempting to use state expression of values to justify 
punishment, the claim still maintains its force. And justifying compensation is far less problematic than 
justifying punishment because of the trouble involved with attempting to justify the harmful treatment 
of offenders. As I wrote earlier in this dissertation, there are many functions of the state expressing its 
condemnation of an offender's actions: it allows the state to disavow the offenders' actions; it serves to 
“speak in the name of the people” the state's symbolic nonacquiescence; it vindicates the law by 
“emphatically reaffirming” it when it is broken and it validates the rights of victims that were 
transgressed.215 These functions are all fulfilled by victim com ensation. Compensation condemns the 
moral wrongness of the breach of lawfulness by expressing each of the above messages. But in addition 
to acknowledging the seriousness of the wrong done and condemning it, compensation is uniquely well 
suited for expressing collective sympathy for the victim, remorse in not having prevented the harm and 
willingness to take responsibility in working to redress the harm. Buck gives a forceful argument that 
compensation should be given to victims out of “social solidarity.”216 A final advantage of state-funded 
compensation is that it can be paid to the victim without any action required from the victim (for 
instance pursuing the harrowingly complicated process of civil compensation). For this reason payment 
can also be expedited to the victim.217 See Felduthusen et al. for excellent research and 
recommendations on how to smoothen this process for the victim. Working with compensation 
schemes in Ontario, they conclude that many victims would prefer to be compensated by the state, and 
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then have the additional option to pursue civil damages if they wish.218   
 The justifications I have given may each contribute to each other, or they may be regarded as 
individually sufficient. For these reasons, I conclude that state compensation is the best way to repair 
harm done to victims of violent crime. It is not the only way, but it is essential. To conclude the whole 
chapter, another avenue that should be available is voluntary restitution. Mandatory restitution should 



















                                                
















 An alternative post-arrest regime to the current punitive model could make use of the hard and 
potentially harmful but non-punitive interventions that are commonly associated with punishment. 
Examples of such interventions include drug rehabilitation, sex-offender therapy, preventive detention 
and electronic monitoring among many others. These interventions are essential for any non-punitive 
regime to meet the first requirement for crime response which I discussed earlier, namely to maintain 
public safety and order. They fall under two broad categories: rehabilitation and incapacitation.  
 There is a wide range of offender-focused state interventions that I will broadly refer to as 
'rehabilitation.' This range includes relatively non-intrusive interventions such as community service 
orders, and it extends to include highly intrusive interventions such as sex offender therapy.219 Another 
range of interventions, conceptually distinct from rehabilitation, involves incapacitating offenders to 
various degrees, from requiring them to wear an electronic monitor to detaining them. Rehabilitation 
aims to change an offender's future behavior in the community by bringing him through a course of 
treatment. On the other hand, incapacitation aims to prevent crime by restricting the freedom of the 
offender.220 One question that arose in Chapter Two becomes the central focus of Chapter Three: 
whether enforcing a non-punitive court mandate will involve recourse to punishment. Regarding 
mandatory restitution, I concluded that enforcing restitution orders, which by themselves are non-
punitive, will inevitably include recourse to punitive measures (with the exception of wage 
garnishment). In this chapter I will come to similar conclusions for rehabilitation and incapacitation. 
Rehabilitation in some cases will need to be mandatory; in those cases, enforcing the mandate will 
include recourse to punishment. Similarly, incapacitation, while non-punitive itself, oftentimes takes 
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the form of a threat of punishment. While the threat is distinct from the punishment, any state engaged 
in common restrictive practices that qualify as incapacitation will have to rely on punishment to carry 
out the threat. In this chapter I will argue that a post-arrest regime that relies on rehabilitation and 
incapacitation (and any viable regime must rely on these) also must rely on punishment out of 
necessity. This conclusion is enough to further conclude that there is no viable non-punitive crime-
response regime. However, this conclusion does not entail that a regime relying on rehabilitation and 
incapacitation will take recourse to punishment in each individual case. In fact, I argue that the opposite 
is true: a regime using punishment as a viable threat should be able to avoid punishment in most cases 
involving rehabilitation and incapacitation. Furthermore, the effectiveness of these interventions, 
coupled with the state's obligation to minimize suffering according to the concept of parsimony, means 
that the state is obliged to attempt to work to avoid recourse to punishment except in cases which 
necessitate its use. And as I will discuss in the final chapter of this dissertation, the recourse to 
punishment can and should be minimized in such a way to drastically change current public policy.   
 I begin my discussion of offender rehabilitation by discussing its definition, the various 
paradigms of offender rehabilitation throughout history, as well as the variety of treatments that fall 
under its scope. Then I will evaluate the justifications for rehabilitative interventions, address 
objections and explore the relationship between rehabilitation and punishment.  
 
	  3.1	  A	  Definition	  of	  Offender	  Rehabilitation	  
 Colloquially, when people refer to offender rehabilitation, they refer to a collection of practices 
aiming to 'make the offender right.' In this section I aim for a precise definition. Defining offender 
rehabilitation in the context of this dissertation has a similar potential pitfall to defining punishment. 
The definition of rehabilitation could be unfair if it smuggles in justification(s) for rehabilitative 











justification question should be approached similarly to the way scholars have attempted to justify 
punishment. Separate from smuggling in justification, another concern is that a definition might 
unfairly preempt the question of whether a rehabilitative intervention is also punitive, that is, it may 
define itself away from punishment without proper explanation of why the two practices are separate. 
But on closer inspection, this is not a problem. In this section I argue that an intervention cannot be 
both rehabilitative and punitive. This is not an outrageous position, and is in fact very similar to how I 
discussed restitution. While I claim that restitution is definitionally distinct from punishment, this poses 
no problem for discussing whether mandatory restitution involves recourse to punishment. In this 
chapter I apply the same skepticism to whether mandatory rehabilitation can be non-punitive.
 Another problem is that the term 'offender rehabilitation' includes a messy cluster of concepts 
and connotations. In 1959 Allen underlined this point hyperbolically: “No idea is more pervaded with 
ambiguity than the notion of reform or rehabilitation.”221 While the concept of offender rehabilitation 
does encompass a wide variety of practices, this does not disqualify it from a precise definition. Legal 
punishment also encompasses a wide variety of practices, and the term 'punishment' also connotes 
many ambiguous meanings in everyday speech, but clearly this does not keep us from arriving at a 
precise definition of legal punishment. There have been many definitions offered for offender 
rehabilitation (hereafter I will use 'offender rehabilitation' and 'rehabilitation' interchangeably). The 
definitions offered often focus on the ultimate goal of treatment, such as behavior change and 
desistance. While definitions and characterizations abound, 222 I am not aware of an attempt to defend a 
precise account of the necessary and sufficient conditions of rehabilitation. 
 What does rehabilitation have in common with punishment? Both are authorized, or 
implemented by the state. Both are retributive, or given to an offender in response to his committing a 
crime. Of course there are offenders who volunteer for rehabilitation in private centers, but because 
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their treatment was not part of a sentence, it would be considered just 'rehabilitation' rather than 
'offender rehabilitation.' Rounding out the commonalities, both punishment and rehabilitation are 
interventions intended by the state. One major difference is that the intention behind punishment is to 
harm the offender, which is not true of rehabilitation, in which the intention is to treat the offender.
 Our definition of rehabilitation includes: authorized, retributive, intended treatment. I want to 
add a further condition: to qualify as rehabilitation, the imposition should include a minimum level of 
consent by the offender. Thus my proposed definition of criminal rehabilitation is: authorized, 
retributive, consensual, intended treatment. Both the 'consensual' and 'treatment' aspects of the 
definition need elaboration. For discussion of the three other requirements of the definition, I refer the 
reader back to my discussion of the definition of punishment.  
 
3.1.1.	  The	  Consensual	  Requirement	  of	  Rehabilitation	   	  
 If an offender dissents from treatment that the state forces on him against his will, or if the state 
treats him without his knowledge, then these interventions are not rehabilitation. Rehabilitation requires 
at least a minimal level of the offender's participation and involvement, and this minimal level is what I 
am using to mean  'consent.' Rotman writes that rehabilitation “demands fully informed and willing 
intelligent participation.”223 Before arguing that consent is a necessary component to rehabilitation, I 
should further specify what I mean by 'consent' in relationship with coercion, because the minimal level 
I am referring to is different from how the term is normally used. Many discussions of consent in the 
applied ethics literature refer to very robust notions of consent. In medical ethics, the consent of a 
patient is treated with utmost care to make sure that the patient's choice has not been coerced in any 
way. For instance, a potential kidney donor goes through a battery of tests and interviews, including 
extensive questioning regarding his relationship with the recipient to determine whether there is any 
                                                











evidence that the choice is being coerced in any manner.224 This firm notion of consent is not what I am 
using to define criminal rehabilitation. When I use 'consent' to refer to rehabilitation, I mean that the 
offender has the physical ability to choose otherwise. The state might strongly coerce the offender to 
participate, but so long as it does not physically force his participation, the program may qualify as 
rehabilitation. This is the minimal, weakest version of consent. It also aligns with our thoughts about 
rehabilitation programs outside of the legal context. Consider a drug addict who is considering 
enrolling in the private drug rehabilitation clinic. This addict has lost his job, much of his savings, and 
his sense of self worth. He is desperate to overcome his addiction. Furthermore, his wife tells him that 
if he doesn't successfully complete the program, then she will leave him and take their children with 
her. The addict's decision is being intensely coerced, yet we would still consider his enrollment in the 
program to be voluntary at this minimal level. He consents insofar as he remains physically able to 
choose not to enroll, despite being coerced from every direction in his life. Consenting to rehabilitation 
in the private facility is the same notion I am using to define consent for criminal rehabilitation. Of 
course, when the state coerces an offender, it often does so with the threat of punishment. I argue later 
in the chapter that the threat itself is an act of incapacitation, separate from rehabilitation. And only if it 
carries out the threat, then it is punishment. 
 There are two primary reasons that I include the consent requirement in the definition. First and 
foremost, without it, rehabilitation would include practices that clearly are not rehabilitative. Secondly, 
it provides very helpful conceptual clarity in distinguishing rehabilitation from incapacitation. I will 
explain that conceptual payoff in section 3.2 when I discuss incapacitation. 
  In order to show that the consent requirement is necessary, I will give examples of state 
interventions that meet all the definitional requirements of offender rehabilitation except for the 
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consent requirement, but which clearly are not rehabilitative. Zimmerman uses the example of aversion 
therapy from A Clockwork Orange to illustrate a strange category that he deems “non-educative” 
rehabilitation, but it seems clear that this should not qualify as rehabilitation at all.225  In both the movie 
and book versions, the story features scenes of state agents forcing the main character, who is guilty of 
brutal crimes, to watch images associated with crime while he is induced with nausea. This is part of a 
regimen of making him physically ill every time he even thinks of a criminal act. This harsh aversion 
therapy qualifies as non-consensual even by the minimal sense of consent because the offender has no 
option to refuse the therapy. But besides being non-consensual, this practice meets all the other 
definitional requirements of offender rehabilitation: it is authorized, retributive, intended treatment. If 
the practice is not an instance of offender rehabilitation, then it is likely because of the difference in 
consent. My intuition is that this practice of clamping open a person's eyelids and inducing nausea is 
not rehabilitation, but even if the reader does not share my intuition, there are good reasons that this 
practice should not be considered rehabilitation.  
 The concept of rehabilitation has changed over time, but currently the debate regarding consent  
has shifted from whether rehabilitation should be consensual at all to what extent it should be 
consensual. Early penal reformers, who may be considered some of the first advocates of rehabilitation, 
advocated for changes that completely ignored the notion of consent and lead to unfortunate outcomes, 
including “extended periods of solitary confinement.”226 These early attempts at reform would not now 
be regarded as rehabilitative. However, the current debate centers on the question of what degree the 
state may coerce an offender to participate in rehabilitation. Underlying this debate is the implied 
premise that the offender must be able to choose otherwise, or must have minimal consent. Even the 
advocates arguing for more state coercion agree with this premise. They argue that “interventions 
offered to [offenders] are coercive not in the sense that individual offenders have no choice but to 
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cooperate, but rather in the sense that there are likely to be negative consequences for non-
participation.”227 Gone are the days when solitary confinement regardless of an offender's will can be 
considered rehabilitation, and in fact, US law claims that rehabilitation cannot be a justification for 
imprisonment.228 Gone too is, hopefully, the notion that the aversion therapy in Clockwork Orange 
could be construed as rehabilitation.  
 Of course, the intervention from Clockwork Orange is an extreme example of non-consensual 
offender therapy. While most types of aversion therapy are physically restrictive, it is possible that they 
could qualify as rehabilitative if the offender consents to the treatment, and has a way to stop it. But the 
course of treatment in A Clockwork Orange is incapacitative because it physically restricts action 
without regard to the offender's will. The practice is the perfect example of a non-rehabilitative 
intervention belonging to a separate, non-consensual category; that category is offender incapacitation, 
as I will explain in section 3.2. 
 Both the Clockwork Orange intervention and solitary confinement-as-treatment are examples of 
state interventions that are authorized retributive treatment, but cannot be construed as rehabilitation 
because of the lack of minimal consent. To further argue for the necessity of the consent requirement, 
consider the example of a private drug rehabilitation program that involves a month of living in a 
facility under strict conditions. Patients are compelled to cut off contact with the outside world, and if a 
cell phone is found it is confiscated against the patient's will. The patient agrees to enter the program, 
and he has the option to leave, but a variety of actions during his treatment are coerced against his will. 
This is uncontroversially rehabilitative. However, if a disgruntled relative paid the program to kidnap 
the patient and force him to stay against his will, this would not be rehabilitative, but troublingly 
incapacitative, even if it is still a course of treatment. Restricting an offender without regard to his will 
is categorically different from his consensual participation in a course of treatment. Coercion in the 
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environment of social work and social service delivery is not unique to criminal justice. As Peters 
notes, “[c]oercive environments, after all, are endemic to many forms of social work intervention... 
Many social workers in other fields have very few clients submitting to services entirely 
voluntarily.”229 And Kleiman notes that, “Probation, fines, community service and drug diversion all 
have something in common: they involve… voluntary—albeit unwilling—compliance… The offender 
always has the option of ignoring the rules… That means that there needs to be an enforcement 
mechanism.”230 
 One might object to the consent requirement of rehabilitation by claiming that it presupposes 
that the intervention is non-punitive. This objection would hold that by building consent into the 
definition of rehabilitation, it precludes the possibility that the state's action is punitive. But this 
objection is mistaken for two reasons.  First, the question of whether a state action is punitive does not 
hinge on whether the offender consents to his sentence. If the state intends to harm an offender for his 
crime, then the harmful action is punitive, regardless of whether the offender consents to it or not. 
Therefore, the definition of rehabilitation does not preemptively shut the door on discussion of whether 
a particular course of rehabilitative treatment is actually the kind of intended 'hard treatment' that 
counts as punishment. Secondly, if the state gives an offender a sentence of mandatory rehabilitation, 
then there are two components to the mandate: the course of treatment, and the threat of enforcement. 
While a course of rehabilitation may not be punitive, the enforcement of mandated treatment includes 
the coercion of treatment over the offender's dissent, or the punishment of the offender for refused 
treatment. Note that the definition remains neutral on the question of whether offender rehabilitation is 
mandatory and if so how it could be enforced. Of course, these are centrally important questions, but 
they are separate from questions of the definition of offender rehabilitation. 
 I should note that professionals in the field of offender rehabilitation generally agree with the 
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consent requirement I have defended. Writing for the Journal of Sexual Aggression, Prescott and 
Levenson (who both work in sex offender therapy) write that,  
Treatment providers do not counsel clients who refuse services, as to do so would be 
unethical. Clients can choose whether or not to agree to the limits of confidentiality, and 
although there may be consequences for choosing not to participate in the programme, 
these sanctions are determined and enforced by the court, not the treatment provider.231 
 
Another example is provided by the Correctional Service of Norway Staff Academy, which keeps 
correctional statistics of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. In its definitions of terms, it 
explicitly states the need for the offender to consent before participating in treatment plans, community 
service or a community sentence.232  
 
3.1.2	  The	  Treatment	  Requirement	  of	  Rehabilitation	  
 Using the word 'treatment' in the definition of rehabilitation has the downside of connoting the 
popular mid-20th century 'rehabilitative ideal' that strove for individualized plans for offenders to such 
an extent that it prompted a backlash from a diverse range of scholars and practitioners.233 I will not 
rehash this well-trod territory, but will simply say that I mean to use 'treatment' in a way that remains 
neutral on such questions as to whether treatment can justify indeterminate sentencing, the extent to 
which the welfare state is obliged to fix societal ills that contribute to crime, and the extent to which 
treatment can 'work.' These issues are important, and I address them later while discussing 
justifications of rehabilitation, but for now I want to explicitly deny that my use of 'treatment' in the 
definition privileges particular perspectives on these issues. Furthermore, by including the consent 
requirement alongside 'treatment' in the definition, I hope to stave off worries that my use of 'treatment' 
implies that offenders are entirely passive recipients of medical attention that would 'cure' them given 
enough time and expertise. Clearly this 'disease analogy' is faulty for many reasons, and foremost 
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among them is the fact that offenders need to take part in their own rehabilitation. It is a mistake to see 
rehabilitation as something done to offenders rather than something the state can manage with them.234 
Indeed, this worry was part of the motivation to include the consent requirement.  
 However, using 'treatment' in the definition has the benefit of capturing a wide variety of state 
interventions for offenders, and is thus a useful word for including the diverse practices that fall in the 
ambit of rehabilitation. 'Treatment' can point to practices that Duff characterized as “seeking to 
improve people's skills, capacities and opportunities.”235 Lynch elaborates, giving a helpful portrayal of 
rehabilitation as “any discourse or practices that speak to transforming or normalizing the criminal into 
a socially defined non-deviant citizen, including psychological programs, drug treatment programs, 
educational and work training programs, work and housing placement assistance, and half-way 
houses.”236 I use 'treatment' to capture these practices, and more specifically, to mean: a course of 
therapy, not limited to the field of medicine, designed to induce or help bring about behavioral and/or 
attitudinal changes in the recipient. Even with this explanation, the term 'therapy' remains vague, but 
this does not pose a problem. When scholars use 'treatment' and 'therapy' in the context of criminal 
rehabilitation, they mean to encompass the wide variety of practices used to spur changes in the 
offender. This is the difference between treatment and punishment: whereas treatment's primary goal is 
to change behavior and attitudes, punishment's primary goal is to harm the offender. Of course, the 
harm of punishment may in the long-term result in the rehabilitation of the offender. But this is a 
secondary goal, or justification of punishment, and should not be confused with treatment. 
Rehabilitation may foreseeably harm the offender, but the intention is to change his behavior while any 
resultant harm is a regrettable and unintended consequence.  
 Again, this raises the question of how we can determine the intention behind the treatment. This 
objection holds that because we cannot know the real intention behind a treatment, a course of 
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treatment may look exactly like punishment but is labeled as 'rehabilitation' simply because someone 
reports that its primary intention is to change the behavior and attitudes of the offender. This objection 
holds that mental states are fickle and that we have no reliable way to trust whether reports of 
intentions are accurate. Again, as with the case of punishment, there is a way to determine the intention 
behind a course of rehabilitation, and it relies on public dialogue rather than internal mental states. 
Recall that in the case of punishment, the external location of the intention rests in the nexus of the 
dialogue between the legislature and the judiciary. The legislature expresses the intention, and the 
judiciary judges whether the practice actually corresponds with the expressed intention. In the case of 
rehabilitation, the intention resides both in the dialogue between legislature and judiciary, as well as in 
the nexus between codes of professional practice and professional review.  
 To illustrate this, I will take the example the recent discussion among sex offender therapists 
over whether the aim of community safety impedes the traditional principles of treatment like 
beneficence and autonomy.237 This debate shows that professional codes and discourse can solve tricky 
problems about the aims of rehabilitation. It also illustrates that external dialogue (rather than hidden 
mental states) provides the intention behind treatment, as well as yielding criteria to determine the 
enforcement of borderline cases. This dialogue takes the form of professional codes of ethics and the 
deliberation over violations of the codes. Among the sex offender therapy community, Glaser has 
raised concerns over the conflicting aims of treatment. He has argued that because of the emphasis on 
changing the offender's behavior for the sake of community safety rather than the sake of benefiting the 
offender, current sex offender therapy “demands that confidentiality be broken, treatment be coercive 
and the offender undertake the therapy chosen by the clinician, whatever the cost to the offender.”238 
Since this is a tension that arises specifically for experts in sex offender therapy, I will not presume to 
prescribe how to think about this issue. I merely want to point out that the dialogue demonstrates that 
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these experts can answer these questions. In response to Glaser, Prescott and Levenson point out three 
organizations that publish ethical codes and review cases of misconduct for the exact locus of tension 
that Glaser is concerned about, namely the tension between a therapist's duty to community safety and 
his duty to protect his client. These organizations are the Association for the Treatment of Sexual 
Abusers (ATSA), the American Psychological Association (APA) and the National Association of 
Social Workers (NASW).  
There is no question that some clinicians attend to the competing needs and other 
challenges of this work better than others, which is why organizations such as ATSA, 
APA and NASW enforce their ethical codes. In fact, meeting these seemingly 
competing demands is what most sexual offender treatment providers do every day.239 
 
They note further that the professional codes explicitly acknowledge the tension, and they mandate 
certain professional practices to account for them. To take one example, the offender is fully informed 
of this tension before treatment begins, and what it may mean for him. He is able to take this into 
account before consenting to the treatment. The APA and NASW mandate that programs must “make 
clear at the outset of treatment that part of their intent is risk reduction, and that this is accomplished, in 
part, through limited confidentiality and collaboration with other professionals.” After this is made 
clear, offenders may choose to then “sign an informed consent statement clarifying the boundaries of 
confidentiality and disclosure.”240 I have provided this brief glimpse into the dialogue between sex 
offender therapists and their professional codes to show that the intentions of treatment are not only 
explicit and codified, but the professional dialogue is able to handle the difficult problems arising from 
aiming for treatment and community safety.  
 Furthermore, this dialogue is also played out between legislature and judiciary. An example of 
this is a recent US court case that calls into question what properly counts as rehabilitation. In United 
States v. Molignaro the First Circuit Court decided that “rehabilitation could not be used to justify post-
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revocation reimprisonment.”241 This decision illustrates a capable and active exchange of laws and 
interpretations deciding whether the intention behind a particular practice (in this case using prison as a 
means of rehabilitation) can be justified. With this as evidence, I conclude that we should reject the 
objection that the true intention of treatment is opaque and that we cannot know whether any course of 
treatment has overstepped this intention. 
 
3.2	  The	  Changing	  Paradigms	  of	  Rehabilitation	  
 For centuries people have focused on how to rehabilitate and reform offenders. Medieval clergy 
emphasized that the primary purpose of punishment was for the good of the offender.242 The rise of the 
prison, especially in the USA, is intimately tied to notions of reforming offenders. While the central 
focus of Bentham's Panopticon, according to Foucault, was to make the prisoner constantly visible to 
authority and thus guarantee “the automatic functioning of power,”243 the American prison experiment, 
starting in the early 19th century, was overtly rehabilitative. They were called 'penitentiaries' for this 
reason: to induce penance and reform.244 The aim was to make offenders “transformed, gaining the 
moral fiber to reenter society and resist its temptations.”245  
 Toward the end of the 19th century, in both the USA and Europe, failed rehabilitative measures 
and the rise of social Darwinist ideology gave rise to the idea of an incorrigible criminal underclass, 
born with predispositions to commit crime and therefore beyond the pale of reform. There is good 
evidence that Bram Stoker based the description of his character Dracula on pseudo-scientific 
physiognomical descriptions of common physical features of this criminal underclass.246 In spite of this 
rise of thinking, in 1870 American prison professionals attending the National Congress on Penitentiary 
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and Reformatory Discipline doubled down on the goal of reforming prisoners by introducing new 
strategies which emphasized “expanded education and industrial training.”247 
 The ideal of reforming offenders gained traction in the early 20th century as medical 
practitioners made advances in diagnosing and treating criminals. Individualized treatments of 
offenders aimed to reform the offender's condition not just via work and education, but also through 
“counseling, group therapy, behavior modification, token economies and therapeutic communities.”248 
This paradigm culminated in the 1950s and 60s; in 1954 the “American Prison Association changed its 
name to the American Correctional Association” and prisons were renamed 'correctional facilities' or 
'correctional institutions.'249 In the field of philosophy this period saw the rise of theorists using the 
morally educative benefits to the offender as justification of punishment. To take an example that was 
applied to policy, the Criminal Code of Finland has the aim of “general prevention” but via the means 
of education: “the disapproval expressed in punishment is assumed to influence the values and moral 
views of individuals.”250 However, this confidence in rehabilitation was soon shattered by rising crime 
rates in the 1960s and 70s throughout the industrialized world. 
 During this time, conservative politicians called for tougher responses to crime, and saw 
rehabilitation as “welfare for criminals;” they pushed for “law and order,” laying the groundwork for 
harsher sentences based on retribution.251 In the USA this expanded punitive regime has lead to 
decades of accelerating growth of incarceration, resulting in the largest prison system in world history, 
far surpassing the number of prisoners in the Soviet gulag at its height.252 In 1974 Robert Martinson 
wrote an article that has had uniquely influential sway over criminal justice policy, especially for the 
goal of rehabilitating offenders. He concluded that “rehabilitative efforts...so far have had no 
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appreciable effect on recidivism.”253 His article was widely interpreted to mean that 'nothing works' to 
reform offenders, and its influence cannot be understated. Even now, when we understand that 
rehabilitation works significantly better than prison to reduce recidivism (as I will explain further in 
section 3.2), the 'nothing works' doctrine has significant influence. This is not the place to give a survey 
of the complicated developments of the past forty years, but I hope that I've shown that throughout 
history rehabilitation has been an integral goal of responding to crime, and that goal has been pursued 
by vastly fluctuating methods.  
 
3.3	  Justifications	  for	  Rehabilitation	  
 In this section I will address the central questions of whether rehabilitation is justified and 
whether it can be part of a viable, minimally punitive regime. When the state intervenes to give an 
offender a course of rehabilitation, it usually does so within a punishment regime. Thus far I have 
defined rehabilitation as conceptually distinct from punishment, and have not discussed how it is 
usually implemented within a framework of punishment. Normally, offenders enter rehabilitation with 
the threat of punishment over them, and other times they are in prison when they receive the 
rehabilitation, thus being punished and rehabilitated at the same time. In current practice, punishment 
and rehabilitation are so entangled that it may strike readers as disingenuous or willfully ignorant to 
speak of justifications for criminal rehabilitation separate from the coercive threat of punishment. Sex 
offender therapy, drug addiction clinics, job and skills training: these are some of the most common 
forms of criminal rehabilitation and currently they usually occur within a framework of parole. 
Completion of these courses is the ticket to escaping the carceral net, while failure or refusal results in 
punitive parole revocation. Here I ask for the reader's patience. Just as pure restitution is a hypothetical 
alternative that can still be discussed and scrutinized, criminal rehabilitation separate from punishment 
is likewise worthy of attention. Before specifically looking at the relationship between punishment and 
                                                











rehabilitation in section 3.3.3, I turn now to justifications of standalone offender rehabilitation. 
 There is one main justification for rehabilitation: the positive consequences of treatment. I will 
discuss the justifications of (1) the benefit to the offender, and (2) the benefit to society, and I consider 
objections to each. The benefit to society is the successful justification, so I will spend much more time 
discussing it. First I will briefly consider the benefit to the offender. 
 
3.3.1The	  Benefit	  to	  the	  Offender	  Justification	  
 The changes induced in the course of rehabilitation can drastically improve the lives of 
offenders. Some offenders who completed drug rehabilitation and turned their lives around remain 
profoundly grateful for the rest of their lives for the treatment they received. Other offenders may not 
be grateful, but because of the changes in their lives due to rehabilitation, they are able to live with a 
much higher quality of life. Perhaps the potential benefit to offenders is sufficient reason to give them 
rehabilitation. On reflection, this justification fails for two reasons.  
 First, it would justify rehabilitating the innocent. If the potential benefits of life changing 
rehabilitation were reason enough for the state to provide treatment, then the state would be obliged to 
provide treatment to those who have not broken the law. Presumably an argument could be made that a 
welfare state does have this obligation, but the obligation would not be part of a post-arrest regime, 
thus is not part of my discussion. Even if this argument were made,  many people would not agree to 
the claim (or at least not want to back it up with tax dollars) that the state should provide rehabilitation 
simply because a person has a problem that would benefit from rehabilitation. This claim follows from 
the Benefit to the Offender Justification, which provides reason enough to reject it.  
 Secondly, the Benefit to the Offender Justification fails to justify some treatments that 
uncontroversially qualify as criminal rehabilitation. Consider a happy drug addict who is completely 











rehabilitation option is to give this offender drug addiction therapy. But the benefit to the offender 
objection cannot justify this option because the offender is content without rehabilitation; in fact he 
would strongly prefer not to have it. He would reject the state's offer, and would resent the state for 
pressuring him to enroll. One reply to this objection would be to claim that the state can determine 
what would be best for the offender, and decide to offer or pressure him into the rehabilitation because 
the state determines that it would benefit him. But this reply fails because it requires that the state take 
a problematically patronizing position. Why would the state be allowed to decide what is best for an 
individual? The happy drug addict surely maintains the ability to decide what he wants for himself. A 
theorist may respond by claiming that the state is not deciding individual cases, but taking a public 
health perspective, and issuing a policy of drug rehabilitation for all addicted offenders. This would be 
similar to preventative health measures such as smoking bans. But by pressuring citizens into 
rehabilitation, the state is choosing a much more invasive course of action than by merely nudging 
citizens away from certain health decisions such as smoking. We would feel that if the state had a 
policy to pressure all citizens it deemed eligible into rehabilitation regardless of whether they had 
committed crimes, then the state would be acting with unwarranted patronization toward the non-
offenders. But the justification cannot distinguish between offenders and non-offenders. To reiterate the 
first objection: if the justification merits rehabilitating offenders solely on the basis of the benefit to 
them, then it also merits rehabilitating non-offenders who stand to benefit similarly. 
 
3.3.2	  The	  Benefit	  to	  Society	  Justification	  
 Alternatively, one could point to the prevention of future crimes, and reduced victimhood, as 
the justification of rehabilitation. This justification rests on the empirical claim that rehabilitation 
reduces crime. Studies have shown that rehabilitation is indeed successful at reducing rates of 











one that better accounts for offender autonomy, is to say that rehabilitation helps offenders to desist 
from crime, but I will assume that these two phrasings of ‘preventing crime’ and ‘helping desistance’ 
mean the same for this discussion. In 2004 Peter Raynor reported that intervention and treatment has 
been shown to produce large reductions in reconviction rates, from 9-21 per cent depending on the 
study.254 In a 2007 meta-analysis, Lipsey et al. report that “[t]he average effect on recidivism found for 
the best forms of intervention in the research syntheses ... was in the range of a 10-25 percentage point 
differential between treatment and control groups.”255  
 There are many different studies exploring the effectiveness of rehabilitation; they have various 
shortcomings, but the consensus is that treatment is better than prison alone. Michael Tonry writes that, 
“A vast new literature on correctional treatment asserts that many kinds of programs—sex offender 
treatment, anger management, cognitive skills training, vocational training, and drug abuse treatment—
can reduce reoffending.”256 There is a dearth of knowledge regarding exactly which kinds of treatment 
work best for specific offenders,257 but the past decade has seen a fervent and growing group of 
researchers working to tackle this question.258 Often the question is reframed to be what intervention 
best helps offenders desist from reoffending, because the reality is that no single course of treatment 
can possibly 'work' in the sense of reliably reducing recidivism for every offender.259 Recidivism is a 
notoriously tricky problem, but treatment does help offenders desist from re-offending. While there are 
dozens of studies to cite that show this conclusion, I will quote Glaser who is a critic of aspects of 
current practice of sex offender therapy. While he has qualms with the treatment delivery, he openly 
admits that research shows “sex offender treatment programmes have enjoyed considerable success, 
resulting in significant reductions in offender recidivism, the suffering experienced by victims and their 
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families and the costs of victim support and offender processing in the criminal justice system.”260 
While this is true, the story is also still fairly gloomy: certain well run rehabilitation programs may 
reduce recidivism some 10-20%, but some offenses typically see rates of re-offense as high or higher 
than 70%. Pedophilia and burglary are two examples of crimes whose perpetrators have disconcertingly 
high re-offense rates. Still, rehabilitation is the most effective course of action we know of to reduce 
recidivism. Furthermore, given the research we have, we know that there are trends that identify better 
courses of rehabilitation. Generally, strength and intensity of implementation are more important than 
the specific differences between types of rehabilitation. Most rehabilitative interventions are more 
effective than prison, except for fear or punitive-based approaches. The most effective programs aim to 
change the “criminal behavior directly” or its “specific proximal causes” but without “fear-based or 
punitive approaches to do this (e.g., boot camps, intensive supervision).”261 The more effective 
programs include “structured regimens, such as training, as their primary component” which are more 
successful than “less structured interventions based on building relationships, such as counseling, 
mentoring, and restorative programs.”262 Finally, “[m]ultimodal programs are generally more effective 
than programs that employ a single treatment strategy” and, unsurprisingly, programs that are 
competently administered with intensive interaction succeed best.263 By 'intensive,' Lipsey et al., mean 
“about 25 weeks’ program duration with 5-10 contact hours of treatment per week delivered in multiple 
sessions.”264  
 A dominant rehabilitation structure has emerged from Canadian researchers, known as the Risk-
Need-Responsivity (RNR) Model of rehabilitation.265 To quote a summary of the three principles of 
this model: 
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[F]irst the risk principle whereby services are directed towards medium to high risk 
offenders; second, the needs principle so that interventions target offenders’ 
criminogenic needs; third, the responsivity principle by which interventions are 
matched to offenders’ learning styles.266 
 
However, in practice, these principles are often not yet implemented. Current common correctional 
practices leave much room for improvement to meet the criteria of successful rehabilitation techniques. 
A review of 374 correctional programs concluded that 61% “failed to reach even a basic level of 
adherence to the RNR principles.”267 This goes to show that policy and on-the-ground practice lag 
behind research. 
 To summarize the thrust of these findings, research confirms the empirical claim that 
rehabilitation can reduce recidivism. The research behind this claim supports the Benefit to Society 
Justification by demonstrating its feasibility. It also demonstrates that the gains are substantial, with a 
much higher success rate, if properly implemented, than current penal practices. Another reason for 
optimism is that we continue to progress in our ability to prompt positive change: in 2005 Raynor and 
Robinson reported that, “We know more about how to help offenders… Twenty years ago, hardly 
anyone would have predicted that such achievements were imminent.”268 Of course, even with high 
quality rehabilitation programs in place, rates of recidivism would still be higher than we would like. 
Also, there are some offenders who will never benefit from rehabilitation. While practitioners are able 
to identify many of them, it would be an intolerable public hazard to rely solely on rehabilitation for 
these types of offenders. For instance, if an offender with psychopathy is a high-level risk, then it may 
be the case that the state is justified in isolating him from society.  
 One objection to the Benefit to Society Justification is to claim that it would justify 
rehabilitating the innocent. This objection was successful against the Benefit to the Offender 
Justification because if the potential benefit to the offender were the reason to offer rehabilitation, then 
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it would follow that the state should offer rehabilitation that it normally reserves for its offenders to 
anybody who might likewise benefit. However, this objection fails in the case of the Benefit to Society 
Justification. The reason for this is that society stands to benefit from reduced crime when 
rehabilitating offenders, but not when rehabilitating non-offenders. There are no cases, to my 
knowledge, in which this justification would sanction rehabilitating innocent people. One possible 
candidate for such rehabilitation is an alcoholic who is veering toward breaking the law but has not yet. 
His behavior pattern suggests that he has a high likelihood of breaking the law soon, and thus from the 
interest of preventing his potential crime, the state would be justified in giving him rehabilitation. 
However, on closer inspection the example fails. How would the state know that the alcoholic is about 
to commit a crime? If he were alone in his apartment, about to be kicked out for not paying the rent, 
then the state could not know that he was headed for a life of vagrant street crime unless the state took 
problematically intrusive measures to monitor his behavior. If he were already out on the street, then 
the best way that the state could know that he is headed for crime is if he already committed a crime 
associated with homeless alcoholics: urinating in public, public drunkenness, disrupting the peace etc. 
Consider if someone makes a criminal threat: while this is a good indicator that the person will commit 
a serious offense, the threat itself is an offense. The point is that the only reliable and unproblematic 
way of determining that someone is an imminent risk of committing crime is if they have already been 
caught committing one.   
 A similar objection claims that the Benefit to Society Justification would allow for 
indeterminate and disproportionate sentences. Take the example of an offender whose conviction of 
assault results in a course of anger management classes. If his anger problems persisted past the usual 
length of treatment, then the state may be justified, using the Benefit to Society, in continuing to coerce 
him into more treatment. This cycle could presumably last for years, resulting in a situation that most 
would deem disproportionately harmful to the offender in relation to his crime. The reality is that this 











individually tailor every sentence to the exact length necessary so that the offender's risk to the 
community would be neutralized. As is the case in the current punitive regime, there would be 
sentencing guidelines based on expert analysis. A guideline might claim that a certain kind of assailant 
with a diagnosis of a particular anger problem should receive a treatment regimen within a certain 
range of intensity and duration that would seek to maximize the benefit to society given the resources 
available and the demonstrated risk. It would not make sense to keep a low level offender coming back 
for more treatment because of a simple assault. Of course, more individualized treatment and attention 
would be necessary for the offenders who present a more serious risk. It may be the case that a 
murderer never quite escapes the state's net of treatment. His treatment providers and risk assessment 
experts would make recommendations that would need to be reviewed by an external body, perhaps the 
courts. Abuse of risk assessment has the potential to unfairly intrude into offenders' lives. But there 
could be systems set in place to check this kind of abuse. There is nothing inherent to the Benefit to 
Society Justification that would automatically lead to sentences deemed to be disproportionate.   
 Another objection to the Benefit to Society Justification is the claim that it could not merit 
giving rehabilitation to certain offenders who need it. Consider the example of a very old offender who 
is deeply addicted to drugs. The state has determined that the cost of rehabilitating him is not worth the 
potential benefit because he is unlikely to commit further crimes, in part because of his placidity and 
also because he is likely to die soon. It would seem callous and discriminatory to deny him the 
programs which are available to similar offenders who only differ because they are younger, healthier 
and thus at higher risk of reoffending. But a successful reply to this objection is to simply bite the 
bullet. If the reason that the state gives rehabilitation to offenders and not to non-offenders is in order to 
prevent future crime, then we must accept the fact that there will be cases in which offenders who 
could benefit from rehabilitation do not qualify for treatment because they do not pose a danger of 
reoffending. To give another example that brings this harsh fact into focus, consider a case of an 











alcohol rehabilitation. But consider if he also has other issues that would warrant treatment but have 
not contributed to his criminal behavior. For instance, if he is also has anger management issues that 
have not resulted in additional crime, then the state would be justified in not treating them, because the 
state is not obliged to treat everyone's anger management issues. Of course, some advocates of the 
welfare state may argue that the state does have this obligation, but I will not be exploring that 
argument. Even in states like the USA without universal health coverage there exist treatment options 
outside of the state's purview for the old man who wants rehabilitation and the alcoholic who has anger 
issues. While these options in the USA are sadly inadequate, the discussion of healthcare obligations in 
a welfare state does not belong here. My assertion is that the Benefit to Society Justification will result 
in cases of offenders who do not receive treatment that they could benefit from, but that this does not 
provide reason enough to reject the justification. 
 However, before moving forward, there is one other notable caveat to this biting the bullet 
response. Suppose that in the course of treating an offender, the state finds that he has a condition that 
is unrelated to the criminal behavior but is dangerous enough to merit treatment. For instance instead of 
anger issues, suppose the alcoholic from the example above demonstrated a pedophiliac orientation. Or 
suppose that he has bipolar disorder that results in homicidal ideation. It seems clear to me that the state 
should be able to provide treatment to these offenders. But the treatment is not justified based on his 
past criminal behavior, but rather potential future crime. The state should offer all of its citizens these 
kinds of treatment, regardless if they have committed a crime yet. This is not a refutation of the Benefit 
to Society Justification, but a wider claim about what the state owes to its citizens. Here I am making a 
claim about the welfare state, but this is because unlike other treatments, there is clear and compelling 
evidence that suggests that every state should provide these treatments to all of its citizens. This 
evidence makes universal provision of these treatments less debatable than, for instance, anger 
management. I do not pretend to know which kinds of disorders warrant this coverage. But it seems 











experts, but let me just briefly focus on pedophilia to make the point that this category of disorders 
warranting universal treatment does indeed exist. If the treatment is a response to a crime, then it is 
rehabilitative, but if it is not, then it is preemptive, and does not qualify as offender rehabilitation. The 
case I mentioned above, where an offender is convicted of an alcohol related crime, but is found in the 
process to be pedophiliac, and is then treated for his pedophilia, would not qualify as offender 
rehabilitation. Below I make the case that he should be treated regardless. 
 Pedophilia is a sexual orientation, which, like other sexual orientations, cannot be changed or 
'cured.' Recent developments in brain scan technology have allowed researchers to accurately give a 
clinical diagnosis of pedophilia by looking at a patient's brain during sexual stimuli. As Ponseti et al. 
conclude, “Functional brain response patterns to sexual stimuli contain sufficient information to 
identify pedophiles with high accuracy. The automatic classification of these patterns is a promising 
objective tool to clinically diagnose pedophilia.”269 Treating pedophiles before they offend has become 
an increasingly high priority. The treatment involves support groups and therapy to help cope with not 
being able to fulfill their sexual urges. This will have the long term benefit of preventing pedophiles 
from acting on their impulses, or as Bleyer puts it: “one way to protect kids may be to reach pedophiles 
pre-emptively, to give them the therapeutic tools to control themselves and still lead fulfilling lives.”270 
Bleyer goes on to report on a successful instance of this kind of program.  
“Fred Berlin, the founder of the Sexual Disorders Clinic at Johns Hopkins University... 
has had success treating pedophiles with therapies similar to those for drug addicts, 
with an emphasis on taking responsibility for one’s actions, identifying triggers, and 
resisting cravings, as well as developing empathy for potential victims and addressing 
cognitive distortions that may support unhealthy behavior. His patients have also had 
successful outcomes with testosterone-lowering medication, otherwise known as 
chemical castration.” 
 
In order to protect children from pedophiles, we should be able to encourage pedophiles to 
acknowledge their orientation in order to seek help and support. For the sake of potential child victims 
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and the pedophiles struggling against their nature by themselves, these treatments should be available 
to all pedophiles, not just ones who have committed offenses. Thus, I hope to have shown that there is a 
category of treatment, one that does not necessarily fit within the definition of offender rehabilitation, 
that should be available to all citizens, not just offenders, because the risk of offending is so costly. 
Notice that the justification for such preventative treatment is not the benefit to the offender, but the 
benefit to others, which mirrors the justification structure of post-conviction treatment. 
 To refocus on the Benefit to Society Justification, a further objection states that it is perverse to 
offer offenders beneficial treatment that is not available to non-offenders solely because the offender 
has committed a crime. In the literature this is known as the problem of 'less eligibility' because, 
according to Bentham, offenders should not be deemed “more eligible” than their innocent citizen 
counterparts.271 This objection holds that such a distribution would create warped incentives for people 
who desperately want treatment but have not been convicted of a crime (due to not having committed 
one or not being caught yet) to commit crime in order to be convicted and given treatment. Again, I 
believe this comes down to questions of what a state is obliged to provide to its citizens. I agree, as I 
detailed above, that all pedophiles should be eligible to receive state treatment, whether or not they 
have offended. The reasoning I use follows a 'benefit to others' justification, and indeed if there is a 
clear benefit to society in addition to the treated individual, it is likelier chance that one could show that 
the state is obliged to provide the treatment. There is also good evidence that the most effective way for 
a state to manage its drug addicts is to treat the problem as a public health issue rather than focusing on 
punitive measures for the addicts. If a citizen is so desperate for treatment that he is willing to commit 
crime in order to find help, then it is likely that the society is failing in many ways that do not have to 
do with the criminal justice system. A state should be able to provide for the general well-being of its 
citizens to an extent that crime does not provide a temptation in order to receive treatment.  
   
                                                











3.3.3	  Rehabilitation	  and	  Punishment	  
 In most instances of rehabilitation, the state has some hand in coercing the participation of the 
offender. While the offender can choose to participate or not, the state attempts to compel the offender 
to choose to complete the rehabilitation. But how exactly does the state pressure offenders into 
rehabilitation? The answer is usually via punishment. The two main questions of this section are (1) 
whether rehabilitation can be coerced without threat of punishment, and (2) whether rehabilitation 
which has been coerced using the threat of punishment is in fact punitive.  
 Lewis, somewhat sensationally, sums up the compulsory nature of rehabilitation: “If a tendency 
to steal can be cured by psychotherapy, the thief will no doubt be forced to undergo the treatment. 
Otherwise society cannot continue.”272 Are there any alternatives to punishment for coercing offenders 
to participate in rehabilitation? One possibility is to threaten offenders with preventative detention in 
order to motivate their participation. But on closer examination, this fails. The best-case scenario would 
be that an offender is in preventive detention because he is a danger to the community and needs to go 
through rehabilitation before any possibility of being released back into the community.  The state 
could then stipulate to the offender that he will likely remain in preventive detention until he decreases 
his risk to the community through participation in treatment. This course, I will later in this chapter 
argue, is non-punitive. However, this would certainly not be an option for many offenders, as 
preventive detention is only justified for very dangerous offenders. It seems that, as was the case with 
restitution, the way to enforce rehabilitation is with the threat of punishment. And carrying out the 
punishment if the offender refused to comply would be necessary in order to ensure that other offenders 
took the threat seriously.  
 Secondly, if an offender participates in a course of rehabilitation because he has been coerced 
by the threat of punishment, does that make the rehabilitation itself punitive? I argue that it does not. 
The rehabilitation itself is still a practice aimed at changing the behavior and attitudes of the offender, 
                                                











not at harming him. The fact that the offender participated because of a threat of punishment does not 
change this aim. It would be strange to claim that by employing the threat the purpose of the threatened 
punishment would somehow be permanently transposed onto the rehabilitation such that the aim of 
changing the offender's behavior would be replaced with the aim of harming him. In this context, there 
are three discrete actions available to the state: to punish, to threaten, and to rehabilitate. Each of these 
has its own discrete aim. The threat of course is aimed at coercing the offender to participate by making 
his refusal illegal; I will argue later that such a threat is a legal restriction of behavior, and thus 
qualifies as offender incapacitation. It does not make sense to assume that these purposes can transfer 
from one to the other.  
 One might reply that the threat of punishment remains throughout the offender's rehabilitation, 
and this changes the nature of the rehabilitation. Certainly most, but not all, cases of coerced 
rehabilitation carry the continued threat of punishment if the offender refuses or fails in his 
participation. So how would the continued threat of punishment affect the purpose of the rehabilitation? 
It seems that the two remain discrete, despite occurring simultaneously. If at any time the offender were 
punished for refusing to participate, then that would be the moment that the punishment would begin. It 
does not make sense to claim that it happened earlier. Coercion in the environment of social work and 
social service delivery is not unique to criminal justice. Recall Peters’ claim that I quoted above: 
“Many social workers in other fields have very few clients submitting to services entirely 
voluntarily.”273  
 Of course, punishment and rehabilitation may happen simultaneously. It is very common to find 
drug treatment programs and mental health treatment within prisons. There is good reason to see the 
co-occurrence of rehabilitation and punishment as distinct actions happening together, albeit 
dysfunctionally. Research shows that punishment is often inimical to rehabilitation when they are 
                                                











administered jointly.274 This suggests that the goals of the two do not change, even when their courses 
coincide; in fact the goals of harming someone and treating them remain in stark contrast. 
 A Danish study that investigated voluntary drug treatment programs held within prisons 
concluded that the negative effects of punishment were the single major obstacle for rehabilitation. 
Instead of being able to focus on changing the offenders' future behavior out in the community, “the 
counsellors’ main goal in providing prison-based drug treatment appeared to be the alleviation of the 
negative consequences of imprisonment.”275 In the words of Robinson and Crow, rehabilitation under 
this view is “conceptually divorced from punishment, such that it is not understood as an objective or 
quality of a positive process of punishment, but rather as an antidote to punishment: or, more precisely, 
the potential harmful effects of punishment.”276  
 Punishment and rehabilitation are discrete even when they co-occur or the threat of punishment 
overlays the rehabilitation; one further piece of evidence for this comes from the US law. The Code of 
the Laws of the US states bluntly that “imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting 
correction and rehabilitation.”277 Furthermore, in 2011, the “First Circuit held that even upon 
revocation of supervised release, courts may not impose imprisonment with the aim of facilitating 
rehabilitation.”278 This means that when an offender is on parole, the state may not put him back in 
prison as a means of rehabilitating him. This suggests that the First Circuit Court agrees with my 
reasoning that punishment and rehabilitation are discrete. The threat of punishment, which is ever 
present for someone on parole, does not mean that it changes the non-punitive aim of any rehabilitation 
program he is completing. 
 As I have argued, compelling offenders to participate in rehabilitation is indeed a necessary 
intervention that the state's crime response regime will need to have available. But the current punitive 
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focus often obfuscates the goals of treatment. As I argue elsewhere, the state has an obligation to 
minimize the punitive aspect of the intervention as much as possible. If punishment is justified as a last 
resort of coercion, then it should be used as a last resort rather than the primary focus. Sex-offender 
therapists have to constantly grapple with this balance. But as Prescott and Levenson note, research has 
shown that offenders' “efforts at change often begin only with outside pressure while the client 
develops his or her own internal motivation.” But they immediately warn that, “[t]reatment methods 
that are purely coercive rarely produce meaningful change. This is precisely why methods that respect 
the inherent autonomy of each client (e.g. motivational interviewing) have gained currency in recent 
years.”279 In conclusion, punishment is necessary as a final recourse for a post-arrest regime that relies 
on rehabilitation. But coercing an offender to participate in rehabilitation does not in itself count as 
punishment. Furthermore, punishment should be limited as a last resort rather than the predominant 
priority. 
 
3.4	  A	  Definition	  of	  Offender	  Incapacitation	  
 In this section I will defend a definition for non-punitive offender incapacitation as well as give 
a brief overview of the kinds of practices that qualify as incapacitative under my definition.  
 As I discussed in the first chapter, when the state quarantines somebody to prevent the outbreak 
of disease, it does not intend to harm him. When the state restricts an offender without intending to 
harm him, the restriction is not punitive, a claim that I will further support in this section. Also in this 
section, I defend three conceptually distinct definitions for punishment, offender rehabilitation and non-
punitive offender incapacitation. Under these definitions, no single act may qualify as more than one of 
these interventions. No single act may be both punitive and rehabilitative or incapacitative; no single 
act may be both rehabilitative and punitive or incapacitative etc. I have previously defended the 
definitions of punishment and rehabilitation on the merits of their respective requirements, and I aim 
                                                











here to do the same for non-punitive incapacitation. Additionally, the division of these three concepts  
yields benefit in organizing and clarifying the intentions and justifications of each discrete state action, 
whereas current dialogue is often plagued with vague or imprecise use of these three terms.  
 To reiterate and clarify, I am claiming that there is both punitive and non-punitive 
incapacitation. There can, of course, be punitive incapacitation, which is what most imprisonment is. 
But I will argue that non-punitive offender incapacitation, as a standalone concept, is worthy of 
scrutiny separate from punishment. And while it is definitionally non-punitive, its use as an alternative 
to punishment merits the same kinds of questions that arose for restitution and rehabilitation. As I 
showed in the previous discussion, state interventions are often composed of more than a single 
discrete action. A court sentence may contain separate parts, each of which on its own belongs to 
different categories. Each of the separate categories, including non-punitive incapacitation, deserve 
scrutiny just as the composite sentences do.  
 Before parsing what makes non-punitive offender incapacitation unique, which I will refer to 
hereafter as 'incapacitation,' a good start to defining it is to ask what it has in common with punishment 
and rehabilitation. All three share the qualities of being authorized, retributive and intended. These 
three, shared conditions confirm that all three are post-arrest state interventions. So what makes 
incapacitation unique? As I alluded to while discussing the definition of rehabilitation, incapacitation 
differs because it is enforced without regard to the offender's will. This does not mean that it is 
necessarily enforced against the offender's will, although it may be. It may also be enforced without the 
offender's foreknowledge, or even with the offender's consent—the point is that none of these 
references to the offender's knowledge or preference matter because the action would be imposed 
regardless. Thus for an action to qualify as incapacitative, the offender's will must not play any role, 
which is how I am using the term 'non-consensual.' Notice that this is also true for punishment, but it is 
unnecessary to name in its definition because intentionally harming someone implies non-consent.











restriction requirement does not necessarily mean physical restriction. The state may also  legally 
restrict an offender from doing something as a result of his breaking the law. The obvious purpose of 
restriction is to prevent future offenses, but in order to avoid smuggling a justification into the 
definition, the term 'restriction' is limited to meaning a physical or legal restriction of the offender's 
behavior. Thus we arrive at the definition: incapacitation is authorized, retributive, non-consensual, 
non-punitive, intended restriction. Below I attempt to elaborate this definition and defend it against 
objections. 
 First, one might object by claiming that the non-punitive caveat is ad-hoc. I previously defended 
my reasoning behind keeping rehabilitation definitionally distinct from punishment, so I will be brief 
here. Incapacitation fills the conceptual void to capture the many non-punitive interventions that are 
non-consensual and restrictive. I will elaborate on the range of practices that fall into this category 
below, but here are some incapacitative examples: preventive detention, non-consensual chemical 
castration, and electronic monitoring. Simply because the categories of punishment and incapacitation 
are conceptually distinct does not privilege any particular justification for either. Non-punitive 
incapacitation by itself needs to be justified. Its role in sentencing, especially in relation to punishment 
also needs scrutiny. An advocate of non-punitive incapacitation as an alternative to punishment needs 
to explain how the practice can remain non-punitive, which is a separate discussion from the definition. 
By making incapacitation definitionally non-punitive, I am keeping the two conceptually distinct for 
the purpose of discussing a particular range of interventions. Surely many criminal restrictions of 
liberty are punitive; but there is a group of interventions that are both non-punitive and incapacitative, 
and defining incapacitation this way allows for the useful discussion of inquiring whether this group is 
justified.  
 A second objection to this definition is to claim that 'non-consensual restriction' is redundant, 
and that the only reason to include 'non-consensual' is to keep it conceptually distinct from 











is useful because it can account for substantive differences in interventions that otherwise might be 
subsumed under an inaccurate label. Take for example estrogen hormone treatment for male sex-
offenders that is known as 'chemical castration.' This treatment drastically reduces male sex-drive; it is 
a reversible administration of anti-androgen drugs, which reduce male hormone uptake. It is designed 
to reduce male libido and sexual activity. The American Civil Liberties Union has argued that such 
treatment is cruel and unusual punishment because if it is mandated then it violates an offender's right 
to reproduce and to refuse treatment.280 While I will not be wading into a debate over whether this 
treatment is constitutional, the debate demonstrates why 'non-consensual restriction' is not redundant, 
as I explain below. It also gives credence to the separation of incapacitation from punishment.  
 Chemical castration, if it is consented to, is rehabilitation. However, there are instances when 
chemical castration is court-ordered. In such cases the state makes it illegal for offenders to refuse 
treatment. The legal restriction is itself a form of incapacitation, but this is separate from the course of 
treatment. Unless the state administers the treatment regardless of the will of the offender, which would 
be a case of physical incapacitation, the course of treatment is rehabilitation because the offender may  
choose to refuse. But it is accompanied by the legal incapacitation of the state's threat to punish the 
offender for refusing.  
Chemical Castration 
Administered regardless of 
offender's will 
= Physical Incapacitation  
Administered with threat of 
punishment 
= Rehabilitation + Legal Incapacitation 
By request of offender = Rehabilitation  
  
In contrast, offenders may request the drug. The ACLU cites the case of a Texas inmate, Larry Don 
McQuay, who for years “begged the state to [chemically] castrate him.”281 There have been other high-
profile instances of offenders requesting to receive the treatment. The BBC recently reported that 
                                                












Christopher Hughes, a serial rapist and pedophile, “has asked to be chemically castrated to stop him 
reoffending.”282 This demonstrates that restrictive treatment can be consensual, and hence it does not 
qualify for offender incapacitation as I have defined it because of the non-consensual requirement. 
Another high profile example is the Whatton prison in Nottinghamshire where over 100 sex offenders 
requested to be chemically castrated. The Guardian reports that the program is “entirely voluntary,” and 
that Prof. Don Grubin, who runs the program, says of the offenders referred to him, that: 
A small number have been referred for anti-androgen treatment which leaves men with 
pre-pubescent testosterone levels similar to those in men who have been physically 
castrated. This so-called chemical castration is reversible and therefore some people 
argue that the phrase "castration", which suggests permanence, is not accurate.  283  
 
The Telegraph further quotes Prof. Grubin saying that “We know the treatment works to reduce sexual 
arousal and fantasies.”284 This shows that chemical castration can be a successful form of restrictive, 
voluntary rehabilitation. Chemical castration provides a useful example of how a single intervention, 
depending on how it is administered, can be either rehabilitation, or purely incapacitation. I have not 
come across any instances of the treatment being forced on the offender regardless of his will, which 
would be the only way that it qualifies as incapacitation, but it is possible. All of the accounts that I 
have found explicitly intend the treatment as a preventive measure against future offenses, which 
disqualifies it as a punitive measure. The ACLU cites a California legislator who “talked of prevention, 
not punishment. 'We are simply trying to stop sexual offenders from committing additional crimes,' he 
said.”285 Even if the offender is mandated to take the treatment under the threat of punishment, but can 
refuse it, then it qualifies as rehabilitation. Of course, as I discussed above, mandatory rehabilitation 
cannot be considered a 'pure' alternative to punishment because it will often involve recourse to 
punishment if the offender refuses treatment. The ACLU documents a Florida law mandating chemical 
castration for sex offenders with the threat of being punished for refusing it: “If the defendant fails to 
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submit to or refuse to appear for treatment, the defendant is guilty of an additional second degree 
felony.”286  
 A third objection challenges the scope of the definition, specifically pertaining to what I have 
deemed 'legal incapacitation.' This objection holds that this practice is better described simply as a 
'prohibition,' and should not be included within the range of offender incapacitation. It points out that 
legal restrictions may be broken, and are thus similar to prohibitions, whereas physical incapacitation 
(usually) cannot be transgressed because of the state's closer grasp. However, this objection fails. There 
is no reason to limit the concept of incapacitation simply to physical restriction; it may also be a legal 
restriction. Both physical and legal restrictions may be broken (think of jailbreaks), and both may be 
tightened according to state control. It is true that most legal restrictions are simply prohibitions created 
by laws. However, there is a specific kind of legal restriction that is a result of an offender's past 
criminal behavior. This is the kind that falls under the definition of offender incapacitation, specifically 
fulfilling the retributive requirement. These restrictions are also administered regardless of the 
offender's will, fulfilling the non-consensual requirement. As a means of further clarification, below I 
attempt to describe practices that I take to be straightforwardly incapacitative given the definition I 
have defended. This of course is not an exhaustive listing, but rather brief evidence that the ambit of 
this category is wide and varied. Above I explained that chemical castration, if administered without 
any regard to the offender's will, is incapacitative. However, this is not a good representative of the 
category, because non-consensual chemical castration seems rare and perhaps non-existent, and 
furthermore it is subject to serious bioethical objections that I do not want to address. There are much 
more common and less controversial examples of incapacitation, in both the physical and legal 
varieties. 
 One example is rescinding an offender's driver's license after his driving related offense. This 
qualifies as incapacitation because the revocation of the license makes it illegal for the offender to 
                                                











drive, therefore legally restricting his behavior. The goal of the restriction is to prevent the offender 
from further driving related offenses, and it is a direct result of his past offenses, meeting the retributive 
requirement. If this restriction is the true motivation for the state's action, then it is non-punitive 
because the aim is preventive rather than to harm the offender. It also (typically) happens without any 
regard to the offender's will. Similar examples of incapacitation via legal restriction are: house arrest 
with electronic monitoring which makes it illegal to be certain places at certain times; restraining 
orders, which make it illegal for someone to come within a certain distance of another person; 
restrictions on sex offenders in the community which make it illegal to live or work within a certain 
distance of places where children gather (an infamous example of this is in Miami where recent laws 
forced sex offenders to camp underneath a causeway on an island in a bay because it was the only place 
they could live that fit the restrictions);287 the multifarious laws governing what offenders on parole can 
and cannot do; and the disenfranchisement of felons in the USA, which takes away offenders' ability to 
vote. Before moving forward, I should emphasize that the act of making these activities illegal is 
incapacitative, but the follow-up action if an offender violates any of these restrictions is most likely 
punitive. The threat of punishment is a restriction, but not itself punishment. I also should acknowledge 
that it is dubious that some of the interventions I listed above can actually be justified on grounds of 
prevention. For instance, the restriction of voting seems like a straightforwardly punitive action without 
any viable justification for public safety. And while others do seem to be able to be justified based on 
prevention, their relationship with punitive consequences needs to be scrutinized. 
 A more extreme and controversial example of incapacitation is preventive detention. This is the 
practice of detaining somebody “not for crimes they have committed, but rather to prevent future 
wrongdoing.”288 This definition raises the question of whether preventive detention is retributive, i.e. in 
response to an offense, which is a requirement for offender incapacitation as I have defined it.  
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Typically, people who are preventively detained are past offenders who are deemed dangerous enough 
to be detained to prevent future offenses. There is no just or reasonable way to ascertain whether 
someone is sufficiently dangerous to warrant preventive detention without evidence of past offenses. 
As DeVore points out, the three groups of offenders who are currently most likely to be subject to 
preventive detention in the USA are: “suspected terrorists, sex offenders, and criminals with severe 
mental illness.”289 There is a robust debate over the legality and ethics of holding suspected terrorists, 
and I will not take a side. It is debatable whether they have committed a crime that signals the need for 
preventive detention. But in the cases of dangerous mentally ill offenders (e.g. psychopathic killers) 
and sex offenders, it is clear that the detention, while aiming to prevent future offenses, is also in 
response to a past offense. DeVore notes that the practice is arguably unconstitutional and unjustified. 
However, he also notes a primary reason for its implementation: “people in the three categories listed 
above are commonly thought to be undeterrable. If this is true, preventive detention may be the only 
way to avoid the crimes they would otherwise commit.”290 Another way to read 'undeterrable,' 
especially in light of the problems with aiming for deterrence (which I describe in Chapter 5), is 
'immune to rehabilitation.' Allen and Laudan give a more precise definition of preventive detention: 
“incarceration of persons not as punishment for harms already wrought but as a device for preventing 
future harms that the state surmises they are likely to inflict if not incarcerated.”291 They also note the 
controversy over whether certain acts, such as those that signal a 'suspected terrorist' are in fact crimes. 
They take the side that an “act or event that in itself produces no harm should nonetheless be 
criminalized, if it significantly increases the risk that future harm will ensue.”292 In other words, they 
claim that an act that produces significant risk of future harm, even without actually harming anyone, is 
a crime. This is a plausible account, and it is backed up by judicial history. Indeed, conspiracy to 
                                                
289 Id. 
290 Id. 
291 Allen and Laudan, 2011, at 782. 











commit crime has been criminalized in England since at least 1305. “What is true of conspiracies is 
likewise true of other inchoate crimes, such as solicitation of a criminal act, facilitation of a criminal 
act, incitement to a criminal act, threat of a criminal act, and attempt.”293 Given that preventative 
detention fits all the requirements of the definition of incapacitation that I have defended, it provides a 
good example of physical incapacitation. 
 Furthermore, the act of keeping an offender in jail prior to trial, by denying bail, is an act of 
incapacitation. It is retributive because it is in response to a crime for which the state has good reason 
to believe that the offender is responsible. It is clearly a physical restriction; and it is usually reserved 
for offenders suspected to be dangerous. There is good reason to believe that these offenders do in fact 
pose significant risk to society. In the USA,  
13% of all homicide arrests from 1990 to 2002 involved persons who were either on 
active bail or were fugitives from bail... Supposing that most of those arrested for 
homicide are guilty and that most homicides that take place would not have occurred if 
the actual perpetrator had been incapacitated, a policy of denying bail to all defendants 
accused of a violent crime or with a history of violent crimes, it follows that we could 
prevent the deaths of around 1,500 citizens every year.294 
 
The goal of preventing the large number of murders committed by suspected offenders on bail awaiting 
trial for violent crimes has nothing to do with intentionally harming the suspected offender, but is 
purely preventive. Having given examples of current practices which qualify as incapacitation, I turn 
now to the discussion of whether such practices may be justified. 
   
3.5	  The	  Benefit	  to	  Society	  Justification	  and	  Objections	  	  
 In this section I will describe the one plausible justification for incapacitation, as well as the 
various objections to it. I will also discuss the relationship between incapacitation and punishment. As I 
have mentioned before, the only justification for incapacitation is preventing future offenses. This 
Benefit to Society Justification in relation to incapacitation faces similar objections as it did in relation 
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to rehabilitation.  
 First, one might object that this justification would justify incapacitating innocent people. But 
this objection fails, because as I argued above, if we accept that nascent planning or risk creation for 
future crimes can be criminalized, then there is no way the state could deem someone dangerous 
enough to justify incapacitating without that person being convicted of a past crime.  
 Secondly, the Benefit to Society Justification could justify severe restrictions that are 
disproportionate in relation to the offender's original offense. This is certainly true. It justifies keeping a 
criminally insane offender detained indefinitely if he is shown to be dangerous enough. Critics argue 
that such treatment may be disproportionate to their desert.  Aside from the criminally insane, many 
justice reform advocates believe that an example of disproportionate restriction is of the Miami 
offenders forced to live on an island under a highway. They see it as a step too far in restricting the 
residency conditions of offenders who have been released from prison where they 'served their time.' 
And beyond these real-world restrictions, the justification may provide reason for a state's egregious 
abuse of power. If sentences of life imprisonment were imposed for minor offenses such as motorist 
speeding, it would almost certainly benefit society by reducing deaths on the road, but this appalling 
consequence would be reason enough to reject the justification. 
 In response to this objection, it seems clear that the extreme cases, such as the life sentence of 
incapacitation for speeding, would never be justified based on reasonable risk assessments, and in any 
case would be inflicting worse suffering than they are preventing. For the more modest concerns, the 
only plausible response would be to bite the bullet and admit that the benefit to society may justify 
unacceptable practices. However, it may also be the case that the bad consequences of rejecting the 
state's ability to incapacitate could outweigh the bad consequences of disproportionate restriction. As 
noted above, the hundreds of murder victims who are killed by suspected violent offenders out on bail 
each year is a compelling reason to deny bail to offenders accused of dangerous crime. Extrapolating 











roam the streets out of fear for disproportionately restricting them. The best way forward would seem 
to be admitting that the justification makes room for inexcusable abuse, and for a system of regulation 
to be set in order to check for abuse. We could expect that with enough attention to risk assessment and 
transparency, a state could do a decent job in preventing grossly excessive incapacitation. 
 A theorist might reply two ways, but both of these responses fail. First, one could claim that the 
harms of biting the bullet would outweigh the actual benefit to society. This response fails because it 
mischaracterizes the context of the incapacitative interventions, and also because it miscalculates the 
harms. The second reply is to claim that while the benefits to society may outweigh the potential 
abuses, an even better route would be to attempt to punish such offenders according to proportional 
desert rather than to incapacitate them. This argument fails because of a pollyannaish view of our 
ability to punish according to proportionality. 
 To begin with the first reply, the idea of a post-arrest regime ‘letting’ abuses of power transpire 
unchecked is deceptive. There is no reason to believe that a system based on rigorous assessments of 
dangerousness with stringent oversight and commitment to minimizing foreseeable295 inflicted harm 
may not address most of the concerns over excessive incapacitation. Of course even in such a well run 
system, there will inevitably be ‘false positives,’ or cases when an offender is deemed to be too 
dangerous to let loose but who in fact would not have reoffended. But the overall benefit of being able 
to incapacitate dangerous offenders clearly outweighs the harms of false positives. To give evidence for 
this claim, the level of false positives is relatively low, and likely to dip lower as the science and 
implementation of risk assessment advances. Take De Keijser’s following summary of a study of risk 
assessment used to determine whether Dutch offenders would be preventatively incapacitated. He is 
explicitly critical of the effectiveness of risk assessment, but as I will explain after the quotation, he has 
no real grounds to be as critical as he is. He explains that the study compares those offenders who 
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actually reoffended and those who did not with their respective diagnostic levels of risk. 
Of the actual recidivists, 84 percent did indeed have a high risk score… These are 
correct predictions. Not bad. However, 29 percent of those who did not recidivate also 
received a high risk score. These are false positives, and they tend to be overlooked… 
If the risk score was used as the exclusive basis for deciding on prolonging [the 
incapacitation], then for almost one-third of those who would actually desist from crime 
the prolongation is unjustified… Compare, for instance, the diagnostic value of a 
witness recognizing the suspect from a correctly performed police lineup:… 75 percent 
correct versus 5 percent false positives… Can that be justified? Yes it can… As a 
consequentialist, one may thus defend the position that, once within the reach of 
criminal justice, in order to protect society against more than four out of five dangerous 
persons, it is necessary to accept that almost one out of three persons who are not 
(anymore) dangerous will also be incapacitated. To me this seems a difficult position to 
defend.296  
 
In a very brief and unconvincing explanation of why he sees this as such an indefensible position, he 
cites the difficulty of knowing when such “mischief” (presumably referring to false positives) overrides 
the benefit. To address this worry, it seems plain to me that the level of mischief that would be tolerable 
to a society would be much higher than the level portrayed in the Dutch system. The benefit of 
preventing such a high percentage of dangerous criminals from reoffending seems clearly worth the 
cost of to incapacitating other dangerous criminals who may not have actually reoffended. To add a few 
more reasons to accept my evaluation, the predictive value of the risk assessment tool is systematically 
underrated because of the high percentage of offenders who commit crime but do not get caught. This 
means that many of those who did not reoffend according to the study may have actually reoffended 
but not been caught. In 2004 in the USA, only 46.3 percent of violent crimes resulted in an arrest, and 
in 2011 the percentage was almost identical, at 47.7 percent.297 Keep in mind also that these offenders 
deemed dangerous are guilty of past crimes that help demonstrate their dangerousness, and that they are 
being kept in conditions that try to minimize their suffering rather than intentionally inflict it. If 
offenders who in the past demonstrated truly dangerous behavior, and who have a one in three chance 
of no longer being dangerous, need to be confined to a reasonably comfortable living situation from 
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which they cannot leave in order to prevent “four out of five dangerous persons” from reoffending, I 
feel comfortable claiming that such a trade off is one that any society should and would make, and far 
from what De Keijser deemed as “intolerable inaccuracy.” The only other attempt De Keijser makes to 
rebuke such a trade off is by quoting von Hirsch who claims that society has an obligation “to do 
individual justice.” By this I assume that von Hirsch means punishing individuals proportionally 
according to their desert. This is the route taken by the second reply, to which I now turn. 
 The second reply claims that rather than the two bad options of: (1) incapacitating none of the 
dangerous offenders, and (2) incapacitating some of them beyond what they deserve, we should instead 
focus on trying to punish them according to desert. Setting aside for a moment the concerns of 
justifying punishment and making the (quite large) assumption that it can somehow be justified, and 
focusing only on those violent offenders deemed highly dangerous by risk assessment tools: even then, 
the option of incapacitation is preferable over proportional punishment. The reason for this is because 
of the massive uncertainty in how to try to assess what a particular offense actually deserves in terms of 
proportional punishment. Without getting into the details of the enormous and ever-burgeoning amount 
of very compelling work done on the problem of proportionality in punishment,298 I feel confident 
claiming that it is absolutely certain that the level of scientific confidence we have in our ability to 
predict the level of a particular offender’s dangerousness far outstrips our ability to tell the amount of 
deserved suffering we should inflict on him. This is an issue of practicality: given the limits of our 
current abilities, we should choose the diagnostic tool that allows for acceptable precision over the one 
that is mired in inconsistency. The further benefit of this route is that it aims to minimize harm to the 
incapacitated offender, thereby avoiding the very messy task of needing to justify intentionally harming 
him.  
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 Restorative justice scholarship has exploded over the course of the past couple decades. 
Especially since the 1989 publication of John Braithwaite's now-canonized Crime, Shame and 
Reintegration, scholars from an impressively varied array of disciplines have been contributing to the 
conversation with accelerating prolificacy. Despite this intense focus, there has been little agreement on 
just what restorative justice is. Because a discussion of alternatives to punishment would be remiss to 
neglect this new and burgeoning body of work, I will address it in this chapter. But on further 
inspection, as I will argue, restorative justice plays a less important role in the discussion of the 
morality of non-punitive alternatives than its current popularity might lead one to believe. The 
usefulness of restorative justice for this discussion boils down to providing a compelling example of a 
ritual that may be used in a minimally punitive post-arrest regime. This ritual is the victim-offender 
conference, and while it has been extensively studied, it is appropriate only for a portion of criminal 
cases, thus its role will be restricted to that limited range of cases.299 In the first section of this chapter I 
discuss the restorative justice movement, its relationship with punishment, its limitations and its 
justifications. However, the victim-offender conference is one example of a broader alternative to 
punishment, that of non-punitive rituals. While the restorative justice conference is currently the 
trendiest example of non-punitive rituals, it is not the most important: criminal trial is arguably the 
most important non-punitive criminal justice ritual, and any crime response regime, whether punitive or 
minimally punitive, will require it. Along with trial, I briefly discuss therapeutic jurisprudence. Other 
important rituals include reentry ceremonies and apology rituals. In the second part of this chapter I 
discuss trial, reentry ceremonies and apology rituals, as well as their justifications and why very few 
rituals (with the obvious exception of criminal trial) should be mandated.  
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4.1	  Restorative	  Justice	  
 It is fair to claim that the core of the restorative justice movement is the practice of holding 
conferences to mediate between the victim and the offender.300 These go by many names in the 
literature, including: victim-offender mediation, accountability conferences, family group conferences, 
diversionary conferences, restorative justice conferences, victim-offender conferences etc. I will refer 
to them hereafter simply as 'conferences.' There is of course a wide variety of conference structures and 
practices, but they “share common features including a community-based sanctioning focus, non-
adversarial and informal processes, and decision-making by consensus.”301 Of course, simplifying a 
vast, theory-based movement to its current practical application is an unfair way to characterize the 
movement. But I am not so much concerned with the broad movement and theory, but rather its 
candidates for on-the-ground alternatives to punishment. While it is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation to evaluate the various restorative justice (RJ) theories, it is appropriate to scrutinize 
conferences as alternatives to punishment. And before delving straight into a discussion of the 
conferences, I should give a brief impression of the wide variety of debates taking place on a 
theoretical level among RJ scholars, and explain further why these debates need not affect this study of 
non-punitive alternatives. 
 
4.1.1	  Definitions	  and	  Theory	  	  
 Braithwaite gives perhaps the broadest possible definition of RJ: “Restorative justice is about 
struggling against injustice in the most restorative way we can manage.”302 Such a broad interpretation 
of RJ is common, and it allows for further general claims about RJ: 
Braithwaite: RJ “is not simply a way of reforming the criminal justice system, it is a 
way of transforming the entire legal system, our family lives, our conduct in the 
workplace, our practice of politics. Its vision is of a holistic change in the way we do 
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justice in the world.” 
 
Walgrave: RJ is “every action that is primarily oriented towards doing justice by 
restoring the harm that has been caused by a crime.”303 
  
Von Hirsch et al.: RJ “has emerged as a potent alternative paradigm in criminal 
justice.”304 
 
While still general, I admire the following definition of restorative justice, because it seems to capture 
the cluster of concepts associated with RJ more succinctly than usual: 
Zehr: [R]estorative justice is a process to involve, to the extent possible, those who 
have a stake in a specific offence and to collectively identify and address harms, needs 
and obligations, in order to heal and put things as right as possible.305 
 
What should we take from these characterizations? First and foremost, they show the generality and 
ambitious scope with which RJ is often described. From just these four (among hundreds of candidates) 
we can glean that RJ has a debatable role within (or external to) the criminal justice system. We also 
get a glimpse into some of the key principles of RJ: restoration for harm, inclusion of stakeholders, and 
collective decision making. 
 If your introduction to RJ is through characterizations such as these, then it would probably not 
be a surprise to learn that the RJ literature is rife with internal debates. There are generally two kinds of 
debates: those arising from critiques of the RJ movement as a whole, and those arising from specific 
questions of scope and clarification. In the first camp, Von Hirsch et al. provide a nuanced and harsh 
critique of the RJ movement, claiming that it has “(1) Multiple and unclear goals... (2) Underspecified 
means and modalities... (3) Few or no dispositional criteria... (4) Dangling standards for evaluation.”306 
They go on to defend a model of RJ that looks very similar to the characterizations that they criticize, 
explaining how their version can be specified and evaluated in a way that avoids some of their 
critiques.  
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 The debates become more interesting when they take on more focused questions. Theo 
Gavrielides offers an incredibly useful account of the various debates within RJ scholarship. He 
describes six different debates, and in order from the most broad to the most specific they are: (1) RJ 
and its relationship with the criminal justice system; (2) RJ and its position within the criminal justice 
system; (3) a definition for RJ; (4) stakeholders in RJ; (5) RJ and punishment; and finally (6) RJ 
principles and their flexibility.307 Keeping these six layers of debate in mind is very helpful for parsing 
the RJ literature, which can often seem muddied by debates in which the two sides talk past each other. 
It also clearly demonstrates the complexity of the subject matter.   
 For the purposes of this dissertation, I will only be dealing explicitly with the question of RJ 
and punishment. I will avoid the other debates by assuming their outcomes or denying their relevance 
to my inquiry. Regarding the first two debates, I assume that RJ conferences can fit within the current 
court-dominated paradigm of criminal justice. I assume that eligible offenders convicted by the courts 
could participate in and receive their formal sentencing from these conferences. I should note that by 
sidestepping these debates I am avoiding discussion of some very useful critiques of the criminal 
justice system. For instance, Braithwaite argues that criminal justice ignores very important questions 
that RJ may be able to answer, namely “questions about whether the injustice would be better 
addressed by a family, by providing economic incentives for just behaviour, by just speech, as opposed 
to criminalisation.”308  Braithwaite also critiques the field of philosophy of punishment by claiming that 
the field has “a puzzling lack of interest in when it is appropriate for state versus non-state actors to do 
the punishing.”309 These crucial questions are outside the scope of this dissertation. Regarding the third 
debate over defining RJ, I will not offer a broad definition, and will restrict my discussion to the brief 
examples I gave above. I will offer a more focused definition of the conferences in the following 
section. And regarding the questions of stakeholders and principles, I will assume that a conventional 
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reading of victim-offender conference structure will be able to sidestep these debates. My analysis of 
the conferences as alternatives to punishment will not change based on the exact composition of the 
conference participants. By resorting to vague terms such as 'community members' I am purposefully 
leaving these questions unanswered, as they are best addressed by criminologists and others who have 
direct experience with such conferences. And the conventional conference structure manifests fairly 
uncontroversial principles. Most will agree that RJ's principles include restoration, accountability310 
and community decision making among others. 
 
4.1.2	  Conferences	  
 As I stated before, it is fair to claim that conferences are the core of RJ. They are the practical 
application of all the theorizing. As Okimoto et al. put it, “conferencing between involved parties is 
common to the majority of restorative programs.”311 A crime response regime aiming to replace or 
minimize punishment should be clear about the benefits and limitations of conferences, as well as their 
relationship with punishment.  
 First I will briefly sketch what these conferences look like. I attempt to describe the basic 
components of conferences such as who takes part, who is eligible, how they are run and what the 
outcomes are. Most conference programs focus on crimes in which there is a clear offender and victim, 
and often, as is the case of a fistfight, involved parties can be both offender and victim. Calhoun and 
Pelech write that “[c]onferences have been held for a wide range of behaviors but mostly for 
interpersonal violence (e.g. assault, assault with a weapon, armed robbery) or property-related offenses 
(e.g. breaking and entering, theft, fraud).”312 The participants include the victim, offender, community 
members and a mediator. Of course there is debate over exactly whom these terms refer to and what 
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their role should be, but this general list is uncontroversial.313  
 Next, conference programs require that the offender admit guilt before he is eligible to 
participate in a conference. “[C]onferencing models emphasize the voluntary inclusion of anyone 
affected by the wrongdoing and the need to provide a safe forum for truth-telling, encounter and a 
negotiated reparation agreement.”314 For instance, the only criterion that Calgary Community 
Conferencing (CCC) requires 
for accepting referrals is that the person who wronged accept responsibility for the 
wrongdoing... Conferencing activities proceed from the referral stage only when the 
youth and the individual(s) harmed voluntarily agree to become part of the process.315 
 
Note that both the offender and the victim need to consent to participate in the process, which is the 
norm for conferences. This voluntary nature of the conference model restricts the range of cases that 
conferences may deal with. Given that, as Daly notes, “the adjudication process rests on a fundamental 
right of those accused to say they did not commit an offence,” the state's post-arrest regime will need to 
be able to accommodate accused offenders who deny their guilt, which is a simple and powerful reason 
that conferences may not completely usurp the 'traditional' trial system. The apparatus of investigation, 
prosecution and trial exists because accused offenders have this right to deny their guilt. And while 
some offenders who admit guilt up front may be diverted to the RJ conferences, there will remain many 
more who are not eligible, either because their victims refuse to participate, or their crimes make them 
ineligible for their local conference program. As Daly observes, “RJ is limited by the abilities and 
interests of offenders and victims to think and act in ways we may define as restorative.”316 This is part 
of the reason that I am comfortable assuming that any viable application of RJ will have to work with 
the current criminal justice system, and not completely replace it—because RJ conferences could not 
deal with the same range of cases that traditional criminal justice can handle. 
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 The actual conferences are typically informal processes that involve open dialogue. Daly 
describes the conference process from the South Australia Juvenile Justice (SAJJ) project on 
conferencing: 
 A victim and admitted offender and their supporters come together to discuss the 
offence, its impact and an appropriate penalty (agreement or outcome). The discussion 
evokes feelings of remorse in the offender, which leads to a genuine apology and a 
desire to repair the harm... Participants then discuss an appropriate penalty (or 
agreement of outcome). Everyone has a say, and participation by the professionals is 
kept to a minimum.317 
 
Usually after the end of conferences the offender signs a legally binding agreement “which itemises the 
group's outcome decision.”318  Of course, this is the ideal version of events, what is hoped for from the 
outset. Daly goes on to describe in detail where practice and theory diverge in her experience with the 
SAJJ. Some common complaints about conferences are that they can be poorly run, the offender can be 
insincere, and the victim can leave feeling like justice was not restored. Generally, despite some serious 
pitfalls that professionals are busy pinpointing and working out, conferences have been a success over 
the past twenty some years since they were first implemented as an alternative to the 'traditional' court 
proceedings of the current dominant criminal justice paradigm.319 Next I will briefly summarize these 
successes. 
 In a 2008 meta-analysis of the literature, Wenzel et al. conclude that “[g]enerally, the evidence 
suggests that victims feel more satisfied with restorative justice programs compared to court 
processes.”320 Beyond the literature that they cite, many other studies have come to a similar 
conclusion. In a summary of research on victim-offender mediation, Umbreit et al. found:  
[T]he vast majority of VOM participants (typically over 80%) across setting, cultures, 
and types of offense reported believing that the process was fair to both sides and that 
the resulting agreement was fair. Where comparison groups were employed, those 
individuals exposed to mediation came away more likely to feel that they had been 
treated fairly than those going through traditional court proceedings.321 
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Two other large meta-analyses that are widely cited and esteemed322 echo these findings and also focus 
on the effectiveness of conferences in reducing recidivism. The first, Sherman and Strang, concludes 
that “RJ seems to reduce crime more effectively with more rather than less serious crimes... RJ works 
better with crimes involving personal victims than for crimes without them.”323 Pause for a moment to 
consider how striking this finding is: we normally associate RJ conferences with offenders guilty of 
less serious crimes, and indeed most conferences deal with such offenders. But they conclude that RJ 
works to reduce crime more effectively when it deals with the most serious offenders, such as rapists 
and murderers. I will refer back to this finding in my discussion below. These reductions are in 
comparison with control groups of offenders going through the normal courtroom channels. The second 
large study, from Bonta and Andrews, concludes that offenders who have gone through RJ 
conferencing have recidivism rates on average seven percent lower than control groups. They admit 
that this effect is significantly less potent than the impact of well-run rehabilitation programs.324 
 To assess the morality of conferences I mostly focus on the question of whether they are 
punitive. The question of whether they are justified is less pressing because of two reasons. First, many 
of the reasons for which the ritual of trial is justified also apply to conferences. For example, both 
practices condemn the offense and this may be enough to justify them. Secondly, RJ conferences are 
composed of two discrete state actions, namely holding the conference and sanctioning the offender's 
communal sentence. I will assume that the act of holding the conference is no less justifiable than the 
act of holding a trial, and thus skip discussing independent justifications for the conferences. The 
question of whether the state is justified in authorizing and carrying out the outcome of a conference, 
i.e. the offender's communal sentence, is intimately tied to whether that sentence is punitive, which is 
what I turn to now. 
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4.1.3	  RJ	  and	  Punishment	  
 As Gavrielides notes, one of the central arguments within RJ scholarship is whether RJ should 
or could be punitive. Most of the theoretical debate has centered over the more conceptual inquiry of 
whether RJ conferences may include punishment and remain restorative. I will focus on this more 
specific formulation of the question: may the outcome of the RJ conference permissibly include 
punishment for the offender? Many RJ scholars “argue that there is no place for punitiveness when the 
goal of the justice process is to repair the harm that the offense has caused.”325 For example, 
Braithwaite and Strang argue that within the context of the goals and principles of RJ, “[r]esponding to 
the hurt of the crime with the hurt of punishment is rejected.”326 The reasons for this position stem from 
the intent of the RJ process. The conference, as the arguments typically go, is meant to restore its 
participants as much as possible. Even if the outcome of the conference includes some burden for the 
offender, the intention behind this burden is to help repair the victim, the community, and the offender's 
standing. 
 This argument immediately runs into a familiar practical concern: how are we to determine the 
intention behind a particular sentence arising from a conference? Unlike the traditional court system, 
RJ cannot point to legislative and judicial intent. Within most RJ conference models, a conference 
sentence arises from the conference participants. Of course, one could easily imagine conference 
models in which this is not the case. These could include maximum or minimum restrictions on 
conference sentences, and firm guidelines for the suggested outcome based on the type of crime. A 
judicial review of the sentence could be in place, with the ability to amend sentences that stray too far 
from the guidelines. If these restrictions were in place,  the conference would retain its role as an 
occasion for discussion, public condemnation of the offense, apology and all the other valuable 
symbolic and communally expressive functions of RJ. However, it would lose much of its role as an 
event for communal decision making. The restrictions and guidelines would be set by separate bodies, 
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namely the legislature and judiciary, and these regulations would largely prescribe the offender's future. 
This solution would sidestep the problem of identifying the intention because it could be located the 
same way as in traditional criminal justice (the way that I discussed in the first chapter). However, a RJ 
conference with a prescribed outcome is a fundamentally unorthodox conception, and it would be 
unfair for an advocate of RJ to rely on this solution. Conferences normally allow for its participants to 
determine the outcome, which means that the intention behind the sentence rests solely with the 
participants. Thus the question of the intention behind the conference outcome leads to empirical 
questions of what typical conference participants intend. 
 Myriad studies show that members of the general public prefer punitive measures for offenders, 
especially for serious crimes. This leads to a dilemma for Braithwaite and other RJ scholars who want 
to keep punishment out of RJ. Put succinctly by Gromet and Darley, the problem is that “[i]f people are 
not willing to send more serious crimes to ‘pure’ restorative justice procedures, then this severely limits 
the viability of restorative justice as [a non-punitive] alternative to the traditional court system.”327 By 
“pure,” they mean purely non-punitive. We know from many different studies that when participants 
are forced to choose between punitive and restorative measures for serious offenders, most choose 
punitive.328 However, the details get more complicated when participants are given the chance to mix 
punitive and restorative measures, which is what the case would be in a RJ conference that had 
recourse to prescribing a partly punitive course for the offender. 
 Gromet and Darley composed a study that introduced participants to a range of offenders and 
gave the participants the choice of three routes to recommend for the offenders: (1) purely punitive 
prison sentences; (2) purely restorative conferences; and (3) to mix punitive prison sentences and 
restorative measures. Given this choice, the study reveals that most participants prefer a mix for serious 
crimes (e.g. burglary, attempted murder, rape). Participants equally prefer the purely restorative 
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measures and the mix for mid-range crimes (e.g. mugging). And participants strongly prefer purely 
restorative measures for the least serious crimes (e.g. vandalism and bike theft).329 Also, those who 
preferred the mix of prison and restoration gave significantly more lenient prison terms than those 
participants who preferred pure prison terms.330 This is a noteworthy finding because it shows that an 
offender will likely be treated more leniently if he participates in a conference. This echoes previous 
research that shows that people are less harsh in sentencing when the offender demonstrates remorse. 
The authors conclude that:  
“As crimes increase in their severity, the system can exercise the option to send 
offenders to prison in addition to their fulfilling the conditions of the conference 
agreement. This finding is especially important because restorative justice procedures 
have been shown to be most effective for crimes that are high, rather than low, in 
seriousness.”331  
 
Note the repetition of the surprising finding that I cited above: RJ procedures work better to reduce 
recidivism with serious offenders. This mix of prison and restorative elements resulting from an RJ 
conference is currently rare in practice because most RJ conferences are used for mid to low 
seriousness of offenses despite the greater successes in reducing recidivism when using RJ with more 
serious offenders. The authors also admit that there are practical problems that would need to be 
tackled, for instance, whether the prison comes before or after an offender’s restorative obligations.  
 Unsurprisingly, other scholars have advocated for this precise mixture of prison sentences and 
restorative justice. In such a “restorative regime, restorative prisons can be built.”332 These prisons 
would be made to help the prisoner via rehabilitation. Prisoners would have the chance to reflect on 
their needs and to work to reduce their risk to society. Using the conceptual distinctions I defended in 
the last chapter, we could surmise that the action of forcing an offender to go to such facilities would be 
either incapacitative or punitive. This is because the action of forcing the offender to go to the prison, 
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even if it is a restorative prison, does not depend in any way on the offender's will. Then once inside 
such a restorative prison, he would have the chance to participate in rehabilitative programs. Would 
conference participants' intention be incapacitative or punitive? The intent would likely be punitive. 
Given the research I cited above, participants would likely act punitively, especially for serious crimes. 
Of course, we would have no sure way of knowing besides directly consulting the participants, but we 
can justifiably suppose that if their intentions are limited to either punishment or incapacitation, they 
are likely to be punitive. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that offenders who need to be incapacitated 
would qualify as eligible to participate in conferences. Presumably decisions of whether to incapacitate 
criminals should be left to experts who can calculate risk and not to lay people in a conference.  
 An RJ advocate might respond by claiming that people's punitive attitudes are influenced by the 
current ubiquity of the punitive regime. If the regime transitioned over time and became principally 
restorative, then people's attitudes would also switch over time and their intuitions would lead to non-
punitive responses. While this is certainly possible, until that transition occurs, it would be unfair to 
consider conferences resulting in prison sentences to be alternatives to punishment. And even if the 
regime becomes principally restorative, it may still be the case that conference participants continue to 
intend to harm the offender when they choose to send him to prison. 
 Perhaps conference participants may intend to rehabilitate the offender by sending him to 
prison, presenting a third option of conference intention beyond punishment and incapacitation. The 
conference will always include the offender, and because the decision is arrived at communally, one 
might say that if the sentence includes a term of restorative prison, then the offender has consented to 
it. This may perhaps qualify the prison term as rehabilitative and non-punitive given the definition of 
rehabilitation that I defended in the previous chapter. But this is mistaken;  when offenders  are sent to 
restorative prison, it is without regard to their will or consent. Many scholars have wondered how 











route as opposed to normal prosecution.333 This choice between unequal results certainly amounts to a 
kind of coercion to choose the conference route. But under the minimal understanding of consent that I 
defend as a requirement for rehabilitation, coercion does not necessarily result in non-consent. If the 
offender can possibly choose otherwise, then his course of action may be considered rehabilitative. 
However using this minimal conception of consent, one could still not claim that an offender consents 
to his conference sentence of a prison term. The reason for this is that if he refused to sign the 
conference agreement then he would be transitioned back to the court system where he would surely be 
incarcerated. Claiming that an offender consents to his prison term by participating in the conference 
would be perverse because in reality he would not be able to avoid prison regardless; if he cannot 
choose otherwise, then he has not consented even using my minimal conception of consent. 
 Of course, one might defend the claim that a prison sentence resulting from a conference may 
be rehabilitative by rejecting my consent requirement of rehabilitation. This position entails two 
separate claims: that consent is not required for rehabilitation, and that sentencing the offender to 
prison qualifies as a kind of this non-consensual rehabilitation. As I argued in the previous chapter, I do 
not believe that the first claim can be defended. And furthermore, even if someone were to successfully 
defend such a conception of rehabilitation, it is unlikely that the second claim could be justified. When 
RJ advocates speak of restorative prisons, they speak of giving the offender time and opportunity for 
rehabilitative programs within the confines of prison. This way of speaking betrays that there are two 
discrete state actions involved: first is imprisoning and second is offering rehabilitation programs. An 
advocate of rehabilitative prison would need to show why imprisoning the offender is necessary to the 
rehabilitation.334 Why not simply offer the programs? If the offender refuses, then perhaps he should be 
imprisoned, but then the act of imprisoning would seem straightforwardly punitive or incapacitative. 
Finally, I take the ability of the consent requirement of rehabilitation to help parse whether RJ 
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conferences are rehabilitative as further evidence of its viability.  
 So far I have been focusing on the question of whether conference participants who give a jail 
sentence act punitively. The reason for this comes in part from the empirical evidence, which presents a 
dilemma for RJ: conferences work best for serious offenders, but conferences are almost never used for 
these offenders. I have argued that conferences for offenders who would otherwise be facing serious 
jail time will most likely result in punitive sentences. Prison also provides a clear-cut example to 
discuss whether RJ is punitive. But most conferences do not result in prison; do these face the same 
problems as putative alternatives to punishment? The answer is that they do not. Research shows that 
the public is much more willing to grant purely restorative, non-punitive sentences in conferences for 
less serious offenders. For example, “Eight in ten (77%) adults believe the most appropriate sentence 
for nonviolent, nonserious offenders is supervised probation, restitution, community service, and/or 
rehabilitative services; if an offender fails in these alternatives, then prison or jail may be 
appropriate.”335 Furthermore, these sentences could be considered consensual. If a conference 
recommends that an offender guilty of vandalizing property spend a certain number of hours cleaning 
up graffiti, then he could choose otherwise. Even if the state made it clear that he would be punished 
for failing to complete the sentence, the sentence itself is separate from the threat, which is 
incapacitative and separate from the actual punishment. The offender had a substantive choice: between 
doing community service and not doing it, with the latter resulting in imprisonment. We can easily 
construe that he had a substantive ability to choose otherwise, in comparison to the choice between 
court-ordered prison and conference-ordered prison, which would be perverse to consider an ability to 
choose otherwise.  
 Now, this may seem jarring because it means that the difference in consent is based on whether 
the outcome will be the same or different. And it leaves room for a critic to offer the following 
objection. What if an offender were given the choice between 100 and 101 days in prison. Surely the 
                                                











introduction of a choice between slightly different outcomes would not mean that he consented to 
prison. But this is not the notion of consent I am defending. As I defined consent in the previous 
chapter, the offender must have the choice between two substantively different options. The choice 
between 100 and 101 days in prison is not a substantively different choice, and likewise the choice 
between a conference-ordered prison sentence and a court-ordered prison sentence is not substantively 
different. A critic might press on the notion of 'substantive difference,' but this is not a problem for my 
account. In application, the distinction may be determined, implemented and monitored by regulatory 
bodies within the criminal justice system. There are plenty of other even trickier concepts that the 
criminal justice system handles, and institutions structured to guide practices and check abuse act to 
regulate the challenges surrounding these concepts. The notions of ‘due process,’ and ‘reasonable 
doubt’ are two similar examples. 
 I will end this discussion with an example of how clear definitions of punishment and 
rehabilitation can aid with confusion within RJ scholarship. Lokanan laments that oftentimes the term 
'punishment' is used imprecisely in the RJ literature. Some scholars (like Daly) use it to mean any 
burden for the offender that results from the RJ process. Others take it to mean the more precise 
conception of a state action intended to harm the offender. Lokanan reacts to these differing accounts 
by claiming that “indiscriminate conceptualizations of punishment create conceptual muddle and 
linguistic imprecision in an already difficult area.”336 But instead of giving a rigorous account of what 
punishment is, he rather splits punishment into two categories: restorative and retributive. His 
distinction between two types of punishment is a strange move. It is, to my knowledge, unique in the 
literature. I mention it in order to demonstrate the conceptual trouble that occurs when RJ scholars are 
not clear in their use of the term 'punishment.' Lokanan admirably acknowledges the need for 
clarification, and in attempting to explain he makes some errors that are useful for understanding the 
relationship between RJ and punishment. He explains the differences between his two conceptions of 
                                                












The fundamental difference between restorative and retributive punishments is twofold. 
First, punishment is not punitive in the restorative process. Rather, punishment is 
instrumental, as it is not imposed with the offender’s negative moral status in mind, but 
rather the desirable consequences it is believed or hoped the disposition will have on 
the offender...Punishment is not intentional; it is a side-effect of the reparation process. 
Second, the emphasis on pain is practically non-existent. When punishment is applied, 
it is done with conditions that control and reduce the level of pain and in a context 
where restoration and healing are the main goals.337 
 
This quotation provides good fodder for analysis. The most striking part of his explanation bears 
repeating with emphasis: “punishment is not punitive in the restorative process.” I admire his 
directness in evaluating his RJ colleagues and noticing confusion over the term 'punishment.' And I 
also agree with his basic approach of keeping two separate categories for acts that are intended to harm 
the offender and others which are aimed at getting the offender to acknowledge the harm and make 
amends for it. However, it seems obvious to me that the punitive category of actions qualifies as 
'punishment' and the other does not. What Lokanan describes as restorative punishment fits well with a 
definition of rehabilitation. It is instrumental, aiming to change the offender. Pain inflicted on the 
offender is not intended, but rather a regrettable side-effect that is minimized as much as possible. This 
is another good example of how conceptual clarity in defining punishment and rehabilitation can have 
wide ranging benefits, which include injecting some clarity amidst the RJ literature. 
 
4.2	  Other	  Rituals	  
 So far in this chapter I have focused on one non-punitive ritual, the victim-offender conference. 
Whether a conference is actually non-punitive depends on its participants, as well as the seriousness of 
the crime they are considering and their intention. It also depends on whether the conference 
participants receive guidelines and constraints on their sentencing choices from a legislative body.338 
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The other rituals that I turn to now are more straightforwardly non-punitive. While some may take it as 
obvious that trials, therapeutic jurisprudence, apologies and reentry ceremonies are non-punitive, here I 
will explain why they are. I will also consider the implications of coercing each of these rituals. I 
conclude that unlike trial and specialty courts such as drug courts, apologies and reentry ceremonies 
should rarely, if ever, be coerced.  
 I do not think that this is the place for pursuing a rigorous philosophical definition of ritual. 
There are no substantive questions raised in this dissertation that depend on such a definition, and 
generally the term is used uncontroversially within criminal justice literature. Rituals are symbolic 
practices that may or may not have further functional uses. Shadd Maruna is one of the foremost 
scholar on rituals in criminal justice, and he writes that, “[a]bove all, a ritual is a medium of 
communication, with its own symbolic grammar and syntax.”339 
 
4.2.1	  Trial	  and	  Therapeutic	  Jurisprudence	  	  
 Trial is the most important ritual in criminal justice. It serves many functions: determining guilt, 
condemning crime, redeeming innocence, expressing various commitments such as impartiality, 
transparency and human rights. Many trials also serve to determine the proper sentence for a guilty 
offender. Trials are not intended to harm the offender. It may result in a sentence that is punitive, but 
the trial itself remains non-punitive. Just as the threat of punishment from not participating in a 
rehabilitation program does not transform the program from rehabilitative to punitive, the threat of 
punishment for not participating in trial does not change the underlying character of the trial. 
Punishment as a result of not participating in trial cannot be considered part of the trial, as they are 
discrete actions. This dissertation is not the place to attempt even a cursory description of trial and its 
purposes; of all the topics that I am discussing, trial is the most exhaustively documented and analyzed. 
Duff writes that, “the criminal trial is the formal culmination of the criminal process” and that it is “a 
                                                











formal process through which an alleged wrongdoer is called to answer to his fellow citizens by the 
court that speaks in their name.” He goes on to claim that the criminal trial “is precisely focused on the 
wrongdoing, not just on the harm that might also have been caused, and focuses on that wrongdoing as 
a public rather than a private matter: the polity as a whole calls the alleged perpetrator to account for a 
wrong that concerns all citizens.”340 I assume for the sake of brevity that of the many purposes of trial, 
some or all of them serve to successfully justify coercing people to take part. It seems uncontroversial 
for a state to claim that the importance of establishing guilt and protecting innocence is far more 
important than an individual's preference to participate, and that it is justified in acting accordingly. 
Furthermore, I assume that these purposes also help serve to justify detaining offenders who are 
considered a flight risk. Ensuring that offenders participate will mean keeping them detained if the state 
has good reason to think that they might run away. Before moving forward, I should note that of the 
many purposes that trial serves, perhaps its most important is aimed at establishing fact. This emphasis 
on external affairs in part explains why trial is so different from apology and reentry rituals. Trial 
aspires to establish historical, objective record. In contrast, apology and reentry rituals aim to signify an 
inner transformation of self. This difference helps explain why trial can reasonably be a coerced ritual, 
and why there are objections to coercing the other two. 
 ‘Therapeutic justice’ is a term that denotes a rising movement to filter offenders to specialized 
courts instead of traditional courts. “The types of specialized courts that exist at present include 
domestic violence, community, mental health, alcohol abuse, homeless, and a host of others.”341 But by 
far the most prominent of these courts are drug courts, and for the purpose of illustration, I will limit 
my discussion to drug courts. Douglas Husak writes that in these courts, “eligible offenders are given 
the option of subjecting themselves to normal adjudication or undergoing a treatment regime designed 
and overseen by the specialty court... Failure to complete this regime results in prosecution of (when 
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courts are postconviction) the imposition of the deferred sentence for the underlying offense.”342 In this 
way, drug courts may be seen as rehabilitation supervisors, with the explicit threat of punishment 
overhanging the process. It is clear that participation in the court-supervised treatment is not punitive. 
The threat of punishment makes drug courts a source of transparent legal incapacitation. Drug courts 
are punitive only when judges send an offender back to traditional court to be prosecuted, or impose a 
deferred sentence. The therapeutic justice movement conceptualizes the courts as alternatives to 
punishment that have strict discipline in ushering offenders through a treatment regime, and that “real 
punishments are held in reserve in case defendants fail to complete their treatment.”343 Husak notes the 
uneasy alliance of goals: rehabilitative until the offender fails to comply, then harshly punitive (most 
often, offenders who fail out of drug courts receive harsher treatment than they would have if they had 
not entered it). In a minimally punitive regime, it seems like the goal of motivating participation could 
justify punishments for failing to comply with a treatment regime, but these punishments would be 
nominal, or only as punitive as needed to motivate behavior. Jeremy Travis, citing research on drug 
courts, concludes that “the severity of the sanction is less important in securing compliance with social 
norms than the consistency and predictability of a system of incentives and modest sanctions 
administered in a respectful manner.”344 In a minimally punitive regime, an offender who serves his 
modest punishment should get another chance at completing treatment under the drug court. This 
would better account for the often-zigzagging road offenders take to desistence. Others have also noted 
the communicative strength of drug courts in comparison to traditional courts. Addressing this 
comparison, O’Hear writes that drug courts communicate “more directly and forcefully to the 
particularities of the offense and what the offender must do to reconcile himself with the community. 
Indeed, even though drug court is typically defended in utilitarian, forward-looking terms, its 
communicative qualities suggest the possibility of justification on retributive, backward looking 
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grounds.    
 
4.2.2	  Apology	  
 Apology has been categorized as a “ritual of inclusion.”345 It functions to bond people. More 
specifically, Petrucci writes that apology is composed of the following core elements: “(i) an 
expression of remorse or regret, such as ‘I’m sorry’; (ii) an overt acceptance of responsibility for the 
harmful act; (iii) some type of offer of compensation, repair, or restitution; and (iv) a promise to avoid 
such behavior in the future.”346This is a stringent set of requirements for an act to be considered an 
apology, and many people would understand the first requirement, an utterance of remorse or regret, as 
the bare requirement necessary for an act to be considered an apology. It seems that an act that fulfills 
Petrucci's requirements amounts to something like a 'full apology.' Furthermore, an apology can fulfill 
the requirements to be a full apology, but still be ineffective. For instance, an apology can be insincere. 
Petrucci notes that, “[t[hree concepts surface as central to effective apologies: communicating emotion 
(such as remorse or sadness), a face-to-face interaction, and the timing of the apology.”347 If an 
offender refuses to admit guilt until after he is convicted, then calls the victim to apologize without 
expressing emotion, then it seems unlikely that the victim will perceive the apology as genuine. He 
may surmise that the offender is apologizing in order to lessen his sentence. For these reasons, it is easy 
to see why conferences are an ideal place for apologies. They happen face-to-face, after the offender 
has admitted full guilt, and before the offender has been sentenced. They also happen in the context of 
a community, and, “[r]estorative justice research suggests that most participants do spontaneously 
apologize for their crimes when confronted by their family members and the victims of their 
actions.”348	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 What are the benefits of apology? Victims, in seeking to understand what happened, tend to find 
ways to blame themselves and hold themselves accountable as having some responsibility for not 
preventing the crime. Apology can clear this burden and show that the crime was totally out of their 
control.349 Additionally, victims generally want to hear apologies. Multiple studies confirm that victims 
valued apology as part of conferences. Research has also shown that victims who accept apologies are 
less angry.350 This gives rise to questions about whether the victim should accept the apology, which I 
discuss below. But apology also benefits the offender and society. “Several studies have found that 
offenders are interested in apologizing.”351 A New Zealand study showed that “after 3 years youth who 
did not apologize were three times more likely to be reconvicted than offending youth who did 
apologize,”352 but of course we don't know if this is causation or correlation. It is also important to note  
that these findings are preliminary, and there is a dearth of research isolating the effects of apology in 
criminal justice. Petrucci, who cites the above studies, also notes that claims about apology in criminal 
justice are “essentially untested.”353 Most findings cite apology as part of conferences, which are much 
better documented. As I noted above, conferences have an effect on reducing recidivism, and apology 
is usually an integral part of conferences. It seems fair to claim that usually apology has beneficial 
effects. However, this should not be reason to coerce apology. Given that effective apologies are 
sincere ones, the beneficial effects to the victim and offender would dissipate if the apology did not 
signify a genuine change of heart. Victims perceiving that an apology is insincere would resent the 
apology, and the offender would not have undergone the internal confrontation of his wrongdoing. 
Unlike the state's obvious reasons for coercing participation in trial, the very reasons that apologies are 
desirable explain why they are impotent when coerced.  
 Are there any downsides to apology? There is research that shows that victims feel compelled 
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by social norms to accept apologies.354 I speculate that this may undercut the dignity of victims who 
would rather not accept the apology but feel compelled to do so. This leads to the further questions of 
(1) whether victims have a duty to accept apologies, and (2) whether offenders have the right to make 
amends and apologize. Some scholars have claimed that when a genuine, full apology is offered, the 
recipient has a duty to 'accept' this. The terminology is a bit vague in this arena. Some writers 
distinguish between the terms 'accept' and 'forgive,' and others use 'accept' to include forgiveness. Lazar 
separates the terms: “When a full apology is made, we can say that it is reasonable to expect the victim 
to at least accept the apology, though forgiveness is another matter entirely.”355 And Radzik argues that 
acceptance amounts to forgiveness: “An apology cannot repair a wrong unless it is accepted. But a 
victim cannot accept an apology without thereby committing himself to forgive the wrongdoer. That is 
what "I accept your apology" means.”356 It seems like an impossibly burdensome task to explain how a 
victim has a positive duty to hear, let alone accept an offender's apology or to forgive him. Part of the 
reason for which conferences may only function in a limited capacity is because all participants need to 
take part voluntarily, which means that victims who would rather not confront their offender may 
abstain. When Lazar separates acceptance from forgiveness, presumably he means that to accept an 
apology is tantamount to listening to the apology, leaving the reaction to the apology ambiguous. In 
normal usage, apology acceptance is a reaction to hearing the apology; and if this reaction is not full-
blown forgiveness, it is at least a commitment toward reconciliation. To expect victims to hear the 
apology, let alone to expect them to react a certain way, is unreasonable because it places an undue 
burden on the victim without justification. 
 One possible route to attempting to justify victims' duty to hear or accept apologies is by 
advancing an offender's right to make amends. This right would entail the state enabling offenders to 
pursue making genuine amends, which may include restitution, apology and rehabilitation. Sayre-
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McCord explains this argument: 
[C]riminals—in addition to having a right to be treated as responsible agents—might 
also deserve the opportunity to make amends... A new injustice comes in (except 
perhaps in the most extreme cases) if a person who commits a crime is denied the 
opportunity to make amends. There are limits here—some crimes are so heinous that, in 
committing them, a person has forfeited this right—but most crimes surely don’t fall 
into this category... While I am somewhat ambivalent about seeing this as a right the 
criminal has, I think there is a point to the idea that people should be given the 
opportunity to “pay their debt to society.”357  
 
I will join Sayre-McCord and remain ambivalent about whether offenders have this right. There are 
good arguments for it, and Radzik defends them convincingly. She also holds the position that this 
right cannot usurp the victim's right to refuse to interact with the offender. She writes that, “Although 
wrongdoers have a duty to make amends, they are not morally permitted to attempt amends if doing so 
would cause extra suffering to the people they have offended.”358 Victims should also be allowed the 
right to refuse to forgive as a protest against the wrong done to them. As Lazar puts it, “There is, to my 
knowledge, no plausible conception of justice which could justify demanding that a person feel a 
certain way.”359 In some cases of irreparable harm, refusal to forgive may be the most appropriate 
response. Some victims of the Holocaust famously refused reparations as a protest in this spirit. 
However, to take a trivial case, if a neighbor forever refuses a young boy for vandalizing his mail box, 
we would find it odd and look down on his response, but we still cannot ask him to give up his right as 
a victim to refuse to forgive. Furthermore, an offender's right to make amends need not require the 
participation of the victim. He could apologize to a surrogate if the victim refuses to see him. He could 
also participate in acts of reparation, rehabilitation and restitution without the victim's involvement, 
thus enacting his right to make amends in these ways.   
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 A trendy observation in criminal justice literature is that 'they all come back,' referring to the 
fact that virtually every offender reenters society eventually.360 How to treat offenders after they 
complete their sentences is a perennial top priority and challenge, as it is likely the most important 
factor in reducing recidivism. A state can only do so much to deter, punish and rehabilitate an offender, 
but if that offender is left to walk back into his old neighborhood without job prospects and if his 
strongest connections are to friends who are still committing crime, then the state stands nearly 
powerless to prevent his recidivism. Managing offender reentry is a fascinating subject with a 
voluminous literature, and I will limit my discussion here to a short appeal to the need for more robust 
reentry rituals, and a brief discussion of reintegrating the worst offenders. When I use the term 'reentry 
ritual' I am referring to ceremonies that recognize an offender as having 'paid his due' and is deemed 
officially ready to be fully reintegrated. There are many other reentry procedures, some of which may 
be deemed rituals. For instance the parole system can be viewed as a liminal apparatus to manage 
offenders' transitions. In this vein, Travis proposes creating “reentry courts,” in which offenders would 
receive the individualized treatment that drug courts can offer. “Just as drug court judges celebrate 
every clean urine test… a reentry court judge would celebrate a job offer… or the completion of a 
community service project. On the other hand, the reentry court judge, just like his drug court 
counterpart, would be able to order curfews, electronic monitoring,” etc.361 I will not be considering 
specific procedures related to helping and preparing offenders to reenter society. I will rather assume 
that after the transition has been made, reentry rituals may signify the completion of the journey. 
 Maruna points out that when someone becomes an offender, it is a credential that signals 
something about him as a person. “Other credentials work this way too. You pass your Ph.D. and you 
become a 'doctor' with all of the connotations of special insight and capability implicit with that title. 
Quickly, the person moves from something one has achieved (finished a big piece of research) to what 
                                                
360  See Travis, 2005, for an especially informative book-length treatment of this subject.  











someone is ('My son, the doctor').”362 Maruna argues that criminal credentialing is unidirectional: there 
currently exists no way for an offender to signal to society that he has made his reparations and should 
be welcomed as a fully reinstated member of society. Maruna argues that certificates of rehabilitation, 
acting as a kind of letter of reference for employers and others, could help to fill this gap. This gap is 
especially large in the USA, and outside of it there are good examples of desistance credentialing. “In 
France, 'judicial rehabilitation' rituals take place in the same court rooms that sentence individuals to 
prison and (not coincidentally) 'resemble citizenship ceremonies.'”363  
 I should note that reentry rituals are not alternatives to punishment in the sense of replacing 
punitive post-conviction sentences, which is the sense I have thus far used in this dissertation. 
However, if one considers the totality of the state's post-conviction interventions with offenders, then 
one must include reentry procedures and rituals. Maruna and others point out that for all our intense 
focus on the initial interventions after a criminal conviction, we have neglected the counter-balance to 
the downward credentialing of labeling people as 'offenders.' This suggests that reentry rituals are 
alternatives in the sense of providing state-sanctioned countervailing force that allows offenders to 
regain symbolic ground which was taken from them by the state and thus may only be replaced by the 
state. Reentry rituals restore symmetry to the arc of an offender's fall and recovery.  
 However, one might point out that in some crimes, no real symmetry is possible. Some crimes 
are irreparable, and so a full restoration of an offender's standing in society is impossible. As Sayre-
McCord points out, there are crimes in which “neither hope nor sense should be attached to the idea 
that the victim might be made whole.”364 He goes on to say that even though reinstatement in society is 
impossible, if an offender has gone through adequate effort to work toward amends (although full 
amends are out of reach), then there may still be space for the state to ritually forgive the offender. 
Sometimes the proper response to people who have worked to make amends for a 
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horrible offense is to forgive them... The institutional forgiveness—conveyed, perhaps, 
by pardon—represents a collective choice by society concerning what should count as 
sufficient grounds for readmitting someone to full and equal status in society. Such a 
decision will no doubt have to be sensitive in some way to victims’ attitudes.365 
 
There are plenty of anecdotal accounts of offenders languishing in prison after they have been fully 
transformed as individuals. They not only present no further risk to society, but also may have given 
their lives to the effort of reforming other prisoners and working as much as possible toward their own 
amends. To insist that these offenders finish their terms of imprisonment simply out of commitment to 
an original sentence is a lopsided view of the goals for the system. When an offender reaches the 
standing that the state can reasonably hope for as the final result of its intervention, then the state 
should be willing to pardon the offender and admit that it has no need for further intervention, even if 
there is no possibility of full reparation because of the severity of the original offense.  
 There is little worry about whether the state should coerce reentry rituals, because presumably 
such rituals require significant work on the offender's part to deserve such recognition. If an offender is 
unwilling to put in the effort to deserve the award, then there is no reason that a state would coerce him 











                                                















 In this final chapter, I give an overview of the conclusions from the previous chapters, an 
argument for why a purely non-punitive crime response regime is untenable, and an argument for why 
the state should punish as little as possible.  
 
5.1	  Overview	  of	  Conclusions	  from	  Chapters	  1-­‐4	  
 In the first chapter, I summarized a few of the reasons that theorists, with increasing frequency 
and forcefulness, have concluded that all the putative justifications of punishment have failed. It is 
plausible that no justification of punishment has succeeded, and also plausible to suspect that a full, 
successful justification may never emerge. Also in the first chapter, I gave a positive argument for the 
necessity of the intention requirement of punishment. This requirement demands that for a state action 
to be considered  punishment, it must be performed with the intention to harm the offender. This 
requirement has received less attention from scholars than it merits. It is important because it is the key 
to determining what counts as punitive. Any discussion of alternatives to punishment must begin by 
distinguishing punishment from alternatives, and justifying that distinction. Every alternative that I 
have explored relies on its status as non-punitive due in part to the distinction arising from the intention 
requirement of punishment.  
 In defending this distinction, I considered the objection that intentions are vague and inscrutable 
and thus not a reliable guide for distinguishing state actions. I countered this by showing that intentions 
behind punishment can and should be transparent. The public record of legislation and its interpreters 
in the judiciary provide adequate basis for identifying these intentions, at least on most occasions. This 
record also provides adequate reason to trust that state actions taken in the name of these intentions can 











 In the second chapter, I argued against the possibility that pure restitution could entirely replace 
punishment. My argument relied in part on my claim that some practices, such as incapacitative 
imprisonment, cannot be justified by appeal to restitution. When an action is so straightforwardly 
preventative, it would be mistaken to claim that it is justified by repaying the community rather than 
the clearer goal of quarantining the offender against future attacks. I outlined other worries about the 
theory of pure restitution, including the objection that it could not adequately account for a murder 
victim who has no assets, not descendants and no will. I argued that a regime of pure restitution is 
impossible because in order to actually enforce restitution mandates, the state would need to resort to 
punishment (except in rare cases such as wage garnishment). I conclude that despite Boonin's 
impressive defense of his theory of pure restitution, it cannot hold up under scrutiny. I also argued 
against the widespread use of mandatory restitution, largely due to the fact that most offenders will not 
be able to pay the restitution. 
 In the same chapter I go on to argue that the welfare state has an obligation to provide 
compensation to violent crime victims. This argument hinges on the observation that most property 
crimes can be protected against with private insurance, while violent crimes most often cannot. While 
victims also have the option to pursue compensation via civil suits, the vast majority chooses against 
this route, mostly because people understand that the offender will not be able to afford the 
compensation. If the state rewarded primary compensation for crime victims, it would not preclude 
victims who choose to pursue a tort. Research from Ontario suggests that this system can work well, 
and that many victims do not place emphasis in formal fault-finding or restitution paid from the 
offender. Many would rather be reliably compensated by the state than to further confront the 
offender.366 I also argue that the state has a positive obligation to provide compensation. I give three 
justifications for this obligation: first that this compensation is an essential public good; next that the 
state failed its duty to protect, and owes compensation for that failure; and finally that compensation is 
                                                











a unique and essential way for the state to express certain values and commitments after the crime, 
namely to express sympathy, remorse and willingness to take responsibility for redressing harm.  
 In the third chapter, I defended a definition of offender rehabilitation that relies on a minimal 
notion of consent. Rehabilitation is authorized, retributive, consensual, intended treatment. I argued 
that mandatory rehabilitation will not be able to remain purely non-punitive because in order to enforce 
the mandate the state will need recourse to punishment. I also drew the conceptual borders between 
rehabilitation, punishment and incapacitation. I advanced a definition for offender incapacitation as 
authorized, retributive, non-consensual, non-punitive intended restriction. The state may restrict an 
offender physically or legally. Preventative incarceration is the most common example of physical 
incapacitation. An example of legal incapacitation is making it illegal to refuse a rehabilitation 
program. If the offender may still choose to refuse, despite heavy coercion, then he has enough volition 
in the matter to qualify under the minimal sense of consent required for rehabilitation. The benefit of 
these conceptual distinctions is being able to accurately explain and scrutinize the state's discrete 
actions that comprise a complex intervention such as chemical castration. In the latter part of that 
chapter I argued that rehabilitation and incapacitation may both be justified by appealing to the benefits 
to society. 
 In the fourth chapter, I showed why restorative justice is too limited to deal with many cases, let 
alone replace punishment altogether. It should be regarded as a valuable but restricted alternative. 
Given public opinion surveys, we can surmise the intentions of average conference participants to 
determine whether a conference will result with a punitive sentence. RJ conferences that result in 
prison sentences are most likely punitive, but ones that do not result in prison are much more likely to 
be non-punitive. But, since most conferences are for non-serious offenders and hence do not result in 
prison, they should still be regarded as an alternative to punishment. I also argued that like restorative 











5.2:	  The	  Case	  Against	  A	  Purely	  Non-­‐Punitive	  Regime	  
 Together, these conclusions can be brought together to make larger claims about crime 
response. We cannot have a post-arrest regime that relies solely on pure restitution, nor one that relies 
solely on rehabilitation, nor one that relies solely on incapacitation, nor one that relies solely on 
restorative justice and other rituals. A mix of all of these, without any recourse to punishment, will not 
suffice either. The candidates that do the heavy lifting for replacing punishment, that is to say, the ones 
that come closest to being viable pure alternatives, are mandatory restitution, mandatory rehabilitation, 
and incapacitation. But it turns out that mandatory restitution and mandatory rehabilitation cannot 
function as purely non-punitive, because the state will require punitive bite in order to enforce their 
mandates. And incapacitation is only justified for dangerous or incorrigible offenders. If there is no 
viable candidate to replace punishment, then there seems to be no way to have a purely non-punitive 
regime.  
 Perhaps a mix of all of these alternatives would somehow suffice to get by without punitive 
interventions. For this to be the case, there would need to be some reason to think that the shortcomings 
of mandatory restitution and mandatory rehabilitation can be overcome by the addition of one or more 
of the alternatives. But the practical problem that leads to punitive recourse is this: how may a state 
enforce its mandates to comply with restitution or rehabilitation orders when it deals with stubborn and 
recalcitrant offenders? If one of the alternatives offers a solution to this problem, then it is possible that 
a mix of alternatives could yield a non-punitive regime. But no alternative can provide a solution, 
leaving us to conclude that a non-punitive regime is out of reach.  
 Of all the candidates, only incapacitation seems like a viable contender to fill the role of dealing 
with offenders who refuse participation in restitution or rehabilitation. An advocate of this theory 
would claim that if an offender refuses to participate, then the state may deem him dangerous enough to 
keep away from society, at least until he comes around to cooperating. But this is an indefensible 











Take a case of simple assault, say during a drunken bar fight. If one of the brawlers refused to 
participate in any restitution or rehabilitation (perhaps paying for broken bones or property, going to 
anger management classes or alcohol treatment), would the state be justified in locking him away as a 
preventative measure? The question of who is dangerous enough to merit preventatively detaining is 
surely a difficult one, but one need not be an expert to know that the offender's behavior that night at 
the bar certainly does not pose a great enough risk to merit his preventative detention.  
 One reply to this response is to claim that I have picked an example of a case that does not merit 
an enforceable mandate in the first place. If the offender is not enough of a danger to society to 
preventatively detain, then perhaps his actions do not merit the state's coercing him with interventions. 
There certainly are cases when offenses are unserious enough that the state should refrain from 
coercive action. However, there are a great many cases of offenses that are serious enough to require 
certain actions from the offender to make amends, but not so serious to merit preventative detention. If 
the offender is unwilling to meet the state's requirements, then the state needs to be able to enforce 
these requirements. This is because nobody would see them as actual requirements if people were free 
to ignore them. The bar fight is an example of this kind of case because it resulted in serious harm that 
demands amends from the assailant. The state is justified in coercing these actions, but if he is 
unwilling to follow the state's mandate, then the state needs to have a way to enforce the mandate, or 
else nobody would have reason to believe that the mandates are indeed required. 
 
5.3:	  The	  Case	  for	  a	  Minimally	  Punitive	  Regime	  
 Given the uncertainty over the moral status of punishment, we should only punish as much as 
we can be confident of justifying. The urgent need to justify our practice, which I described in the first 
chapter, forces us to err on the safe side of justification. To give a brief reminder of how pressing this 











example the numerous institutional and procedural safeguards that states take in order to justify 
practices such as eminent domain. Citizens may sue to keep their property, and courts then must rule on 
whether the state's justifications for seizing the land are adequate. An example of the extremely 
painstaking and careful deliberation that may undergird a contentious eminent domain decision is the 
US Supreme Court case Kelo v. City of New London.367 Eminent domain is just one of many actions the 
state takes that harms its citizens. Taxation is another example, and the heated debates it inspires in 
legislatures throughout the world attests to the seriousness with which people treat its harms. For all the 
disputes these actions inspire, they have a crucial advantage over punishment when it comes to 
justification. Their primary intention is to benefit society, so their merit can be debated in terms of cost 
and benefit. The harms are explicitly regarded as lamentable outcomes that should be minimized as 
much as possible given the agreed course of action to benefit society. Punishment not only inflicts 
harm as serious (and usually much more serious) as these other state actions, but the nature of inflicting 
intended harm exacerbates the problem of justifying it. I can think of no other state action that 
undertakes to harm citizens with the intended outcome of precisely the harm itself. As Gross puts it 
succinctly, “[c]riminal punishment is by far the worst thing that the law allows.”368  
 In addition to this, as I hope I’ve shown, there is no clear consensus on whether the institution 
of punishment can be justified. As Tunick puts it, “legal punishment is essentially contested.”369 As I 
pointed out in the first chapter, even doyens of this corner of philosophy whose work has heretofore 
assumed that punishment can be justified, have recently admitted that the search for a justification has 
been unsuccessful and may be futile.370 Examples abound of other practices throughout history in 
which a practice that involved intentionally harming other people once had wide respectability, then 
were contested, then were abolished or minimized as much as possible. Punishment seems like a prime 
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candidate for such a practice, and it seems clear that we should move with haste to be on the safe side 
of justification, and history. An objection could make the claim that we do not have an obligation to 
minimize punishment until we know for certain that there is no way to justify punishment in toto. But 
this claim is indefensible because although we may never achieve such certainty, we need not achieve 
it to know that we should minimize punishment as soon as possible. Given the enormous scale of 
suffering involved, we should act with parsimony pending further justification. Imagine if the world's 
governments held out from officially abolishing slavery for another two to three decades in order to be 
more certain that it is morally wrong. Those additional millions of hours of human suffering would 
have been the result of moral reluctance to act quickly in order to be 'safe rather than sorry.' Because it 
is at least possible that most punishment is unjustified, it seems unconscionable to take the same foot-
dragging approach to minimizing punishment. While unlike slavery, we can be sure that at least some 
punishment can be justified, but punishment resembles slavery in inflicting suffering on millions of 
people. And like slavery was once contested, the practice of punishment is also contested.  
 We should therefore punish as little as we need (which is as much as we could confidently 
justify) until we have relative consensus that a different level of punishment can be justified. This is the 
concept of parsimony. Von Hirsch even admits that if the requirements of a criminal justice system 
“can be performed without having to resort to the coercive and unpleasant features of punishment” then 
the institution of punishment “would lose its raison d’etre.”371 How can we be confident of the level of 
punishment that we may justify out of necessity? The only method is to build a thorough understanding 
of the non-punitive practices that a post-arrest regime may rely on to fulfill the requirements of a 
criminal justice system, and to clarify when the use of these alternatives is justified, and when 
punishment will be required in their stead. This dissertation is an attempt to head down this road. To 
remind the reader, three of the basic requirements any criminal justice system must fulfill are to 
maintain safety, communicate condemnation of offenses, and redress harm to victims. In this section I 
                                                











argue that a minimally punitive regime that relies on the alternatives I have explored in previous 
chapters can fulfill these requirements.  
 To help demonstrate this, I will imagine how two different offenders might travel through a 
minimally punitive regime. Of course, this is a speculative enterprise, but I hope that I can at least 
demonstrate the following: first that such a regime would result in serious changes in practices in order 
to minimize suffering, and secondly that the differences are not too big to merit panic over deterrence. 
After this brief speculation, I will address deterrence in a separate discussion. 
 First, let’s take a low level offender, Mike, who is convicted of a nuisance crime that I will 
label ‘drunken and disorderly conduct,’ as well as vandalism and destruction of property. The police 
found Mike in a stupor and looking for his keys on the ground, but only in the circles illuminated by 
the streetlights. He had been cutting off the heads of parking meters and broke a shop window. In a 
sentencing hearing, the judge learned that Mike has recurrent alcohol problems. The Judge ordered 
Mike to get an assessment by an addiction treatment practitioner, and in the meantime to also work 30 
hours for the city’s ‘Blight Reclamation Street Team,’ boarding up broken windows and cleaning 
streets. He also is told that he has the option to write an apology to be published in a local weekly 
paper. He has the option of including his name in the piece, as is regulated by a piece of legislation 
guiding public displays of apology. The sentencing order cites a law that restricts the hours of 
community service that can be given for certain offenses, and directs the service to be related to the 
community that was victimized as much as possible. The judge gives Mike one month to meet with the 
practitioner and begin the first five hours of the service. If he does not meet these requirements, he will 
be immediately put in the county jail for five days. The county jail is a medium security facility made 
specifically to hold offenders with short sentences. It is clean and safe. Mike meets his requirements, 
returns to the judge, and the judge orders him to attend ten meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous on the 
recommendation of the practitioner. There is no penalty for not attending, and the city gives him 











if he completes all ten sessions.  
 Now let’s consider a terrible offender, Zeb, who is convicted of raping and murdering his 
neighbor. Zeb was held in custody before and during his trial. The judge publishes a formal 
condemnation in the paper, and before the trial the victim’s family was compensated by the state’s 
violent crime victim fund, with access to counselors, school loan forgiveness, paid leave and a direct 
deposit of money. The sentencing guidelines order a risk assessment, which deems Zeb dangerous 
enough to incapacitate for two years before another assessment is completed. He is sentenced to 
complete an intensive regimen of rehabilitation while detained. The incapacitation is very secure (i.e. 
escape-proof), but inside it is also clean, safe and comfortable. If he gets far enough behind on his 
commitments to the treatment requirements, he is punished by being put into isolation for twelve hours 
per day for a week. After his first two years, he is given different, more lenient requirements for 
rehabilitation, and is allowed to begin working 30 hours a week for the incapacitation center’s kitchen. 
He has access to conjugal visits, and education. After 12 years in the incapacitation center, he begins a 
transition to the community, living in a half way house where he has to check in each evening at 6pm. 
Certain restrictions on his behavior mean that he can be punished for short period of times in the jail. 
Eventually he makes the full transition back to the community. 
 While this is a small, speculative exercise, I intended to suggest that a minimally punitive 
regime could deal with all levels of offenders and situations without any problem meeting the 
requirements of a criminal justice system. Of course, how such a regime would actually function is 
beyond the scope of this essay, and I do not presume that the above recommendations would be 
appropriate—surely experts in criminology and treatment would guide how such a regime would 
function. But by condemning the crimes, redressing harm to the victims, and keeping the community 
safe, both the minimally punitive sentences I described indicate that it is at least possible that a larger 
system could also meet these requirements. We have no reason to resist moving in this direction 











 But critics will doubtless say that there is reason to resist this change. The biggest worry that 
most critics would have is whether such a regime would adequately deter crime. But as the research on 
deterrence shows, there is no good reason to believe that additional severity sentences results in any 
additional general deterrence.372 Tonry writes that “the clear weight of the evidence for more than 
thirty years is that harsh punishments, compared with lesser punishments, have few if any deterrent 
effects.”373 Indeed, analysts have noted that harsh sentencing policies are frequently adopted because 
they serve politicians as a way to communicate to the public that “something is being done—rather 
than because policy makers believe they will have any effects on crime.”374 And public officials would 
have no reason to believe that making sentences harsher adds general deterrence, because studies have 
repeatedly shown that legislating harsher sentencing policies, even when they are publicized, have no 
impact “on short or long-term crime rates.”375 Of course, in the complete absence of a criminal justice 
system, crime rates soar, as historical evidence of police strikes indicate.376 But what a critic would 
need to show is evidence for why minimizing punishment, while maintaining the structures of police 
and courts, would result in any crime increase. There is good reason to think that money saved by 
minimizing punishment could go to hiring extra police, and that this would have an overall increase in 
the level of general deterrence. 
 Additionally, what we know about deterrence indicates that specific deterrence works better 
than general deterrence. Specific deterrence occurs when an offender knows that if he does a particular 
action, he will most likely be punished for it. This is the kind of deterrence that is achieved at drug 
courts, with impressive success.377 David Kennedy even demonstrates that this kind of deterrence can 
be achieved by police before an arrest: it turns out that the best way to clear away an illegal drug 
market is to gather all the evidence needed to convict each of the key sellers, then bring them into a 
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room with their parents and other family, show them the evidence, and tell them that if they are seen 
selling once more then they will be immediately arrested and tried, and to tell all the other sellers that 
the neighborhood is now off limits for selling. As if by magic, the street corner is cleared of drug 
dealing.378 Mark Kleiman has written a thorough, impressively researched book detailing specific 
policy proposals that decrease crime called When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and 
Less Punishment. Unsurprisingly, many of his suggestions focus on creating a system that relies on 
specific deterrence. As he writes, “uncertainty, delay, and inaccurate perception all limit the 
effectiveness of deterrent threats,” and therefore policy makers should increase ways of making 
outcomes more certain in the minds of offenders.379 A minimally punitive regime could take advantage 
of the effectiveness of specific deterrence, and abandon the ineffective, harsh sentencing policies 
aimed at general deterrence. With all of this evidence that deterrence would not be a problem for a 
minimally punitive regime, the onus is on the critic to show otherwise. 
 The final objection is that a minimally punitive regime would look so similar to a punitive one 
that the transition would effectively be in name only. Especially after reading my argument that 
practices such as coerced rehabilitation and preventative detention are non-punitive, one might wonder 
if the shift in emphasis to avoiding intended harms would result in negligible differences in practical 
outcomes. If the state is still coercing offenders to join rehabilitation programs that are segregated from 
the rest of the population, or incapacitating offenders deemed too dangerous to remain in society by 
imprisoning them, then one may wonder whether the resultant regime would look very different from 
current punitive models. If not, then this exercise in shifting emphasis would be a load of hot air 
without practical payout sufficient to justify its implementation. However, there is very good reason to 
believe that the opposite is true: that the difference would be so stark that the main practical 
impediment would be convincing the public to endorse such drastic changes.  
                                                
378 Kennedy, 2010. 











 Here is short list of current practices that would likely be eliminated as a result of this switch: 
the death penalty, life sentences, felony disenfranchisement, solitary confinement, restriction from 
labor, mandatory restitution or fines imposed on indigents, imprisonment for drug possession, 
mandatory minimum sentences and three-strikes laws. Inn addition, the use of home detention curfew 
would significantly rise,380  and there would be far-reaching changes to prison conditions that would 
align with the recommendations made in Lippke’s (2007) Rethinking Imprisonment. Tonry details 
particular policy steps to take in order to do less harm, which, along with radically decreasing the use 
of prison and abolishing punitive laws such as mandatory minimums, he also proposes the “creation of 
emergency mechanisms for shortening sentences of many currently imprisoned offenders; and 
reconstitution of permanent institutions to oversee release of offenders whose continued confinement 
serves no valid public purpose.”381  
 Portugal and Norway provide glimpses of this minimally punitive future. In the nomenclature 
currently used by the drug policy writers, Portugal has 'de-criminalized' all drugs. It has not legalized 
them, but simply stopped punishing people for possessing them.  
That doesn't mean drugs are legal in Portugal. When caught, people are summoned 
before an administrative body called the Commission for the Dissuasion of Drug 
Addiction. Each panel consists of three members—usually a lawyer or a judge, a doctor, 
and a psychologist or a social worker. The commissioners have three options: 
recommend treatment, levy a small fine, or do nothing. In most respects, the law seems 
to have worked: serious drug use is down significantly, particularly among young 
people.382 
 
Portugal still punishes drug dealers, but it has begun treating drug possession laws as simply one 
component of a public health crisis intervention. It even provides clean drug paraphernalia to drug 
addicts in an effort to cut down on disease.   
 Norway, famously, has perhaps the least punitive penal system in the world. The Scandinavian 
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penal systems are generally regarded as anomalously liberal,383 and among them Norway stands out. Its 
most publicized differences from other, more punitive regimes are its open prisons and its short prison 
sentence lengths. Bastoy prison is on an island four kilometers from the mainland. Prisoners live in 
plushly furnished cottages and work outdoors, unsupervised, during the day. There is almost no guard 
presence on the island, and prisoners are mostly free to do as they please, even go swimming, despite 
the fact that the mainland is close enough to swim to. There are no fences. The prison is only open to 
serious offenders who have shown a maturity and willingness to change in other, higher security 
prisons. A chainsaw murderer was even allowed to work in the forest with a chainsaw. Bastoy is one of 
Norway's 'open prisons' and news stories covering it from flabbergasted US or British media with a 
tone of bewildered outrage are prevalent. Another oddity of Norway's system to outsiders is its 
maximum prison sentence of 21 years. Anders Breivek, who killed 69 people in 2011, is the focus of 
considerable attention, and his case has highlighted Norway's maximum sentence. After 21 years, if the 
authorities deem that Breivek is still a danger to society, it may extend the term again. Thus it is likely 
that if Breivek continues his hateful and far-right militant speech and thinking, he will stay in jail for 
the duration of his life. Still, the sentence also allows him to possibly be paroled after 10 years. The 
difference between this sentence and sentences he would receive elsewhere highlights how stark the  
contrast would be between punitive regimes, and minimally punitive regimes. It is undoubtable that if 
he were convicted in one of the 29 states in the USA where the death penalty is legal, he would be put 
to death. Norway has arguably made most of the transition to becoming minimally punitive. The fact 
that it achieved this transition is further reason to think that it is possible. Notably, it has a remarkably 
low rate of crime and recidivism. While the average recidivism rate of Norwegian prisoners is around 
20% (between one half and one third of what the rate seen in countries like the US and UK), the rate of 
recidivism from prisoners leaving Bastoy is a remarkable 16%.384 
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 It may be the case that the rest of the world never catches up to Scandinavian implementation of 
criminal justice, but we can at least hope to head that way. In order to turn that direction, theorists 
should be leading, and there has been too little done to scrutinize alternatives to punishment. This 
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